MDOs solve NATO Euro-Atlantic deterrence – BUT, organizational decentralization is key to efficacy
Lt. Gen. Andreas Marlow 21, German Army Lt. Col. Wilson C. Blythe Jr., U.S. Army, Lt. Gen. Andreas Marlow, German Army, is the commander of the NATO Rapid Deployment Headquarters, 1 German-Netherlands Corps. He has commanded at every level in the German Army. Marlow deployed as the Chief of Staff of the German contingent within NATO’s Kosovo Force mission, Deputy Chief of Staff-Operations Regional Command North International Security Assistance Force, and as the Chief of Staff Headquarters Resolute Support in Afghanistan. He is a graduate of the University of the Bundeswehr Hamburg, the German General Staff Officers Course, and the Command and Staff Course at the Canadian Forces College. Lt. Col. Wilson C. Blythe Jr., U.S. Army, is a strategist in the G-5 Plans of the 1 German-Netherlands Corps. He holds a bachelor’s degree in history from the University of Mississippi and a master’s degree in history from Eastern Michigan University. Blythe is a recipient of the Army Historical Foundation’s Distinguished Writing Award. His service includes deployments to Iraq and Afghanistan. 10-4-2021, "Multi-Domain Warfighting in NATO," https://www.armyupress.army.mil/journals/military-review/online-exclusive/2022-ole/blythe/, nihara, [brackets in original]
Since its formation in 1995 as a result of the merger of the Cold War-era 1 German Corps and 1 Dutch Corps, 1 German-Netherlands (GE/NL) Corps has repeatedly confirmed the commitment of its framework nations (Germany and Netherlands) to NATO, deploying to Afghanistan in 2003, 2009, and 2013. To continue this commitment, deter aggression, and defend the Euro-Atlantic area, 1 (GE/NL) Corps must demonstrate the ability to conduct large-scale combat operations as part of NATO against a peer enemy in an Article 5 scenario. The ability to conduct large-scale combat operations underpins the credibility of the Alliance’s deterrence and provides the basis for the defense of the Euro-Atlantic area in the event of conflict. This means that 1 (GE/NL) Corps must possess the ability to successfully perform the warfighting corps role, following its 2023 stand-by period as the NATO Response Force (NRF) Land Component Command (LCC).1
Execution of the warfighting corps role on the Euro-Atlantic multi-domain battlefields of today and tomorrow requires specific capabilities, in the required capacities, along with the expertise necessary to employ them in an Article 5 scenario against a peer enemy. As part of its transformation into a warfighting corps capable of multi-domain operations (MDO), 1 (GE/NL) Corps has conducted a campaign of learning consisting of academics, wargaming, and training and exercises. The results of this work are detailed below and specify the roles and responsibilities of a NATO warfighting corps within MDO, define the requirements and the structure for an MDO-capable warfighting corps, and describe the conduct of corps operations within the context of an Article 5 scenario.2
Organization
In contrast to stabilization operations in which the corps acted as a command-and-control node, for warfighting operations the corps functions not only as a headquarters but also as a formation that consists of its headquarters, combat and maneuver support forces, sustainment units, and other functional support units assigned to, attached to, or under the operational control of the corps.3 Also included are functional support capabilities operating in direct support of the corps or its subordinate divisions. Functional support units operating in the corps area of operations as general support, but not part of the corps, are normally not included in the corps formation.
