Ukraine is a unique opportunity for NATO to ensure interoperability in Artificial Intelligence to stop escalation due to bad crisis decision-making
Benjamin Jensen 22, Senior Fellow, Future War, Gaming, and Strategy, and International Security Program. “The Coming Storm: Insights from Ukraine about Escalation in Modern War” May 26. https://www.csis.org/analysis/coming-storm-insights-ukraine-about-escalation-modern-war //barn
Crises such as Ukraine will become more acute and risk prone over time without investing time and resources into understanding competition and escalation for the twenty-first century. Strategy must start with problem framing and creating a clear description of the ends, ways, and means within the context of a crisis in a manner that allows for clear-eyed assessments of how to achieve a competitive advantage. This process starts with reimagining competition, crises, and escalation in the twenty-first century.
First, the larger national security community needs new models and ways of thinking about deterrence, competition, and risk. Current defense planning and academic analytical frameworks are the legacy of Cold War dynamics that may not match a new era of competition. Unlike the Cold War, nuclear-armed states in a multipolar world will likely use nonnuclear weapons (e.g., cruise missiles, space capabilities, and cyber operations) to produce strategic effects.20 Beyond capabilities, these studies should bring the individual back in and assess risk attitudes.
Alongside efforts to think about coercion and cross-domain aspects of deterrence, the national security community needs more policy-relevant research that brings individual decisionmaking and attitudes toward risk back into how it thinks about great power competition.21 In particular, strategic analysis needs more crisis simulations and wargames designed as survey experiments to capture how both individuals and groups respond in different scenarios prone to competitive pressure, fog, and friction.22 These survey experiments enable researchers to bridge the insights of Carl Von Clausewitz’s on war, Thomas Schelling on deterrence, and Daniel Kahnmann on decisionmaking. These studies should put competition front and center and integrate new data and analytic techniques to understand competitive dynamics in a connected world.
For integrated deterrence to be more than a bumper sticker, the Department of Defense will need to initiate a new wave of research that evaluates if and how alternating capabilities—to include the emergence of Joint All-Domain Command and Control (JADC2)—and partner networks affect crisis decisionmaking. These studies will need to create alternative scenarios that reflect whether promised technological capabilities and advances in artificial intelligence and machine learning materialize, as well as the degree of partner political interests and interoperability. In other words, the national security community needs to revitalize strategic studies for the twenty-first century and integrate best practices from social science, as opposed to relying on thin case studies and broader—and often untestable—generalizations about war.