Hacking is a corporate tool used to control social realities – it’s intrinsic nature to the cybernetic system means the alternative is the only option
Burkart 19 (Patrick Burkart, Asistant professor in the Department of Communication @ Texas A&M, “Why Hackers Win: Power and Distribution in the Network Society”, University of California Press, 2019, https://www.academia.edu/38287801/Why_Hackers_Win_Power_and_Disruption_in_the_Network_Society?from=cover_page) // EL
Contemporary geopolitics are in flux as their norms shift and institu- tions realign. Information increasingly is employed as both hard and soft power in struggles that cross the social and technical boundaries of long-standing networks. These struggles are central to what we term the “Network Society.”1 Why Hackers Win: Power and Disruption in the Network Society examines the pressures that have driven global law and policy into ambiguous territory. While many popular and scholarly accounts posit hacking as a means to wobble the trajectory of late capi- talism, we argue the inverse is true. Hacking (offensively through exploits and defensively through cybersecurity) extends and deepens state and corporate proclivities to control social realities. We define “hacking” as unauthorized trespass, breach, or bypass of “trusted sys- tems” for purposes of surveillance and potential theft, manipulation, or destruction of information.2 These systems are based on communica- tion networks in which service providers and users must be authenti- cated to access goods and services. Therefore, user trust in their secu- rity and reliability is essential.3 We focus on the hacking of trusted systems—and not other kinds of readily accessible systems—because the template for their protection has been refined in key areas of law, technology, and society. We posit hacking as a generalized symbolic medium, like power and money, which can be collected and mobilized to influence communica- tion systems. In the process hacking affords opportunities to bypass exist- ing law and policy through force. Our purpose in Why Hackers Win is to examine hacking as a corporate and state strategy for managing risk. Ulrich Beck claims that “being at risk is the way of being and ruling in the world of modernity; being at global risk is the human condition at the beginning of the twenty-first century” (2006, 330). Given the immense complexity of the Network Society, state and corporate actors seek greater self-awareness and certainty. Hacking enables these actors to seek out their blind spots in online boundaries and activities. This knowl- edge is valuable for maintaining systems and exposing risks. Hacking (offensively through exploits or defensively through cybersecurity) reflects common social impulses to survey, to measure, to model, and to predict. While hacking often is viewed as essentially disruptive to social structures, we argue the inverse is true. States and corporations seek to maintain their standing and seek competitive advantage through hacking campaigns. The creation of markets for exploits and cybersecurity also affords new opportunities to develop and exchange commodities. Conse- quently, to preserve national-security prerogatives and develop global markets for hacking technologies, states have resisted legal regimes to contain hacking by institutions—even as they have enacted draconian laws against hacking by individuals. We find that hacking and cybersecurity reinforce and accelerate each other in trusted systems. While ostensibly antagonistic, both increasingly share a common grounding in intellectual property. For hackers the value of hacking victims, or “data subjects,” is not so much in their personally identifiable information, which is gathered and com- modified by trusted systems. Instead, hackers exploit the “intellectual property” that gathers and commodifies this information within these systems to squeeze revenues through phishing and fraud. A secondary value is that hacking provides data for valuing insurance products and refining cybersecurity products already in use. In turn, cybersecurity offers possibilities for developing intellectual property in the military and civilian sectors, particularly in software and services. Both private security firms and state military and police forces claim to have evolved cybersecurity and cyber warfare into a “science,” in which knowledge and expertise are increasingly institutionalized in higher education and corporate management. Both markets and militaries view offensive hacking techniques (intrusion software like malware and botnets) and defensive countermeasures as new opportunities to generate power and money and manage risk. Much like the “dual-use” nature of exploits themselves and consist- ent with other domains in the Network Society, the boundaries between private and public are blurred and indeterminate. In the neoliberal era the economic system has assumed more and more responsibility for allocating risk through the market function of pricing, and the state has turned more areas of social welfare over to markets in an elaborated process of risk management and deregulation.4 Similarly, states increas- ingly outsource both hacking and cybersecurity as a means of manag- ing risk. Internet service providers perform state surveillance by proxy, and states (including the United States) frequently employ independent spyware and hacking firms to supplement their operations. Innovations such as insurance against corporate hacking and identity theft also reflect the commodification of hacking risks. When these responsibili- ties are outsourced to the market, risks are distributed in patterns that can reinforce social inequalities. The economy provides markets for risk management, but “with the economic exploitation of the risks it sets free, industrial society produces the hazards and the political potential of the risk society” (Beck 1992b, 23). Through all these means hacking represents an interface between technical code (the structure of trusted systems), legal code (the laws that govern their access and use), and social code (their impact on soci- ety, particularly in terms of privacy and sanctioned activity). As a grow- ing portion of the global economy is based in digital trusted systems, we find a proportional growth in the vulnerabilities inherent to these systems: the buggy software, the unprotected account access, and the availability of personally identifying information to others on the inter- net. Although hacking ostensibly undermines their own security, corpo- rations and states paradoxically use hacking for gain. Hacking can suit a broad spectrum of purposes, including gathering intelligence, managing crises, and accumulating competitive advantages over rivals. Some “exfiltration” hacks have successfully stolen data such as business plans, while some failed episodes have landed spies in jail (Landau 2013). The “hack-back,” an attempt by victims of cyberattacks to get into the hack- er’s computer, can try to ascertain the fallout from the initial breach, as well as knowledge about any new schemes and risks of future breaches. While examining abuses of power through computer vulnerabilities and exploits, we have not found “master conspiracies” of