When operating in the context of an Article 5 or warfighting operation, the corps is the highest tactical echelon. It is task organized for the operation, taking into account the operational and mission variables, and that task organization is dependent on the relative combat power of the enemy formations with which the corps will be engaged, the mission it receives, and the size of the area of operations in which it will operate. There are several proposed corps structures for the MDO battlefields of today and tomorrow. While there is much overlap to these proposals, the 1 (GE/NL) Corps structure was specifically developed to focus on the threats to the Euro-Atlantic area (see figure 1).4
Ideally, a NATO corps capable of conducting multi-domain operations within the Euro-Atlantic area includes the following:
2 to 5 divisions
1 x military intelligence brigade
1 x intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) battalion equipped with unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) and unattended ground sensors (UGS)
1 x electronic warfare battalion
1 x corps fires command
2 x long-range artillery brigades
1 x cyber company
1 x ISR/targeting battery equipped with UASs and UGSs
1 x aviation brigade
1 x armored reconnaissance and surveillance brigade
1 x information warfare battalion
1 x psyops company
1 x engineer brigade (including chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear [CBRN] capacity)
1 x air defence brigade
1 x signal brigade with a dedicated cyber defense organization
1 x rear area operations command
1 x sustainment brigade
1 x medical brigade
1 x military police brigade
1 x CBRN defense battalion
1 x civil affairs battalion with a political liaison team
1 x space battalion (includes high altitude companies for use as ISR or signal platforms)
Other forces may be assigned, attached, or provided operational control to give the corps additional capabilities) or additional capacity.5
[FIGURE 1 OMITTED]
Much of the structure above may sound familiar. However, based upon analysis conducted by 1 (GE/NL) Corps, this structure is better optimized to penetrate and dis-integrate the integrated air defense systems (IADS) and the integrated fires complex (IFC) that could challenge NATO forces in the Euro-Atlantic area. The presence of substantial long-range fires systems provides the corps with an organic capability to engage enemy fires systems and support assigned forces or other component commanders if conflict should occur. The corps’s capability to link a greater number of sensors than in the past, located throughout the depth of an expanded battlefield, to specific shooters enables it to converge capabilities in support of operational objectives and enhances the deterrent effect of Alliance ground forces.6
A key formation within the corps is the corps fires command, which integrates joint, interorganizational, and multinational targeting capabilities. The corps fires command plans, coordinates, and delivers joint all-domain fires to shape operations. The scale and scope of operations against a peer enemy generally necessitates multiple brigades of long-range rockets and missile systems. Two assigned field artillery brigades provide the corps with the means to defeat an enemy’s long-range and midrange fires and IADS to enable divisional tactical operations and freedom of maneuver for the Alliance joint force.7
Unlike a U.S. Army corps, a NATO corps does not fall under a standing theater army with organic capabilities or have subordinate divisions with a common and standardized divisional structure. Depending on the composition of the corps’s higher echelon and subordinate divisions and brigades, the corps may require additional capabilities or capacity. These capability gaps are most likely to be found in electronic warfare (EW), fires, ISR, and intelligence. During Article 5 operations, divisions will require additional assets to assist in converging effects from multiple domains. While the corps does not own space or special operations assets and its organic cyberspace capabilities are limited, it does possess the necessary tie-ins and expertise to integrate these domains into its operations. As the critical echelon in the execution of MDO, the corps will need the capacity to provide concurrent support to multiple divisions.8
Role of the Corps
1 (GE/NL) Corps is a multinational headquarters assigned to NATO. Therefore, NATO-compatible equipment (e.g., communication and information systems), and NATO processes and procedures (e.g., the operations planning process; data management platforms; and Allied Procedural Publication 28, Tactical Planning for Land Forces) will be used. It can translate operational inputs into tactical outputs. It synchronizes maneuver, fires, and effects with the requisite maneuver support and sustainment to shape the environment for subordinate forces to accomplish tactical missions and achieve operational and strategic objectives. This is accomplished through planning and mission orders to subordinate forces, making the best use of their capabilities and capacities while enforcing unity of command and achieving unity of effort.
To defeat the enemy, the corps executes five functions. It shapes the enemy forces in the corps deep area with available corps and joint capabilities;
maneuvers divisions and other combat formations to gain positions of advantage to close with and defeat enemy forces and compel their surrender or withdrawal, synchronizing the maneuver of divisions and, if necessary, brigades to reduce friction and coordinating the simultaneous maneuver of multiple formations in time and space;
initiates, executes, implements, ensures, and supports consolidation activities to set conditions for transition to a sustainable political end state;
sustains close, deep, and consolidation operations; and
generates combat power through RSOM&I and reconstitution.
