Legal resolution of the attribution problem is an attempt to reinscribe cyberspace within the state’s control.
Joque, 18—PhD from the European Grad School, researches philosophy, technology and media and is the visualization librarian at the University of Michigan, go blue (Justin, “Buffer Overflow: The Space and Time of Cyberwar,” Deconstruction Machines: Writing in the Age of Cyberwar, Chapter 1, 53-56, dml)
War and politics in this realm then begin not only to fix upon the most important nodes in various economic, legal, and military networks but also to reshape the connections and nodes of these networks to their advantage. War becomes the ability not only to occupy and control nodes or connect and disconnect parts of the network but to shape the space and networks that underlie the global battle space. Perhaps this is part of the reason that late-twentieth- and early-twenty-first-century war begins to fixate so heavily on the spectacle. It may be that, rather than war becoming a purely virtual phenomenon, war has instead taken the naming of reality itself as its object. If one can effectively intervene in the multiple networks that define the twenty-first-century globe, it may now be possible to win conflicts without even fighting them. Through these attempts to win by defining the battle, war has become actively engaged in the process of representing both the world and the ability to destroy it. In that sense, we must add a provision to Galloway’s claim: “There is one game in town: a positivistic dominant of reductive, systemic efficiency and expediency. Offering a counter-aesthetic in the face of such systematicity is the first step toward building a poetics for it, a language of representability adequate to it.”55 These dominant forces are equally invested in destroying this game, in upsetting the positivist investments of their enemies. War machines, states, and corporations are already invested in representing the complex space of these networks and in destroying both networks and their representations. The cases of Comment Crew and Stuxnet demonstrate that there is not merely a reductive system of efficiency. Rather, the powers of war and conflict are invested in both speed and slowness; pure unnamed flow and the poetics of representation; construction and destruction. Thus any resistance to these forces of war and control, while it certainly must utilize these tactics, cannot rely solely on representation and slowness against the speed and complexity of war and domination.
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND TERRITORIALITY
The speed at which these spaces are created and reconfigured creates dynamic forces that threaten to destabilize the institutions that exist within these spaces. One need only look at the difficulty that governments face in legislating and regulating networks to see how destabilizing these spaces can be. The constant reconfiguration of the technological, topological, and conceptual nature of these spaces impedes their integration into legal frameworks. For instance, the attribution problem stems from the reach and speed with which individuals can connect and disconnect from the global Internet. This particular difficulty is often taken up in legal discussions surrounding cyberwar. Although the problem of attributing attacks affects the security of systems, it is more often a political and legal problem. If it is impossible to assign responsibility for an attack convincingly, political and military responses become difficult. A number of legal solutions to both the attribution problem and this more general destabilization of quickly shifting spaces have been proposed, but many quickly run into challenges.
One potential legal remedy to the uncontrollability of networks has been to make individual nations responsible for attacks originating in their territories.56 This attempt to solve the attribution problem shifts the burden of responsibility to the countries from which attacks emanate, regardless of their political or military involvement in the attacks. Although a number of legal scholars, especially from the United States, have suggested this potential approach, their optimism is usually tempered by the admission that the vast majority of attacks traverse networks inside the United States owing to the density of well-networked (and often insecure) computers in that country.57 It seems ultimately unlikely that the United States or many other countries would actually push such an agenda on an international level, because they would then be responsible for a vast number of attacks and compromised machines. Aside from the question of whether such a solution is politically viable or would actually serve to decrease the rate of attack, it is interesting in that it attempts to reassert the geographic territoriality and responsibility of nations over the network. Moreover, these attempts mark a willingness among these authors to give up identity in favor of a new territoriality. The proponents of this plan seem so frustrated by attacks that they are willing to forgo knowing the identity of attackers (whether they are military, paramilitary, rogue agents, etc.) by assigning responsibility to those with national political control over territory.
An American legal scholar and a computer scientist, Jeremy and Ariel Rabkin, have gone so far as to suggest that the United States reintroduce the practice of issuing “letters of marque” to counter cyberattacks. Letters of marque were a practice for dealing with pirates up until the middle of the nineteenth century. With a letter of marque, a privateer would be authorized by a government to attack and capture pirate vessels. Thus, while the government did not take responsibility for the reprisal, it would offer legal protection for privateering. The notion proposed by the Rabkins would have the U.S. government offer letters of marque to domestic hackers to attack particular hackers in other countries. They are clear about the claimed benefits of privateering, both historically and contemporarily: “In practice, letters of marque often were issued to those who had learned the craft of capturing prize at sea without any government authorization. Governments issuing authorization brought these raiders under more state control in return for offering them more state protection.”58 The extent to which some scholars of cyberwar are willing to go to reassert state and territorial control over its complicated existence in cyberspace is at times astounding. This is not to suggest that an unraveling of state control over cyberspace or territory is inevitable. The opposite may be true: that we are condemned to live in a bordered, nationalized, territorial world for centuries. What is surprising about the Rabkins’ suggestion is the intensity of their response to the fear that an uncontrolled military force might grow outside of the state’s control. Rather than rethinking the relationship between state, territory, and war, they seem to reach for any legal metaphor to recapture these events in the space of law and territory. They are keenly aware that one of the effects of letters of marque is to bring privateers under some state control. They are willing to return to privateering so as to guarantee that everything falls into the state/territorial system at least to the highest degree possible.
Both of these attempts appear to try to reinscribe cyberspace into the space of the nation: the first simply by using the physical location of servers to inscribe cyberspace in national law and the second by treating cyberspace as analogous to the high seas and legalizing privateering. In both cases, the authors see war located on the Internet as problematic for state control. This fear testifies to a loosening of the state’s control over space, or at least the new spaces created through modern communication technologies.
This is not to say that such a process is historically unique but rather that cyberwar can be understood as part of a process of militarization creating smooth space, Deleuze and Guattari’s term for an open space across which forces are able to move uninterrupted. They define this type of space against striated space, the space of law and the state, in which one is held in place and blocked from movement. Their concepts of smooth and striated space share much with Castell’s distinction between spaces of flow and spaces of place. The distribution and configuration of these spaces are central to contemporary politics. As Deleuze and Guattari suggest, the state “does not just go from the smooth to the striated, it reconstitutes smooth space; it reimparts smooth in the wake of the striated. It is true that this new nomadism accompanies a worldwide war machine whose organization exceeds the State apparatuses and passes into energy, military-industrial, and multinational complexes.”59 This is not to suggest that these are necessarily spaces of liberation or freedom. Rather, these spaces can become the most terrifying sites of state violence. One could easily imagine that smooth spaces inhabited by pirates and privateers could be more violent than the interiors of state control. Thus we must draw a distinction between the spaces in which the state acts and spaces the state can control. These spaces that are opened for military intervention often turn into spaces in which the state acts but is ultimately unable to control and is thus forced to appropriate and integrate privateering, piracy, and other forces that exceed the state and potentially destabilize it.
The militarization of new spaces is not unequivocally on the side of expanded state control. Rather, it appears that the expansion and distortion of the space of war may ultimately undermine the state’s relation to its territory, requiring the creation of novel legal regimes or the reintroduction of old institutions, such as privateering, to reappropriate these destabilizing spaces to state control. These spaces are not frictionless networks over which the state unceasingly expands its control. It is the complexity, multiplicity, and polyvocal nature of these spaces and those systems that inhabit them that continually challenge state attempts to fix, stabilize, and manage them.