Legal agreements are grounded in the construction of intellectual property regulations as enlightened safeguards against the primitive savagery of indigenous conceptualizations of property – international legal frameworks are an ethically bankrupt starting point for change.
Rahmatian ’10 -- Professor of Commercial Law at the University of Glasgow (Andreas Rahmatian, 6-23-2010, "Neo-Colonial Aspects of Global Intellectual Property Protection," The Journal of World Intellectual Property, Vol. 12, No. 1, pp. 40-74, 2010, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1629228, accessed 8-27-2021) //nikki --bracketed for ableist language
The problems that the establishment of an international legal framework for world trade could pose for developing countries had been noticed right from the beginning. In 1964, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) was founded because it was felt by developing countries that the pattern of world trade disproportionately favoured the industrialised nations (Blakeney, 1996, p. 26; Zamora, 1995, pp. 512, 518). In the course of the negotiations leading to the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organisation (WTO Agreement), a convergence in the positions of the industrialised and the developing countries has repeatedly been attempted, with some success (Blakeney, 1996, p. 6). When the Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) ended with the Final Act on the results of the Uruguay Round and the Agreement establishing the WTO in Marrakesh on April 15, 1995, the creation of the WTO as a specialised agency of the UN realised the hope (reaching back to the time of the creation of the UN itself) of an international organisation with responsibility for world trade (Blakeney, 1996, pp. 29, 36; Zamora, 1995, pp. 503, 506; Jackson, 1998, pp. 24-9); thus in theory, the promotion of world trade should benefit each Member, developed or developing alike. The preamble to the WTO Agreement states expressly in the second paragraph that especially the least developed countries should be secured “a share in the growth of international trade commensurate with the needs of their economic development”. This overriding principle also applies to TRIPs (Appendix 1C to the WTO Agreement), and the preamble to TRIPs expressly recognises (in paragraph 6) the special needs of the least-developed countries as far as the required domestic implementation of laws and regulations is concerned, “in order to enable them to create a sound and viable technological base ...”. These aims indicate the intention to create the implementation of a benign system of universal common standards of intellectual property rights for the mutual benefit of all nations. However, it is well known that originally the principal objective of what was to become TRIPs was actually the fight against piracy of Western intellectual property rights in developing countries. In the 1970s, the realisation of the adverse effect which the increase of sales of counterfeited trade-marked goods had on trade income prompted industrialised countries to reach an “Agreement on Measures to Discourage the Importation of Counterfeit Goods”, whereby the United States took the lead.8 It was also the United States which pushed for a recognition of legislative measures for the protection of intellectual property rights as to be considered within the jurisdiction of GATT, and not of WIPO only, as developing countries, especially Brazil and India, had argued (Blakeney, 1996, pp. 2-3; Zamora, 1995, p. 529). This was the starting point for the present situation of TRIPs being within the WTO framework (Drahos with Braithwaite, 2002, p. 109).9 The “anti-counterfeit” origin of TRIPs does not appear in its final preamble (Blakeney, 1996, p. 9), but the preamble makes clear that the objective of TRIPs is “the provision of effective and appropriate means for the enforcement of trade-related intellectual property rights, taking into account differences in national legal systems”, which obviously encompasses measures against counterfeited goods. Thus TRIPs grew out of the endeavours by the Western industrialised world to safeguard and enforce their own Western intellectual property rights, based on Western concepts, in the non-Western, and typically developing, countries.10 Theoretically, this could have been achieved without any reciprocity, because what really matters to Western interests is that Western rights are respected in a nonWestern context and culture, especially by way of an effective combat against piracy. Thus bilateral agreements could have been reached ensuring that, say, a US patent will be duly protected and enforced in developing country X, without the requirement that a patent granted in X will be enforced in the US, or indeed, without X even being required to maintain a national patent law which could enable X to grant patents itself; hence there would be no (theoretically) enforceable right in a country outside X. Such a measure would be openly colonial in its approach, but politically unsustainable in the late twentieth century or today, because the developing countries have achieved sufficient political counterbalance against Western interests during the period of decolonialisation that allows them to counteract such strategies