Free beta access. 50 free AI tokens each week. Optional top-ups available. See what is included
Opening Word document…

Cybersecurity logics are false – threats stem from unpredictability of cyber itself which the aff reproduces

Hansen & Nissenbaum 9 (Lene Hansen & Helen Nissenbaum, IR scholar and Professor at University of Copenhagen & Professor of Information Science at Cornell Tech, “Digital Disaster, Cyber Security, and the Copenhagen School”, International Studies Quarterly, Volume 53, Issue 4, 12/2/9, https://academic.oup.com/isq/article/53/4/1155/1815351?login=false) // EL

Securitizing Digital Systems: The Referent Objects of Cyber Security The history of cyber security as a securitizing concept begins with the disciplines of Computer and Information Science. One, if not the first, usage of cyber security was in the Computer Science and Telecommunications Board’s (CSTB) report from 1991, Computers at Risk: Safe Computing in the Information Age which defined ‘‘security’’ as the ‘‘protection against unwanted disclosure, modification, or destruction of data in a system and also [to] the safeguarding of systems themselves’’ (CSTB 1991:2). Security comprised technical as well as human aspects and ‘‘it has significant procedural, administrative, physical facility, and personnel components’’ (CSTB 1991:17). Crucially, threats to cyber security do not only arise from (usually) intentional agents, but also from systemic threats. These systemic threats, defined by Hundley and Anderson (1995 ⁄ 1996:232) as ‘‘cyberspace safety’’ stems from the inherent unpredictability of computers and information systems which by themselves ‘‘create unintended (potentially or actually) dangerous situations for themselves or for the physical and human environments in which they are embedded.’’ Threats arise from software as well as hardware failures and cannot be corrected through perfecting digital technology and programming; there is, in short, an inherent ontological insecurity within computer systems (Edwards 1996:290–2; Denning 1999:12). ‘‘Computer security’’ would not, however, in most cases by itself qualify as a security concept according to the Copenhagen School. As Helen Nissenbaum points out, the majority of computer scientists adopt a technical discourse that is focused on developing good programs with a limited number of (serious) bugs and systems that are difficult to penetrate by outside attackers. In the move from ‘‘computer security’’ to ‘‘cyber security,’’ this technical discourse is linked to the securitizing discourse ‘‘developed in the specialized arena of national security’’ (Nissenbaum 2005:65). ‘‘Cyber security’’ can, in short, be seen as ‘‘computer security’’ plus ‘‘securitization.’’ In the 1991 CSTB report it is argued that ‘‘We are at risk’’ and in a remarkable mobilization of securitizing prose that ‘‘Tomorrow’s terrorist may be able to do more damage with a keyboard than with a bomb.’’ No major attacks have been launched so far, but it is a key element of securitizing discourse to argue that if action is not undertaken then serious incidents will materialize in the near future, thus ‘‘there is reason to believe that our luck will soon run out’’ (CSTB 1991:7–8). The constitution of a much too complacent audience that does not realize the magnitude of these dangers is another key staple of securitizing discourse, and the CSTB laments that ‘‘Very few individuals not professionally concerned with security … have ever been directly involved in or affected by a computer security incident. … most people have difficulty relating to the intricacies of malicious computer actions’’ (CSTB 1991:159–61). Eleven years later, most Americans have been exposed to (scares of) computer viruses, worms, and hackers, yet the Board complains that in spite of the reports produced over the past years, ‘‘not much has changed with respect to security as it is practiced.’’ As the threats to cyber security have increased while the countermeasures have not, ‘‘our ability and willingness to deal with threats have, on balance, changed for the worse’’ (CSTB 2002:2). In another attempt to stress the urgency and wake up policy makers and the broader public, the report is titled Cybersecurity Today and Tomorrow: Pay Now or Pay Later. A similar tone is struck a year later in the so-far most authoritative and comprehensive statement of US cyber security policy: President Bush’s The National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace which opens by asserting that ‘‘In the past few years, threats in cyberspace have risen dramatically.’’ Although a large-scale cyber attack has not yet taken place, this is no time to ‘‘be too sanguine’’ as ‘‘the attack tools and methodologies are becoming widely available, and the technical capability and sophistication of users bent on causing havoc or disruption is improving’’ (The National Strategy 2003:viii). Key to understanding the potential magnitude of cyber threats is the networked character of computer systems. These networks ‘‘control physical objects such as electrical transformers, trains, pipeline pumps, chemical vats, and radars’’ (The National Strategy 2003:6–7) and attacks—or ‘‘cyberdisasters’’—would ‘‘compromise systems and networks in ways that could render communications and electric power distribution difficult or impossible, disrupt transportation and shipping, disable financial transactions, and result in the theft of large amounts of money’’ (CSTB 2002:6). Although not necessarily directly connected, the magnitude and simultaneity of these attacks would have cascading effects and thus networked consequences for referent objects beyond networks themselves. Networked computers have also dissolved the traditional boundary protecting the territorial nation state, ‘‘the infrastructure that makes up cyberspace—software and hardware—is global in its design and development’’ and cyber attackers may operate at a distance obfuscating ‘‘their identities, locations, and paths of entry’’ (The National Strategy 2003:7; Yould 2003). To give an indication of how an attack transgresses territorial boundaries, RAND’s ‘‘The Day After… in Cyberspace II’’ exercise in 1996 drew up a list (Anderson and Hearn 1996:4–5) including electronic looting of European and American banks by (unspecified) Russians, software computer viruses causing financial havoc and plane and train crashes, power grid fall-outs at airbases, malfunctioning of ATMs and news broadcasts, and stock market manipulation. RAND’s scenario shows aptly how cyber security discourse moves seamlessly across distinctions normally deemed crucial to Security Studies: between individual and collective security, between public authorities and private institutions, and between economic and political-military security. The private sector’s fear of hackers stealing large sums of money, intellectual property owner’s worry that file sharing compromises their rights and revenues (Nissenbaum 2005:68), and public, private, and civil society scares that bugged software and computer viruses will have damaging consequences produce a powerful blending of private-economic and public-national security concerns. Not only are large parts of the networks, hardware, and software privately