The plan institutionalizes and exports the DoD’s AI bureaucracy internationally – preventing direct feedback loops and effective operationalization of AI for mission-critical requirements
Marc Losito & Anderson 21, John Anderson, Marc Losito is a first-year Master of Public Policy candidate at Duke University and an active-duty U.S. Army Warrant Officer, focusing on the intersection of technology and national security policy. Marc holds a degree from Norwich University and has served in the military and Special Operations Forces for 20 years specializing in counterterrorism, irregular warfare, and intelligence operations. John Anderson is a U.S. Army Reserve military officer focused on applying AI and machine learning to mission critical problems. He has served in the U.S. Army for nearly 20 years and previously worked in the financial industry as a senior research analyst at a value-oriented hedge fund and a mid-sized private equity firm. He holds degrees from the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill and Columbia Business School. 5-10-2021, "The Department of Defense’s Looming AI Winter," War on the Rocks, https://warontherocks.com/2021/05/the-department-of-defenses-looming-ai-winter/, nihara
The Four Horsemen of the Department of Defense’s Looming AI Winter
The four horsemen of the forthcoming AI apocalypse, so to speak, are this time around human problems without technological scapegoats. They are a lack of AI expertise, too much AI bureaucracy, the challenge of democratizing AI to the user level, and an old-fashioned approach to AI integration.
Domain Expertise: The Education Challenge
To become an AI force, the Department of Defense should inculcate AI domain expertise at appropriate levels of leadership — with the warfighters who employ AI, not bureaucrats. Creating a curriculum for AI within enlisted and officer professional military education should be a priority. The curriculum should include a breakdown of the core components of an AI pipeline — data, computing, algorithm development, test/evaluation, and AI-enabled platforms.
Commanders and their staff should have AI Smartcards, a rubric for exercising domain expertise, at the ready. First introduced in February 2021, the smartcard is structured into six main categories corresponding to the core functionality comprising an AI system. The smartcard is a framework for curriculum, both readily adaptable for professional military education learning modules and unit-level adoption. Not simply a technical guide, the AI Smartcard also helps the unit to think through operationalizing AI and becoming “AI-ready.”
An indicator that the scales are being rebalanced will be warfighters peppering AI subject matter experts with questions that get to the heart of the smartcard — is real AI being delivered? When slick briefings full of drive-by tech-splanations of AI capability evolve into a user asking penetrating questions to get the heart of AI performance, then the expertise obstacle will have been overcome.
Bureaucracy: The Management Challenge
Bureaucracy can be a beautiful thing — structure, talent, mission, and resources coming together in a cohesive, logical manner to deliver mission-critical capabilities. With that said, Department of Defense bureaucracies have a way of calcifying around programs and people, not actual capabilities. The consequence of the AI bureaucracy — which consists of several one-off groups organized around the task of bringing AI to the department, but which are stovepiped away from the people they’re actually trying to buy AI for — is an unnecessary buffer between users and developers. This convoluted system confuses what should be a direct feedback loop to ensure that capabilities are acutely focused on mission-critical requirements.
The department should shrink centralized groups like the Joint AI Center and the Army Futures Command AI Task Force and instead send their authorities, decision-making power, and resources down to operational units. AI centers of excellence should be creating processes, policies, and resourcing to facilitate a constant feedback loop between user and developer, with no-one in between to garble the message. They should exist as idea-centric organizations at the service level that cut across the warfighting functions, providing the tools, lessons learned, resources, and expertise to help commanders to operationalize AI. The bureaucracy should connect intent, constraints and restraints, and resources — and then get out of the way.
The Department of Defense’s managing philosophy with respect to AI bureaucracy should mirror the computer programming concept called the “self-deleting executable.” It is a string of code designed to allow a program to delete itself. Instead of thinking in terms of hiring hundreds of pseudo-experts, think in terms of creating an organization and then setting an egg timer for it to expand and contract, responsive to a direct user-developer feedback loop. The AI bureaucracy only survives as a platform to connect users with development talent, contracting, and computing power. It should shrink, not expand, over time.