at a large scale.11 TRIPs wishes to represent a compromise, which may have been honestly conceived as such in that it leaves some flexibility for developing countries (Correa, 2002, p. 52), but, as it is modelled on Western intellectual property legislation, it is nevertheless in effect slanted in favour of Western interests (Drahos with Braithwaite, 2002, pp. 11-6, 143-6; Correa, 2000, p. 3; Robbani, 2005, pp. 565, 571). The “provision of effective and appropriate means for the enforcement of trade-related intellectual property rights” (preamble, pt. c) is obtained through an introduction of minimum standards of intellectual property protection (Article 1 (1) TRIPs). These minimum standards are determined by TRIPs itself, which is remarkably detailed for an international instrument in respect of the substantive law of the respective intellectual property rights,12 and by broad reference to the central international intellectual property conventions, especially the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property 1883 (Paris Convention) and the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works 1886 (Berne Convention).13 The principle of minimum standards as a basis of mutual recognition and protection of intellectual property rights is reinforced by the national treatment rule (Article 3) which echoes the existing intellectual property conventions in this respect.14 As a result, non-Western countries are required to introduce comprehensively the Western regime of intellectual property rights, irrespective of whether this regime is necessarily compatible with, and useful to, their own cultures and economies,15 otherwise they would not be able to conform to the protection obligation of Western intellectual property rights in their own territory. Non-Western countries are also expected to undergo an industrialisation process according to the model of Western industrialised nations to create a context in which Western intellectual property rights would then become meaningful (Ngenda, 2005; Gana, 1996, p. 738). In return for the protection of their own rights, Western countries could generously agree to recognise Westerntype intellectual property rights originating from developing countries, because these rights were unlikely to arise often and would not pose a real competitive threat.16 This is a good example of the liberal ideal of two equal contracting parties that [ignores] the real imbalance created by political and economic realities. It could also be seen as a modern version of constructed savagery of the non-developed world which will be overcome by the gift of intellectual property rights from the developed and civilised nations.17 How Western in nature TRIPs effectively is, can be shown by the fact that Western national legal systems have had to adapt little to TRIPs,18 while, for example, Latin American and Carribean states had to make significant changes in their intellectual property laws to implement the minimum standards (Correa, 2000, pp. 101, 111).19 More recently, TRIPs also serves as a bottom line for further extension of IP protection which the developed world continues to push for in bilateral “TRIPsPlus” agreements with countries of the developing world (Drahos, 2001, p. 805). Such “friendly nudges” towards adaptation of international standards are obviously not a development of the postcolonial era. The national treatment provision of the Paris Convention in Article 2 intended to compel Paris Union members to provide mutually adequate industrial property laws. It contributed to Switzerland’s decision to introduce a patent law (which it did not have when it joined the Paris Union) in order to be able to give effect to this obligation towards nationals of the Paris Union (Oddi, 1987, p. 869). The Netherlands also enacted patent laws which it had abolished some time before (Bender, 2000, p. 54; Drahos with Braithwaite, 2002, p. 36). The Paris Convention, and later the Berne Convention, had the then industrialised Western countries of the 1880s as relevant potential members to the Paris/Berne Union in mind; the non-Western world (where it did not have the status of a colony anyway and was therefore part of the Paris/Berne Union, see Drahos, 2002a, pp. 766-7; Drahos with Braithwaite, 2002, p. 75) was not perceived as a significant candidate for such conventions, and conflicts with indigenous cultures as a result of this transplantation of rights were then unlikely to be noticed as a potential problem. Sensitivity in relation to one-sided technology transfer and possible lack of economic equality was also less developed in the nineteenth century, despite an otherwise generally far greater tendency to arrogant nationalism among the European nations. An example is the awkward British standard gauge of railways of 561 /2 inches (1,435 mm) that can be found in much of Continental Europe (which adopted the metric system far earlier) because George Stevenson’s first locomotives delivered from England were produced with this gauge. The legal protection of such technological innovations usually follows suit and that may help explaining why it was possible at all to agree on a modest legal standardisation through the Paris and Berne Conventions in the much more belligerent atmosphere of the nineteenth century.