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Turkey expanding digital authoritarianism into AI greenlights further human rights abuses and anti-democratic control

Fatma Timucin 21, “8-BIT IRON FIST: DIGITAL AUTHORITARIANISM IN COMPETITIVE AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES: THE CASES OF TURKEY AND HUNGARY”, 8 July 21, https://research.sabanciuniv.edu/id/eprint/42417/1/10337574.pdf//cpd

Unfortunately, in the last decade, Turkey has garnered international attention with its violation of free media. As stated in the literature (Yıldırım, Baruh, and Çarkoğlu 2020), her track record in media freedom has been far from perfect since the 1990s. Governments have displayed consistent patterns of restriction and punishment for opposition outlets as well as apparent favoritism towards pro-government ones. The remaining content opted for appealing to the relatively stable opposition voter base. The electoral success of Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi - AKP) back in 2002 failed to signal a deviation from this path in its early years. As 2021 marks their 19th consecutive year in government, we can observe a steady increase in media pressure over AKP’s time at the helm of parliament. The key argument of high political and societal polarization stands (Çarkoğlu, Baruh, and Yıldırım 2014). In addition, another process we must observe is the democratic backsliding Turkey has experienced over the last two decades (Yıldırım, Baruh, and Çarkoğlu 2020). Indubitably, consequences of the accelerating authoritarianism are evident, with Turkey now being dubbed as “the largest prison for journalists” (Eski 2019). Turkey, especially the “New Turkey” Erdoğan declared after the 2011 legislative election victory, paints an illustrative example of media violations. Admittedly, Turkey’s shortcomings in media freedom precede Erdoğan and his party. The media has, notoriously, stayed in line with a multitude of governments and changed its discourse in accordance. Sensitive topics relating to ethnic and religious minorities were unanimously avoided. 1980 coup provided a window of opportunity as the media expressed more diversity thanks to democratic transition (Bayram 2010). Similar to Latin America (Guerrero 2014), a wave of deregulation in the early 1990s resulted in further commercialization (Yıldırım, Baruh, and Çarkoğlu 2020) and led to “captured liberal” media. It is necessary to mention here that the literature on political communication refers to both direct (or classic) and indirect censorship (Shadmehr and Bernhardt 2015) over media in its “captured” aspect. Hence, with 22 the direct and indirect censorship media is now facing, Turkey’s media freedom has hit an unprecedented low. The following chapter aims to describe the process of the Turkish case of digital authoritarianism under AKP’s rule regarding tools and strategies mentioned in the previous section. Three strategies are essential: media ownership and leverage of government founded upon crony relationships, censorship and bans on alternative media, intimidation of its users by abuse of legislative framework, and lastly, employment of manipulation by trolls and bot accounts. 3.1 Media Ownership: Creating a Government-Friendly Media Landscape by Crony Capitalism As is the case with the general populist rhetoric, Erdoğan and AKP came to power as challengers to the existing regime and status quo. As a prominent party figure, Erdoğan has explicitly been vocal about his distaste in media since the beginning, for its being owned by the “elite” and maintaining the status quo. Another factor of utmost importance in shaping this attitude was Erdoğan’s experience in Refah Partisi (Welfare Party). Existing media outlets held Erdoğan and RP in a negative light. This was made evident with the four months imprisonment sentence Erdoğan received due to reciting a poem in 1997. Media coverage regarding the adjudication showed apparent enthusiasm about the unfolding of events, with the most memorable headline being “He will not be able to become even a headman” (Radikal 1998). This headline became a central piece of Erdoğan’s populist rhetoric in underlining “the people’s” triumph over the preceding regime in later years. In combination, the two motives mentioned above propelled AKP and Erdoğan to replace the media with a pro-government one. Control over traditional media has set the stage for AKP’s digital authoritarianism. As the media became tied to conglomerates owning several pro-AKP outlets, said outlets’ news sites became a projection of their traditional counterparts. In tandem with the increasing control, ‘professional’ digital media became dominantly in favor of the government. 23 Figure 3.1 Democracy Index Scores DemocracyIndexOverallScore Turkey’s descend into competitive authoritarianism came gradually. As Figure 11 shows, it is not unique in this aspect that each of the four countries mentioned throughout this thesis has experienced a slight but consistent decrease in their democracy scores over the last fourteen years. AKP’s media control was no different, a ‘patient struggle’ against the conventional media (Aladağ 2013). Between 2014 and 2018, the asymmetry in media ownership in pro-government and opposition was made official. This clear government bias was the consequence of a series of changes that took place since 2002. By buying outlets and shifting ownership to businessmen with close ties to the government, AKP has laid the ground for what came to be called havuz medyası by its opposition.

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