surveillance and espionage, or even a systematic imposition of will, in coordinated hack- ing campaigns. Instead, we see a proliferation of agents contributing to offenses and defenses played in long games and embedded in global net- works. In our view hacking has become a mundane, “business as usual” application of force for many enterprises. The development of hacking and cybersecurity together also fore- grounds paradoxes for social systems. Hacking is now integrated into state and corporate activities, especially where business or security interests are invested in maintaining trusted systems. Organizations may hack for advantages over rivals by exploiting vulnerabilities in trusted systems. At the same time organizations may hack their own trusted systems or invite others to hack them (sometimes called penetration testing or “pen testing”) for purposes of cybersecurity. “Red Team v. Blue Team” exercises take pen testing to active warfare levels— one team trying to break in while the other defends. (In cybersecurity gospel “Red team ALWAYS wins eventually. Blue just holds on as long as they can.”) “Red teaming” is embraced and institutionalized by the U.S. Department of Defense, where “in the cyber world, offense and defense stemmed from the same tools and techniques” (Kaplan 2016, 260). In all these scenarios hacking activity provides recursive knowledge about trusted systems and the communication systems in which they are embedded. In turn, these reflexive processes can exercise coercive force in these systems. Whether or not they encounter defenses, an exploit delivered through the right attack vector can contribute to cybernetic feedback loops within systems. These loops appear to be generated with increasing frequency, as hacking campaigns (or cyberat- tacks) proliferate together with mass data breaches. Our approach to technology foregrounds the role of human agents and institutions in communication. We argue that technologies are socially constructed rather than deterministic and autonomous. Not- withstanding the impact of technological change on the economy and society, even our most powerful technologies do not operate independ- ently of human controls such as market exchange, law, policy, and cul- tural norms. Why Hackers Win takes a sociological perspective on hack- ing, viewing it as one of many activities that constitute communication in social systems. If we view the cybernetic arena as a social system, hacking serves to differentiate the components of this system, which then adapts accordingly. The system as a whole is reconfigured, with consequences for political, economic, and legal systems, among others. Hacking and its codependent, cybersecurity, therefore contribute to encoding communication in social systems rather than undermining them. This idea is informed by Jürgen Habermas’s (1984, 1987) theory of communicative action and his dualistic “system and lifeworld” analysis of modern societies. Accordingly, hacking is related to digital piracy as a means of cultural reproduction (Burkart 2011, 2014). In the absence of a tightly regulated market for cybersecurity and component exploits, hacking has greater freedom to “steer” interactions between states, markets, and laws. If the legal system were to suppress the proliferation of commercial hacking tools and spyware, the risks perpetuated by cyber insecurity might improve. But the legal system is not designed to do this; in fact, it contributes to systemic risk by enabling legal or gray markets for vulnerabilities. We argue that the conjoining of intellectual property and cyber defense in copyright law and policy adds additional levels of risk for society as a whole. This is in part because hacking and data breaches are not just episodic bugs; rather, they are routine and institutionalized features of the system. The growth of cybersecurity software and related industries also impact these institutions and rou- tines, contributing social effects in the process. Although social-technical systems for media, business and finance, and defense are increasingly globalized, the nation-state still provides the basis for law and policy governing hacking. But the coherence and continuity of law and policy within nation-states can fall on a contin- uum from anarchic to totalitarian. Hacking therefore illustrates “gov- ernance in areas of limited statehood” (Risse 2013). The relative depend- ence or independence of hacking on law and policy can turn on a variety of factors. Why Hackers Win addresses cases where new laws on hacking have conflicted with both received policy traditions and emer- gent policy regimes and where hacking still occupies legal gray areas. Judicial review is not fully incorporated into many decision-making processes; broad categories of hacking remain the privilege of the state and therefore are exempted from the rule of law. Even hacking by pri- vate firms may be absolved by the state (such as when telecommunica- tions carriers received retroactive immunity from illegal wiretapping violations).5 Secrecy and self-regulation are the rule for states and firms, with little concern for values and norms for personal privacy. Numerous national and international legal systems have categorized piracy and hacking as cybercrimes, which has intertwined their history and led us to consider them as distinct but related aspects of communica- tive social action. As with piracy, the conflicts surrounding trusted sys- tems center on issues of ownership and control, based on the right to share private property or exclude others from access. It remains as unlikely today as it did in 2006, when we wrote Digital Music Wars, that a universal standard for digital-rights management will be adopted by even a single industry. But the reprising of digital-rights–management models for managing cybersecurity risks and the securitization of intellectual property in military cybersecurity policy suggest that guidelines for ntellectual-property theft will dominate discourse over how to define and prioritize cyber threats. We also anticipate that enterprises depend- ent on trusted systems will employ technology practices, legal activities, and political lobbying to strengthen pecuniary rights at the expense of the public good. However unjust they may be, “consumption norms” already have gelled for trusted systems—along with their bases in sur- veillance and intellectual property (Burkart 2010, 2014). In the aggregate of digital dirty tricks and the attack vectors that enable them, we find an unfolding, alternative history of technological development and its impact on society. We conclude our study with a reflection on the overt and covert applications of hacking and cybersecurity by states and cor- porations and the importance of research and activist groups in drawing attention to these activities. Without their efforts the question of who is responsible for guarding the public interest in the Network Society seems to answer itself: no one. The development of hacking and its dou- ble star, cybersecurity, offers another example of how ostensibly resistant technologies and practices may be contained, controlled, and repurposed to suit the instrumental purposes of state and corporate power.