The corps sets the conditions for subordinate divisions to focus on the close fight by integrating all elements of combat power in time and space to disrupt, interdict, and degrade the enemy while shaping the operating environment and enabling friendly forces to ensure freedom of action at the expense of its opponent. While the corps leverages Alliance joint capabilities to achieve effects in its area of operations, it is fundamentally a tactical and land-centric formation.9
In the conduct of its operations, it is essential that the corps sets an operational tempo that does not permit the enemy to recover and establishes an inexorable momentum using echeloned maneuver to ensure that once contact is gained, it is maintained. The corps feeds forces into the main battle area and controls the dispersion and mass of maneuver units. Divisions do the same at their level. The corps enables operational tempo at the division level by keeping enemy space, cyber, air defense, and long-range and midrange fires under constant pressure. This allows the divisions to finish decisively once they gain contact with the enemy. Momentum and tempo are vital and are metrics the corps commander uses to gauge success.10
Momentum and tempo are the threads that run through the corps’s operations and ensure that the enemy faces a continuous onslaught of simultaneous multi-echelon convergence. The importance of controlling the pace of operations challenges command and control because the corps must maintain forces not in contact to ensure fresh forces can reinforce success. The side that sets an overwhelming tempo will win. However, the speed component of tempo is not just speed of decision but also the cumulative speed of all our actions from planning and issuing orders to executing movements, fire missions, and transmitting decisions.11
Given the nature of the threats posed to the Euro-Atlantic area, an MDO-capable NATO corps must maintain joint, interservice, and multinational relationships to facilitate the quick transition to conflict. These relationships help prepare the corps for its role as the senior land tactical headquarters and are developed and maintained through multi- and bilateral training events and exchanges as well as the multinational layout of the headquarters itself. 1 (GE/NL) Corps emphasizes and trains the comprehensive approach in all phases of competition, conflict, and postconflict.12
The presence of a corps and its subordinate units serves as a deterrent force capable of simultaneously engaging multiple enemy combined arms armies and provides the means to shape the area of responsibility. During competition, the conduct of intelligence activities to set the conditions for successful combat operations will be a major focus of the corps. This work is essential to establishing the preconditions not only for a rapid transition to conflict but also for the achievement of tactical objectives. This includes the conduct of the threat systems analysis and comprehensive understanding of the operational environment (CUOE) necessary to support the convergence of Alliance, national, and organic assets necessary to achieve the desired effects against the enemy’s sophisticated and resilient layered standoff.13
The corps denies/deters the ability of an enemy’s ISR and EW systems to target NATO formations and facilities to gather information about capabilities. In addition, as deception is a key function of the corps, it will focus on deceiving and denying an adversary’s access to information related to current and future operating locations, units, and equipment.
To achieve decisive effects on an enemy during combat operations, the corps synchronizes and integrates combat power throughout the expanded battlefield. The ability of the corps to shape the lower operational and upper tactical environments is especially vital to Alliance operations during the initial period of a conflict when enemy long-range IADS will deny, or at a minimum contest, the Alliance’s use of the air domain. The contribution of the corps to the penetration and dis-integration of the enemy’s layered standoff is essential to generating freedom of maneuver for the Alliance joint force.14
During Article 5 or warfighting operations, the focus of the corps is on the conduct of the fight in the deep area with the objective of collapsing the enemy’s long-range and midrange IFC and IADS. The MDO-capable NATO corps utilizes an array of interconnected sensors—artillery delivered, UAS, cyberspace, space, and infiltrated—that place enemy systems at risk. These allow the corps to employ its long-range artillery to destroy targets throughout the depth of the corps area of operations. It is important to remember that this is not a targeting drill; these mid- and long-range enemy systems are attacked to enable maneuver and freedom of action. Only by defeating the enemy’s layered standoff will the Alliance be able to apply its air assets and will the corps’s subordinate divisions get to the close fight with the combat power to prevail.15
The corps is the central echelon in the planning and execution of MDO and is the lowest echelon capable of converging all domains. It creates the conditions for convergence at lower echelons by allocating resources, sequencing division maneuver, and incorporating it with deception. Especially within NATO, the corps will be the primary integrator and synchronizer of multi-domain capability in the forward conflict area and will array assigned capabilities to defeat enemy systems and enable tactical maneuver.
