Overhyped expectations causes inevitable “AI winter” – which draws funding and investments away from R&D. Independently, defense officials resist integration
Julia Ciocca et al 21, Michael C. Horowitz, and Lauren Kahn, Julia Ciocca is a Research Fellow at Perry World House at the University of Pennsylvania. Michael C. Horowitz is Richard Perry Professor and Director of Perry World House at the University of Pennsylvania. Lauren Kahn is a Research Fellow at Perry World House at the University of Pennsylvania. 4-6-2021, "The Perils of Overhyping Artificial Intelligence," Foreign Affairs, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2021-04-06/perils-overhyping-artificial-intelligence, nihara
In 1983, the U.S. military’s research and development arm began a ten-year, $1 billion machine intelligence program aimed at keeping the United States ahead of its technological rivals. From the start, computer scientists criticized the project as unrealistic. It promised big and ultimately failed hard in the eyes of the Pentagon, ushering in a long artificial intelligence (AI) “winter” during which potential funders, including the U.S. military, shied away from big investments in the field and abandoned promising areas of research.
Today, AI is once again the darling of the national security services. And once again, it risks sliding backward as a result of a destructive “hype cycle” in which overpromising conspires with inevitable setbacks to undermine the long-term success of a transformative new technology. Military powers around the world are investing heavily in AI, seeking battlefield and other security applications that might provide an advantage over potential adversaries. In the United States, there is a growing sense of urgency around AI, and rightly so. As former Secretary of Defense Mark Esper put it, “Those who are first to harness once-in-a-generation technologies often have a decisive advantage on the battlefield for years to come.” However, there is a very real risk that expectations are being set too high and that an unwillingness to tolerate failures will mean the United States squanders AI’s potential and falls behind its rivals.
ACCIDENTS HAPPEN
The path to the effective uses of military AI will inevitably be rocky, with accidents and missteps amplified by overhyping of the sort that has seen, for example, outsize excitement over futuristic, fully autonomous cars give way to the mundane reality of vehicles that can just about parallel park. A mismatch between expectations and reality can spell the end for new technologies and is especially likely to do so when governments prioritize quick wins over long-term potential. Successful AI adoption will require patience and careful communication so that opportunistic naysayers cannot hold up accidents as proof that failure is inevitable.
AI might be especially vulnerable to this type of hype-induced backsliding. It has suffered two previous winters in its relatively short history, during which AI’s failure to live up to expectations drove declines in funding and interest. AI is also tricky to understand and to define, and the algorithms on which it is based are prone to failure when used outside the context of their initial development.
Incorporating AI into the U.S. military, moreover, will require disruptive changes to everything from force structure and promotion patterns to doctrine and responsibility. This will inevitably trigger resistance. And because U.S. defense officials generally lack the expertise to assess AI advances currently being driven by the private sector, opponents of the new technology will find it easier to capitalize on inevitable setbacks, arguing that a potentially effective application of AI is not just too early but will never materialize.
Yet the naysayers cannot be allowed to triumph. Over and over throughout history, resistance to technological change has come back to haunt militaries. In the late nineteenth century, for instance, France’s navy sought to counter British naval supremacy by investing heavily in submarines and torpedo boats. The technology of the time was not up to the task, however, and France reverted to building battleships, a move that left the United Kingdom to rule the waves until the outbreak of World War II.
About 25 years later, Russia abandoned early design armored vehicles because they got stuck in the mud. Better tread and more power were the simple fixes. But instead, Russia put off procurement of the vehicles and fell behind as others moved forward. In short order, the armored vehicle evolved into the tank, a critical innovation in ground warfare. The Russians, like the French, ought to have shown more patience and persistence.