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Yes Revisionism---1AR

Putin’s propaganda is grounded in revisionist tendencies, revising the past.

Mendel, 22 (Iuliia Mendel journalist, ex-press-secretary to the President of Ukraine, and communication consultant, 2-20-22, Putin – the Crude Revisionist who Ignores Lessons of History," KyivPost, /alundy)

Vladimir Putin wants not only to seize new territories, but to own history. History often falls victim to autocracies and dictatorships. Reshaped historical narratives become compelling explanations of all-powerful leaders and serve their propaganda as one of the instruments to preserve and increase their political weight.

No wonder that Russian President Vladimir Putin comes up with absurdly manipulated historical facts to push his geopolitical policies. But it is more than just lies or manipulation. It is a well-grounded philosophy that not only revises the past, but also becomes his instrument to reshape the present.

Isn’t that what Putin does when he plays the “independent republics” card, with which the post-Soviet space that emerged 30 years ago is generously dotted by his bloody will: South Ossetia in Georgia, Moscow-created Luhansk and Donetsk people’s republics in Ukraine and the breakaway Transnistria republic in Moldova – God knows how many more such black holes the Kremlin leadership can create with the help of mercenaries and propaganda.

Putin is offended by the collapse of the Soviet Union. His love for that bygone era is actively cultivated in Russia even 30 years after its implosion. Putin manipulates the notion of democracy by comparing artificially created pseudo-states with the real ones that constituted the USSR. He may indeed not see the difference between Ukraine, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Georgia and the conjured formations of LPR, DPR, South Ossetia, Abkhazia, or Transnistria. In this way, Putin suspends the understanding of freedom as a hostage to his biggest political intrigue – the confrontation between the West and Russia.

According to this primitive formula, if the U.S. once divided the USSR into some 15 republics, why can’t Russia today break those republics into smaller ones?

Having amassed nearly 200,000 troops with weapons and military equipment around Ukraine’s southeastern borders, Putin refuses to directly talk with the political leadership in Kyiv. Literally, he ignores any attempt at dialogue and sends messages through European interlocutors. This seems to be his response to the Ukrainian leadership’s unwillingness to negotiate with the Russian installed puppets whose Moscow-armed formations have been fighting in Ukraine’s two easternmost regions of Luhansk and Donets for nearly eight years.

The parallels are blustering, but quite possible for a man offended by the historical collapse of the state he seems to consider his homeland, the USSR, and who is already personally expressing doubts about Ukraine’s sovereignty. “I am convinced that Ukraine’s true sovereignty is possible precisely in partnership with Russia,” Putin wrote in a diatribe in July 2021.

Putin acts as if he really sees no difference between the sovereign state of Ukraine and the quasi-republics that are under his own military control. It is as if the Russian leader is trying to teach the world a lesson by creating imitations and empty simulacra on copies of real historical facts.

Putin’s version of history distorts understandable values to help manage his own country. If you don’t know how to create, then ”protect” and take away. Russia’s hybrid or covert invasions of Ukraine’s Crimean Peninsula and Georgia’s Abkhazia, and Moldova’s Transnistria province under the guise of “protection” was done against phantom enemies he conjured.

Isn’t this what happened to the Soviet Union? While the West was recovering from World War II, building democracy and competitive market economies, the USSR was building tanks to defend itself and intimidating its own people with U.S. aggression. A Ukrainian diplomat who survived Stalin’s death as a child recounted how his entire family stayed awake, gazing up into the night sky. “We waited that every second we could see American missiles that were going to destroy us,” he recalled vividly for the rest of his life.

The Soviet Union, in fact, was built on falsehoods, lies, and unrealistic, artificial ideals. Putin is deliberately repeating this failed scheme and therefore risks his empire falling just as loudly.

