Global digital authoritarianism greenlights Chinese and Russian aggression- turns the aff
Justin Sherman 2021 “Digital Authoritarianism and Implications for US National Security.” The Cyber Defense Review, vol. 6, no. 1, 2021, pp. 107–18. JSTOR, https://www.jstor.org/stable/26994115. Accessed 24 Jun. 2022.//cpd
Private firms worldwide legally or illegally have long been selling dual-use digital technologies that can be used to monitor web traffic and to censor information. That there is a global market for digital surveillance tools is old news. Companies incorporated in democracies heavily export these dual-use technologies worldwide, including, in many documented cases, to despots.[12] Likewise, companies incorporated in autocracies sell dual-use technologies, including those that can be used for censorship and surveillance, to other authoritarian regimes.[13] Some studies suggest that democracies account for a far greater volume of surveillance technology exports, including to despots, despite attempts to restrict such exports.[14] The pursuit of digital authoritarianism to bolster state power magnifies incentives for some countries to acquire dual-use surveillance tools, and for others to encourage their spread. China’s state leadership, for instance, consistently has advocated a sovereign and controlled Internet governance model on the global stage, with practices like censorship and surveillance, as opposed to a global and open model supported by many liberal democracies.[15] In tandem with this global diplomatic messaging, the Chinese government has reportedly conducted trainings on new media or information management with representatives from dozens of countries, many on record as pursuing restrictive online practices.[16] This has coincided with countries targeted by the Belt and Road Initiative passing cybersecurity laws that sometimes mirror laws already enacted in China, such as Vietnam’s recent establishment of data localization requirements.[17] Causality remains unclear in this situation, and empirical questions remain to be answered about the underlying drivers of digital authoritarianism in different countries. Nonetheless, these patterns and events, coupled with exports of surveillance technologies from China, raise questions about Beijing’s intentions to spread digital authoritarianism globally, including through a greater focus on, and/or endorsement of, the sale of digital surveillance and control capabilities. This could amplify the aforementioned national security risks, should authoritarian countries acquire the tools and/or knowledge needed to bolster their power through digital surveillance. National security analysts have already flagged these potential risks across Africa. Many countries China has engaged with through its Belt and Road investments have acquired Chinese surveillance technology, potentially usable for oppressive purposes. For instance, Chinese company exports of surveillance technology to the Ethiopian government have occurred alongside Chinese government investments.[18] Given China’s history of spying on and suppressing political dissidents, this is hardly a benign fact, and Ethiopia is but one of several examples. Should China’s leadership be intent on spreading digital authoritarianism worldwide, to include diffusion of surveillance tools, this likely could include countries aligned with China’s national security and/or economic interests. Like China, Russia has long advocated for cyber sovereignty on the international stage,[19] with President Vladimir Putin repeatedly emphasizing the importance of information control within a country’s sovereign borders.[20] As noted above, Russian companies export surveillance and hacking technologies, especially to post-Soviet states.[21] Andrei Soldatov and Irina Borogan actually suggest that Russian surveillance technology exports to some of these countries are a better fit than Western-made surveillance applications, because Russian laws and procedures governing traffic interception are more compatible for these countries, and the technologies are tailored accordingly.[22] In either case, these surveillance technology exports need further study, and they clearly serve as tools of political influence in Russia’s near-abroad. As with China, the extent of the Russian government’s direct involvement in and support of such exports needs further study, because the Kremlin’s direct hand in these exports, while visible, is hardly transparent. The desire to spread digital authoritarianism may well incentivize the Kremlin to better spread its surveillance technologies, or to at least look the other way when they occur, and thereby consolidate power in the hands of Russian-aligned countries at the expense of US government interests. This also could threaten vulnerable democracies worldwide, and facilitate the so-called fracturing of the global Internet, as countries build out technical and legal regimes that filter the global and open Internet touching and running through their borders.[23] Again, the threat here is not only from governments in China and Russia. Companies incorporated in democracies also sell a high volume of dual-use surveillance technologies to despots, and this is something we are better able to monitor and correct. It is also important to reemphasize the existing incentives for countries to encourage or allow the spread of these capabilities to other countries (including the technologies and how to optimize them). But growing desires to spread digital authoritarianism globally not only undermine human rights and developing democracies; this also exposes US national security to increased risk.