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Hacking is integral to digital capitalism – corporations lie to achieve surveillance

Burkart 19 (Patrick Burkart, Asistant professor in the Department of Communication @ Texas A&M, “Why Hackers Win: Power and Distribution in the Network Society”, University of California Press, 2019, https://www.academia.edu/38287801/Why_Hackers_Win_Power_and_Disruption_in_the_Network_Society?from=cover_page) // EL

growth hacks The extent of corporate espionage (or “corporate intelligence”) through hacking is unknown, although Fortune 500 companies use it to maintain defenses against IP theft (Bailey 2016).19 As a byproduct of “digital capitalism” (Schiller 2000), hacking markets flourish at numerous levels (Burkart and McCourt 2017). In addition to markets for exploits and packaged cyber-defense tools, other “growth areas” include insurance against corporate hacking and identity theft (whether these insurance products add or reduce risk is another question). Markets for risk can diminish trust in social and sociotechnical systems, resulting in what Jürgen Habermas (1975) terms a “legitimation crisis.” Although attempts to offload risk have worked for now, we can already see how legitimation problems in cybercrime law and policy are converging with escalating social risk toward catastrophe. As Ulrich Beck proposes, “risk is not synonymous with catastrophe. Risk means the anticipation of the catastrophe. Risks concern the possibility of future occurrences and developments; they make present a state of the world that does not (yet) exist. Whereas every catastrophe is spatially, temporally and socially determined, the anticipation of catastrophe lacks any spatiotemporal or social concreteness” (2009, 9). We address the institutional shaping of social norms in the next chapter. Three cases, in which transnational corporations hacked trusted systems to engage in deceptive and anticompetitive behavior, illustrate the way in which “growth hacks”—a Silicon Valley euphemism “that describes breaking legal or moral rules in a quest for scale” (Roberts 2017)—have migrated from start-up culture to big business. We distinguish growth hacks from “deep hacks” (see chapter 2), which can emanate from outside the marketplace and which reverberate through the systems of technology, law, and society. The first example of a growth hack involves Uber Technologies, which secretly built the Greyball and Hell software tools into its drivers’ smartphone app, enabling the company to operate in markets where its services had been restricted. Uber’s Android rider app “phoned home” to send sensitive user data back to the company (Khandelwal 2014). News Corporation (News Corp) hacked voice-mail accounts and intercepted private communications to generate sensationalized stories for its News of the World tabloid newspaper—which it then tried to cover up. Finally, Volkswagen’s software hack was created to mask excessive emissions by their diesel vehicles, in clear violation of environmental protection rules in the United States and abroad, even as the company sued researchers who had discovered a way to hack its vehicle’s locks. These examples illustrate the ways in which corporations have relied on hacks of trusted systems as a standard business tactic while sometimes using antihacking law to slow discovery of vulnerabilities in their own systems.20 Uber has a particular “reputation for ruthlessness” (Estes 2017). Its business model, based on a trusted-system software platform shared by drivers and users, uses real-time surveillance to match rides more efficiently than taxicabs. To expand into areas where its operations were prohibited, in 2014 the company surreptitiously added the Greyball function to its smartphone app for riders. Greyball allowed Uber to identify and evade potential authorities through practices such as “geofencing,” in which a digital map would locate city government offices and enable drivers to avoid riders from those areas. Besides deceiving regulators, Greyball also allowed Uber to survey social media and mine credit card databases to identify and flag potential government or police employees (Isaac 2017, A1). Another module on the driver app, known by Uber executives and engineers as “Hell,” allowed the company “to track drivers using its biggest competitor in the US, Lyft, and to monitor which of Lyft’s drivers also drove for Uber” (Cook and Price 2017). The Hell and Greyball programs exploited the surveillance features of smartphones on both sides of its platform—driver and rider—to seek anticompetitive advantage in labor markets for drivers and to evade government regulations. Although these deceptive growth hacks contributed to Uber’s business plan by adding scale to its overall market, they also added to a growing list of legal problems (including sexual harassment and antilabor practices) attributed to Uber’s former management. As of this writing, the company is under investigation by the U.S. Department of Justice for Greyball and by the FBI for both the Greyball and Hell initiatives. But Uber remains “unrepentant.” The firm’s response to getting caught deploying Greyball was to denigrate the public investigators and law enforcement who caught them, while at the same time implying that Uber was entitled to pursue hacking its employees’ and customers’ phones as a proprietary business strategy. It employed a classic hacking rationale to protect its trusted system (its private property) from trespass (theft): “This program denies ride requests to users who are violating our terms of service, whether that’s people aiming to physically harm drivers, competitors looking to disrupt our operations, or opponents who collude with officials on secret ‘stings’ meant to entrap drivers,” an Uber spokesperson stated (Estes 2017). Uber was itself breached, as evidenced in May 2014, when