Cryptography is a double-edged sword. The aff’s attempt to completely control encryption turns against itself.
Joque, 18—PhD from the European Grad School, researches philosophy, technology and media and is the visualization librarian at the University of Michigan, go blue (Justin, “Distributed Denial of Service: Cybernetic Sovereignty,” Deconstruction Machines: Writing in the Age of Cyberwar, Chapter 3, 121-125, dml)
As the state summons a counterwriting against the tendencies of the universe, it increasingly risks itself in the process. As we saw in the example of Tor, it is often the war machine that takes advantage of this counterwriting against, or at least outside, the state. Both the state and the war machine have an uncertain relationship to cryptography and the ability of citizenry to write in secret. The state appears at once to promote and develop cryptography, especially as a support for modern networked-based capitalism, and at the same time it moves to undermine and defeat cryptography. Moreover, since the invention of publickey cryptography, when we speak of the desire for and promotion of cryptography, we must remember that we are referring to the ability not only to send secret messages but also to authenticate and prove one’s identity. Thus both states and war machines arrive at the public realization of the universe’s tendency toward strong cryptography in a difficult situation. If, as Foucault suggests in his lecture series Security, Population, Territory, the function of the modern state is to secure the population, the state both requires cryptography to secure digital spaces and the digital population but must then defeat cryptography to secure its physical population. The ability to guarantee secrets becomes critical for maintaining long-distance communication networks but at the same time threatens to empower secret conspiracies that would turn against the state.
To better understand what is at stake in the state’s relation to cryptography in particular, and more generally in relation to cyberwar and the militarization of networks, it is helpful to trace these developments through Foucault’s work on the state vis-à-vis its population.24 Foucault outlines three historical modes of operation of the state: sovereignty, societies of discipline, and finally, societies of security. He cautions, “There is not a series of successive elements, the appearance of the new causing the earlier ones to disappear. . .what above all changes is the dominant characteristic.”25 Still, the most contemporary in this list, security societies, has as its most notable element the creation of a population that must be secured as a whole. Foucault says of security,
Security will try to plan a milieu in terms of events or series of events or possible elements, of series that will have to be regulated within a multivalent and transformable framework. The specific space of security refers then to a series of possible events; it refers to the temporal and the uncertain, which have to be inserted within a given space. The space in which a series of uncertain elements unfold is, I think, roughly what one can call the milieu.26
To control this milieu, the state intervenes in a population that is treated as a biological entity. Norms and limits are discovered against which to measure the population. In contrast to previous forms of the state,
the milieu appears as a field of intervention in which, instead of affecting individuals as a set of legal subjects capable of voluntary actions—which would be the case with sovereignty—and instead of affecting them as a multiplicity of organisms, of bodies capable of performances, and of required performances—as in discipline— one tries to affect, precisely, a population. I mean a multiplicity of individuals who . . . essentially only exist biologically bound to the materiality within which they live.27
Security thus takes a space and a biological population that exists within that space and attempts to maintain control over the uncertain events of the milieu and the embedded population. The population, as biological entity, is measured against a norm and securitized to maintain the desired norm. This relation, between the state and a population that must be accounted for as a whole, radically changes in our contemporary era, especially under the threat of cyberwar.
The advent of cyberwar, especially with its cryptographic concerns, adds to the complexity of the state’s desire for security. As more and more of our daily activities occur online and more infrastructure is supported and made vulnerable by its connection to the global Internet, the state becomes responsible for a digital milieu and a digital population as much as it is responsible for a biological population. The state’s quest for security becomes bifurcated between a topographic and topological space, a biological population and a digital population. Cryptography bifurcates along similar lines and now fills a dual function. On one hand, cryptography has become the linchpin to security online. Without the ability to both send secure messages and identify individuals, there would exist no way to use the Internet for any but the most trivial functions. Cryptography thus becomes a requirement for security online and for the physical infrastructure connected to these digital networks. On the other hand, cryptography allows the exchange of messages across the globe beyond the watchful eyes of security agencies and militaries. Cryptography, in a sense, cuts between the war machine and the state, becoming a necessity and a threat to both.
The problem posed by cryptography is not an entirely new problem for the state. While, on one hand, it is a problem of spatiality, between topographic space and topological space and between a digital population and a biological population, it is also a problem of the relationship between the mass and the individual. Cryptography is critical for the security of the mass of online functions, for the global totality of the Internet, but an individual’s use of cryptography can easily threaten the digital or physical whole. Cryptography thus repeats a central problem Foucault outlines in relation to the rise of security and the art of government, or governmentality, as he refers to it. Foucault traces the roots of the modern security state to the Christian pastorate, which he claims to be
paradoxically distributive since, of course, the necessity of saving the whole entails, if necessary, accepting the sacrifice of a sheep that could compromise the whole. . . On the other hand, and this is the paradox, the salvation of a single sheep calls for as much care from the pastor as does the whole flock; there is no sheep for which he must not suspend all his other responsibilities and occupations, abandon the flock, and try to bring it back.28
Both the mass and the individual must be saved, and each at the expense of the other. For Foucault, the pastoral problematic does not stumble upon an already constituted individual who is opposed to the mass it constitutes; rather, the pastorate “is a form of individualization that will not be acquired through the relationship to a recognized truth, [but] will be acquired instead through the production of an internal, secret, and hidden truth.”29 The Christian pastorate constructs both an individual and mass that come to be diametrically opposed and require salvation both through and against the other.
Foucault goes on to say that as this system of pastoral power is adopted by the state, its logic disregards the problem of the mass and the individual.30 Thus, for Foucault, the state as an institution of governmentality does away with the problem of the mass and the individual. It decides clearly on the side of the mass at the expense of the individual. But he also notes that as the state becomes a more liberal institution and its aims become “a matter of insuring that the state only intervenes to regulate, or rather to allow the well-being, the interest of each to adjust itself in such a way that it can actually serve all,”31 the issue of this relation between mass and individual is maintained as an aporetic concern of the state. We see it arise precisely in the relation between the state, cryptography, and its defenses against cyberwar. The whole requires cryptography to function in a digital world, but the individual’s access to cryptography threatens the whole. At the same time, the individual, as potential threat to the mass, must somehow be barred from full access to digital security. The paradox the Christian pastorate stumbles upon returns as a key aspect of the apparatus of security. Moreover, even if the state were to find an optimal balance between the two, the war machine’s attempts to both secure its own systems and disrupt the security of enemy systems further destabilize any technopolitical balances.