Much as it does with the air and maritime domains, the corps coordinates for—it does not execute—and integrates effects from the space and cyberspace domains through space and cyber support teams embedded in the command. These include effects to disrupt satellite communications to compound effects by organic EW against key command-and-control nodes to degrade enemy positioning, navigation, and timing, cyberspace and space-based ISR, and offensive cyberspace operations. Though the corps may not have the organic capabilities in all domains, it must possess the ability—to include the necessary staff bandwidth and expertise—to access effects from the space, cyberspace, and other domains.
By synchronising all reconnaissance and security operations across subordinate units, coordinating intelligence requirements, and fusing intelligence from multiple echelons, the corps supports echeloned maneuver and actively informs and integrates the full range of capabilities in all domains throughout the depth of the battlefield. Additionally, the corps unburdens subordinate formations by narrowing their focus, reducing their span of control, and maintaining the broader perspective in time and space, across the expanded battlefield. The planning horizon of a corps is typically seventy-two to ninety-six plus hours.16
While the corps’s focus is on the deep area, and much has evolved with MDO, the corps still supports division-level tactical maneuver. In the close fight, it will support its major subordinate units by reinforcing them with forces, especially in the main effort (Schwerpunkt) and by applying joint effects, fire support, air and missile defense, and to a limited extent, cyber defense. The corps will have to conduct information activities and additional stability tasks as well. The ability of the corps to provide this support to its subordinate divisions is especially critical in a multinational setting where the structure and capabilities of its subordinate divisions can greatly vary.17
To preserve the corps’s freedom of action for operations in the deep and close areas and to extend the force’s operational reach, in part through the generation or reconstitution of combat power, the corps must provide security in the rear area to prevent or minimize disruption of combat support and combat service support from the rear area forward and provide unimpeded movement of friendly forces throughout the rear area. To do this, the corps must be able to find, fix, and defeat enemy incursions into the rear area. This will require close coordination with host-nation defense and security forces, and nonmilitary actors.18
The corps must wage this fight to protect its formations in the rear and close areas while simultaneously waging a fight in the deep area to set conditions for exploitation, and it must manage forces out of contact to ensure exploitation can be sustained and reinforced. The corps must provide for the echelonment of formations to ensure depth and agility to maintain tempo once a penetration occurs.19
[FIGURE 2 OMITTED]
The corps protects its subordinate tactical formations from attacks originating in other domains. Especially important is the requirement to provide air and missile defense against the enemy’s substantial inventory of artillery and ground- and air-launched missiles. This will enable the divisions to engage in the close fight with favorable combat power ratios. To do this, the corps must not only possess the necessary air and missile defense assets but also incorporate deception and electromagnetic spectrum management into its operations. The main effort will be on proactive counterfire.20
To succeed, the corps must set the conditions prior to conflict (i.e., in competition). Especially important is the continuous conduct and refinement of the robust CUOE of the enemy required to understand its key systems so the corps can begin the penetration and dis-integration of the enemy’s mid- and long-range IADS and IFC during the transition to conflict. Vital to the success of these efforts is the corps’s ability to exercise command and control throughout the depth of the expanded battlefield. To command and control throughout the entirety of its area of operations, the corps will employ a distributive command post structure using multiple, dispersed, and mobile command posts.21
The corps area of operations and responsibility can extend up to 500 km deep and includes multiple echelons of tactical- and operational-level adversarial capabilities. Figure 2 illustrates how a corps operates across more than 60,000 km2 during large-scale combat operations. Assuming the corps consists of two divisions abreast, the area of operations for the corps could be 500 km x 120 km. In consequence, the corps area of influence would extend out 500 km/72 hrs., while the corps area of interest would extend out to 1,000 km/96 hrs.22 In this example, the corps rear area extends 200 to 250 km to the rear of the forward line of own troops.23