two sellers on the anonymous Tor network offered thousands of Uber usernames and passwords that would allow buyers to log in and book rides (Gibbs 2015b). Uber first issued a denial, but in November 2017 the company admitted that it had hidden the breach, in which fifty-seven million driver and rider accounts were stolen from a third-party server, for over a year. After paying a $100,000 ransom, Uber tracked down the hackers and pushed them to sign nondisclosure agreements forbidding them to tell regulators or users that the information was stolen. The company then concealed the ransom by calling it a “bug bounty,” in which hackers are hired to test the security of systems (Isaac, Benner, and Frenkel 2017, B1; Larson 2017b). Yet, as the New York Times noted, “The issue is not legally clear cut. Laws concerning bug bounties are ambiguous. The Justice Department weighed into bug disclosure programs for the first time in July and largely left it to organizations to decide what access they will authorize for hackers and what they can do with the data. . . . Breach disclosure laws also differ state to state. The state laws most relevant to Uber’s case require disclosure if names are exposed in with driver’s license numbers in a ‘breach of security’” (Perlroth and Isaac 2018, A1).21 At News Corp illicit hacking teams appear to have operated regularly under the direction of its board of directors and subsidiaries, depending on the business needs of the day. To bolster readership of News Corp’s well-known tabloids, its journalists have turned to innovative means of gathering information, including brute-force password hacking of voice-mail boxes to access and delete messages. One voicemail box belonged to a teenage UK girl at the center of a missing person’s case, who was later discovered murdered; others belonged to victims of 9/11. A former News of the World employee (Paul McMullan, deputy features editor) offered a wildly bent rationale for his team’s illegal phone hacking. He claimed that surveillance and privacy violations are necessary to acquire exclusive sources for any story: “Phone hacking is a perfectly acceptable tool, given the sacrifices we make, if all we’re trying to do is get to the truth. . . . Privacy is for pedos” (qtd. in Lyall 2011). By 2017 News Corp’s newspapers had settled with more than a thousand phone-hacking victims (Ruddick 2017). That same year News Corp’s News Group apologized in court to a former British intelligence official whose computer had been infected with eBlaster spyware by a “private investigations” firm operating under News Group’s direction (2017a). The legal record strongly suggests that hacking for business advantage is normal operation in News Corp’s TV distribution division as well. Although the company claims to have disproved all allegations of illegal hacks, their extensive computer hacking, including that in the service of “predatory piracy” (Sauer and Tepper 2008), has been traced to roughly 1997. Four separate lawsuits, accusing News Corp firms of hacking copy-protection schemes, revealed a News Corp team dedicated specifically to developing such “black ops” in support of its DirecTV operations. Following a 2011 shareholder action against the company, a court found News Corp’s subsidiary NDS guilty of hacking Vivendi and Echostar TV smart cards and recruiting hackers to distribute counterfeit NagraStar cards to pirate Dish Network signals, beginning in 1997. Specifically, NDS “was accused by satellite company EchoStar of illegally extracting software code from competitors’ cards and posting the information online, allowing hackers to create counterfeit cards that could be used to intercept television programming. A federal jury found that NDS’s practices were illegal and the court subsequently granted EchoStar an injunction preventing NDS from intercepting its satellite signal” (Pilkington 2011). NDS won on appeal to the U.S. Ninth Circuit Court in 2010 and eventually collected $18 million from EchoStar. But in the testimony a witness claimed to have been paid more than $20,000 in cash concealed in CD and DVD players from HarperCollins (a News Corp division) to “develop a pirating program to make DirecTV more secure, not to sabotage rival systems” (Zetter 2008). Researchers have noted that News Corp’s News America Marketing division “has been the subject of five lawsuits alleging anti-competitive behavior . . . [forcing] the company to pay out more than $650 million in settlements to three competitors” (Longstreth and Hals 2011). One suit involving a competitor, Floorgraphics, claimed that “on at least eleven separate occasions between October 2003 and January 2004, News intentionally, knowingly and without authorization breached FGI’s secure computer system and repeatedly accessed, viewed, took and obtained [Floorgraphics’] most sensitive and private information concerning its past and upcoming advertising and marketing programs” (Edwards 2009).22 News America Marketing settled the lawsuit by purchasing Floorgraphics’ contracts midtrial, before the company had finished presenting its case. The claims involving News Corp cluster around breaches of trusted systems, for corporate espionage (theft of intellectual property), hacking news makers and public officials, and circumventing digital-rights management (conditional access controls for competitors’ satellite TV channels). Their pattern begins with News Corp–owned (or majority-owned) companies instigating hacks against competitors, continues with defensive litigation, and typically resolves with a corporate takeover, settlement, or (in the case of News of the World) restructuring.23 As UK regulators evaluate the Murdoch dynasty as “fit and proper” in News Corp’s bid for total ownership of Sky (Sweney 2017), its hacking victims have undermined News Corp’s claims that its standards and practices are, to use British