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The aff’s hypersecuritization of cybersecurity stems from itself – disasters of cyber systems happen as a result of their initial investment

Hansen & Nissenbaum 9 (Lene Hansen & Helen Nissenbaum, IR scholar and Professor at University of Copenhagen & Professor of Information Science at Cornell Tech, “Digital Disaster, Cyber Security, and the Copenhagen School”, International Studies Quarterly, Volume 53, Issue 4, 12/2/9, https://academic.oup.com/isq/article/53/4/1155/1815351?login=false) // EL

Hypersecuritization The first concept, hypersecuritization, has been introduced by Buzan (2004:172) to describe an expansion of securitization beyond a ‘‘normal’’ level of threats and dangers by defining ‘‘a tendency both to exaggerate threats and to resort to excessive countermeasures.’’ This definition has an objectivist ring to it in that to identify ‘‘exaggerated’’ threats implies that there are ‘‘real’’ threats that are not exaggerated. Moreover, the question of whether a securitization is seen as ‘‘exaggerating’’ concerns the degree to which it is successful (unsuccessful securitizations are seen as ‘‘exaggerating’’) and is not part of the grammatical specificities of sectors. Thus we suggest to drop the ‘‘exaggerated’’ from the definition of hypersecuritization and to apply it to the cyber sector to identify the striking manner in which cyber security discourse hinges on multi-dimensional cyber disaster scenarios that pack a long list of severe threats into a monumental cascading sequence and the fact that neither of these scenarios has so far taken place. All securitizations do of course have an element of the hypothetical in that they constitute threats that must be countered, and thus mobilize an ‘‘if-then’’ logic, but what distinguishes hypersecuritizations from ‘‘mere’’ securitization is their instantaneity and inter-locking effects (Denning 1999:xiii). This combination draws critically from the securitization of the network (Deibert 2002), yet the power of hypersecuritization stems not only from a securitization of the network itself, but from how a damaged network would cause societal, financial, and military break-down hence bringing in all other referent objects and sectors. Securitizations always mobilize the specter of the future to some extent, but most nevertheless articulate the past as a legitimating reference that underscores the gravity of the situation. Looking to the Cold War, the logic of nuclear deterrence relied upon projections of a nuclear exchange that had not taken place, yet there were the devastations of Hiroshima and Nagasaki to be used as a yardstick for what nuclear war would imply. Cyber securitizations on the other hand have no similar history of founding incidents to base themselves on but try to conjure historical analogies such as ‘‘electronic Pearl Harbors’’ (Bendrath 2003:50).7 The combination of cascading disasters and the absence of a prior incident of that magnitude creates a crucial ambiguity within cyber security discourse. The extreme reliance on the future and the enormity of the threats claimed at stake makes the discourse susceptible to charges of ‘‘exaggeration,’’ yet the scale of the potential catastrophe simultaneously raises the stakes attached to ignoring the warnings.8 Turning the absence of prior incidences in the opposite direction, the difficulty of saying that it could not happen also creates a powerful space for the projection of the (im)possible. The hypersecuritization of the entire network in cyber security creates an obvious resemblance to environmental security discourse where the fate of the planet is claimed at stake. Both discourses also emphasize irreversibility: once a species is extinct or a digital system gone, they can never be recreated in full. Yet, there are also crucial differences between the two discourses. First, the speed of the threat scenarios differ with cyber security gaining its power from the instantaneity of the cascading effects whereas environmental security usually allows for a gradual accumulation of threats and dangers until a certain threshold may be reached and events accelerate. This establishes different modalities of urgency and hence different spaces for political intervention.9 Second, there is a crucial difference in terms of the possibility of visualizing threats, and hence for how securitizing actors communicate to their audiences (Williams 2003). The digital, networked character of cyber security—and the absence of prior disasters—is hard to represent through images, whereas environmental security discourse may mobilize for example endangered and extinct species as well as melting ice caps and forests devastated by acid rain or clear-cutting.

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