Russia is revisionist --- it is transparent in its intentions to regain power and overthrow the international hierarchy

Pisciotta, 20 (Barbara Pisciotta, 8-9-2019, Associate professor Roma Tre University, Russian revisionism in the Putin era: an overview of post-communist military interventions in Georgia, Ukraine, and Syria, /alundy)

On the assumptions that changing the status quo is the basic aim of a revisionist strategy (Buzan, 2008) and that acceptance of the risks involved in the use of force is a key factor in distinguishing the different forms of revisionism (Schweller, 2015), this study puts forward a new typology of revisionism. The six types identified are based on three dimensions: the means employed (peaceful/violent), the nature of the objectives (territory/norms/power), and the level of action (regional/global). The introduction of a new typology of revisionism can also stimulate further research on the possible change of goals, means, and level of action of the potential claims of the revisionist powers that have economic and military capabilities to act both regionally and globally to change the status quo (see the case of Russia, China and, according to some scholars, the United States). Further research insights can be derived from the application of normative revisionism to the various empirical cases (see the Arab countries and the developing). Our empirical analysis, in particular, confirms the importance of the level of action as a new element with respect to previous typologies and makes it possible not only to demonstrate the central part played by the military option in Russian strategy inside and outside the post-Soviet space but also and above all to confirm the escalation of the revisionist objectives pursued both at the regional level with the interventions in Georgia and Ukraine, and at the global level with the intervention in Syria. The respectively nationalist (Georgia and Ukraine) and radical (Syria) nature of the interventions emerges in relation both to the means and the level of action of these interventions, and to the objectives. In Georgia and Ukraine, Russia obtained the control and/or annexation of territories like South Ossetia, Abkhazia, and Crimea, strengthened its position with respect to neighbouring countries, and impeded the expansion of NATO and the EU. In Syria it obtained control of the port of Tartus, ended the American monopoly in the war on terrorism by asserting itself as a strong party to the peace negotiations, challenged American interests in the Middle East by strengthening the Assad regime, and clearly manifested its determination to halt the decline that set in after 1989. The dual nature of Russia’s objectives – both territorial (annexation and/or control over certain areas) and political (improvement of power and prestige at the regional and global levels) – characterized the country’s revisionist strategy as a whole from August 2008 to March 2016, confirming the importance of the gradual increase in military expenditure and the reforms of the SAP in pursuit of the same. If the spectre of the ‘end of history’ that hovered over the ashes of communism was swept away by Putin at the end of the 1990s and the impact that his long period in power has had on domestic and regional balances is unquestionable, what is instead still in need of discussion is the effect that his plan of radical revisionism has had on the configuration of the international system as a 102 Barbara Pisciotta Published online by Cambridge University Press whole. As matters now stand, any talk of American decline at the military level is misleading and empirically incorrect. It is, however, necessary to take the readiness to use military force as our starting point if we are to understand the nature and the consequences of Russian revisionism at the global level. A power in a position of hegemony cannot in fact hesitate to use all of the diplomatic, economic, and military means at its disposal in order to preserve its status and prevent any destabilizing threats from calling it into question. The USA has made systematic use of force since 1989 to preserve its spheres of influence all over the world and eliminate threats (from figures like Milosevic, Saddam Hussein, and Qaddafi) to the stability of the liberal world order on which its indisputable supremacy rested. Where it intervened militarily, with or without a resolution of the UN Security Council, it told the rest of the world that it was the only actor authorized – or rather self-authorized – to intervene in defence, at least formally, of human rights at the expense of national sovereignty. Russia’s revisionism is the child of this strategy. In order to alter the status quo in its favour, Putin has operated on at both the regional and the global levels to oppose American expansion in the post-Soviet space and its version of humanitarian intervention all over the world, not hesitating to use force in order to challenge the United States openly and bend the international rules to Russia’s advantage. At the regional level, Georgia and Ukraine have been blocked. Their entry into the EU and NATO will not be possible without Russian consent or the risk of a frontal clash with Moscow. At the global level, the effects of Russia’s strategy will have to be assessed in the medium and long terms. Russia has now revealed its intentions and explicitly threatened the US monopoly in Syria both in words and in deeds. It is clearly not enough for Russia to alter the hierarchy of power. It wants to obtain acknowledgement of its prestige as a great power in both diplomatic and military terms. In other words, Russia wants to play a decision-making part once again in the management of world affairs. It also wants a less centralized system offering the opportunity to regain important margins of power.

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