produced and owned and thus governed by financial considerations, but the security logics of the economic and the cyber sector have crucial similarities. The economic sector is also ‘‘rich in referent objects, ranging from individuals through classes and states to the abstract and complex system of the global market itself’’ (Buzan et al. 1998:100), and in liberal economies instability and risk taking is built into the logic of capitalism itself. The modern economic system is, like the cyber network, constituted by trans-border flows, and authority and sovereignty is more ambiguously located than in traditional national-military security. It is in both sectors often difficult to identify where an attack originated, and with the global reach of the Internet⁄world economy, tricky questions of responsibility and enforcement are continuous sources of fraught cross-border and international treaty negotiations. That said, cyber security does not fully mirror the economic sector either: its securitizing potential exceeds that of the economic sector as strictly defined (Buzan et al. 1998:116–7) and this in turn allows—or is an indication of—a much stronger link to national military security. Cyber security is not left to the liberal market, but implies a complex constellation of public-private responsibility and governmental authority. Drawing upon the individual-collective resolution laid out above, the government consistently holds the private sector co-responsible for cyber security: not only does the latter own major parts of the computer network, it also possesses the knowledge—‘‘In general, the private sector is best equipped and structured to respond to an evolving cyber threat’’ (The National Strategy 2003:ix). Mobilizing civil liberties discourse further invokes a crucial balance between the public and the private that should not be violated: ‘‘The federal government should likewise not intrude into homes and small businesses, into universities, or state and local agencies and departments to create secure computer networks’’ (The National Strategy 2003:11). To the government this allows for a distribution of the financial and political burden and it strategically engages critics who point to privacy violations. To the private sector, these securitizations boost its calls for the protection of intellectual property rights, for vigilant prosecution of cyber crimes, and for combating digital anonymity (Nissenbaum 2005:68). Negotiation of the boundaries between the public and the private and between the economic and the political thus couples the network-fragmentation implied by ‘‘cyber’’ with an understanding of business and government as sharing the same goal. At the same time the political center still constitutes the private sector as responsible for major parts of the digital realm. This academic and policy discourse articulates in sum a wide array of threats to government, business, individuals, and society as a whole perpetuated by hackers, criminals, terrorists, commercial organizations, and nations that adopt cyber strategies for financial, ideological, political, or military gain (Hundley and Anderson 1995 ⁄ 1996:232). Yet obviously not all political or societal actors concur with the manner in which official American cyber security discourse has attempted to keep the public-private and individual-state resolutions in place. As Ronald J. Deibert (2002) and Diana Saco (1999) have argued, cyber security is a terrain on which multiple discourses and (in)securities compete.6 Privacy advocates and cyber libertarians point to governmental violations of personal security (Saco 1999), and authoritarian (and not so authoritarian) regimes securitize transborder information flows as threats to regime ⁄state security and national (societal) identity in a way that expands the threat-referent object constellation considerably (Deibert 2002). The question is therefore how we incorporate this complexity into our theoretical framework without loosing the sense of cyber security discourse as a distinct phenomenon? Deibert (2002) argues that cyber security is constituted through four separate discourses with distinct referent objects, threats, policy options, and world orders: national security, state security (comprising external threats to state sovereignty as well as internal threats to regime security), private security, and network security, and Saco holds that national and personal security compete (Saco 1999:270, 286). We agree with Deibert that cyber security should be theorized as a sector where multiple discourses may be found, yet we think that understanding this multi-discursivity as arising from competing articulations of constellations of referent objects, rather than separate referent objects, better captures the securitizing and political dynamic of the field. To see cyber security discourse as fragmenting along the lines of distinct referent objects downplays the ways in which cyber security discourse gains its coherence from making connections between referent objects rather than operating at separate tracks. Particularly crucial in the case of cyber security is the linkage between ‘‘networks’’ and ‘‘individual’’ and human collective referent objects. Thus it is not the case that a private security discourse constitutes the individual as its referent object, but rather that ‘‘the individual’’ of this discourse is linked to societal and political referent objects. Take the example of post-September 11 battles between governmental discourses legitimizing digital surveillance and data-mining through securitizing reference to the War on Terror and citizen groups fighting this legislation through reference to basic civic liberties and privacy issues. These are not two separate discourses with unrelated referent objects, but competing articulations of the appropriate individual-state contracts of the liberal state (Saco 1999:271). Moreover, it is not fully clear from Deibert’s and Saco’s accounts whether private security discourse operates through the political rather than the semantic modality of security. This does not mean that cyber ‘‘privacy’’ cannot be securitized, but this has to be mediated through a collective referent object, either a political-ideological one, questioning the appropriateness of the individual-state balance, and⁄ or a national-societal one, mobilizing the values held to be the core of the community’s identity. Similarly, a securitization of the network cannot, and does not, stop at the network itself: it is the implications of network break-downs for other referent objects, ‘‘society,’’ ‘‘the regime,’’ or ‘‘the economy’’ (which is, again, in turn linked to ‘‘state’’ and ‘‘society’’) that makes cyber securitization a plausible candidate for political and media attention. Securitization works in short by tying referent objects together, particularly by providing a link between those that do not explicitly invoke a bounded human collectively, such as ‘‘network’’ or ‘‘individual,’’ with those that do. Contestation and multidiscursivity is thus found between competing articulations of linked referent objects as well as by tracing the potential internal instability of each discourse.

Sign in to recut, update, or save this card.