military parlance, tickety-boo. Volkswagen’s software hack enabled cars marketed as “clean diesel” vehicles to “pass” emissions tests despite dirty exhausts, and its discovery triggered international regulatory reforms for car emissions. Installed inside the car, Volkswagen’s defeat device informed the emissions-testing computer when a testing cycle was activated and changed the vehicle’s emissions accordingly. Researchers at West Virginia University discovered cars with hacked chips emitted pollutants almost forty times what was allowed by U.S. regulations (Glinton 2015). After pleading guilty to federal fraud and conspiracy charges, Volkswagen paid $15 billion in fines for software installed in cars made from 2009 to 2015 (McCarthy 2017). It also agreed to compensate individual owners and repair all affected models. An engineer pled guilty to participating in the scheme and was sentenced to a forty-month prison sentence in 2016. New York and Massachusetts attorneys general have pursued a civil case against Volkswagen, claiming that “this was a widespread conspiracy involving many, many people,” including the company’s CEO, who resigned when the scandal went public (Isidore 2016). At the time of this writing, German authorities arrested and held the CEO of Volkswagen’s Audi branch for over three months in an ongoing criminal investigation into emissions-test cheating. With the discovery of its “defeat devices,” Volkswagen found itself on the wrong side of its own hack. But Volkswagen was not charged with creating and deploying defeat devices; it was instead charged with conspiracy to defraud the United States and its customers and to violate the Clean Air Act. However, two years prior to the emissions-hack revelations, Volkswagen sued Flavio Garcia, a computer science security researcher at the University of Birmingham (and his team), to prevent disclosure of a vulnerability in the antitheft system of some Volkswagen vehicles, including high-end sports cars. In this case Volkswagen asked the UK government to censor research findings that the wireless autoignition system was easily hackable by thieves or others with criminal intent. The lawsuit prevented Garcia and his team from presenting their findings at the USENIX Security Conference in Washington, DC, in August 2013 (Trotman 2013).24 Publication of the research (Garcia, Verdult, and Ege 2013) was delayed two years by the suit but was soon followed by a new paper, whose findings were even more serious (Garcia et al. 2016): “Volkswagen left not only its ignition vulnerable but the keyless entry system that unlocks the vehicle’s doors, too. And this time, they say, the flaw applies to practically every car Volkswagen has sold since 1995.” These cars numbered about a hundred million units. With Volkswagen’s security system disclosed as a potential attack vector, the company faces extensive recalls and repairs and possibly other large expenditures related to the vulnerability (although none are reported at the time of this writing). The hack used a cheap, off-the-shelf microcomputer kit (called an Arduino). The suit against the Birmingham researchers raised concerns that the company may have known about the security vulnerability for years. The chip manufacturer that served Volkswagen and other companies noted that VW’s chip uses “a legacy security algorithm, introduced 18 years ago. . . . Our customers are aware” (Greenberg 2016). The UK court’s 2013 order against Flavio Garcia’s team quashed the news of the vulnerabilities and placed an embargo on their publication. The ruling reduced VW’s short-term financial risk in the conflict but potentially increased security risks to the public through vulnerabilities that were known but unfixed for at least two years. These three cases of corporate “growth hacks” are known through their failures; we must ask how many other cases –successful or not— have gone undiscovered and unreported. Each company has offered a unique response to its resulting public-relations nightmare. Volkswagen launched advertisements titled, “Keeping Your Promises” with the tagline, “It’s more than just a car. It’s keeping your promises” (Slater 2016), a campaign seemingly designed to exploit audience ignorance or shortterm memory loss. News Corp’s Rupert Murdoch (sort of) apologized to the family of the dead thirteen-year-old girl whose voice mail was hacked: “As the founder of the company, I was appalled to find out what happened” (“Murdoch Begins” 2011). Uber claimed to have deployed Greyball in charity, “because it was ‘deeply concerned that its driverpartners would be penalized financially’ or otherwise for their driving” (“Uber Faces” 2017). The cases of Uber, News Corp, and Volkswagen share a corporate realpolitik: turnabout is fair play when hacking is part of corporate strategy. Hack your customers, your employees, your competitors, your regulators, and, if expeditious, retaliate if you’re hacked. Deny, disclaim, or even cover up as needed, and offer a counternarrative for plausible deniability. Use antihacking law to your advantage if others find bugs in your trusted systems. None of these cases demonstrates negligence as clearly as they demonstrate hubristic anticompetitiveness. As giant corporations caught abusing trust, their growth hacks add social risk, complexity, and extra layers of secrecy and suspicion to the economy, politics, and the law. They signify the impetus to manipulate trusted systems, a form of “soft power,” to compete for advantage. A hacker’s successful exploit of a trusted system is not the sort of news willingly shared by a company whose reputation and business depends on that system. News of hacking cases bubbles up from industry trade magazines, hacker forums, security email listservs, and other sources removed from the business pages of newspapers and magazines. Hacking tools and techniques allow states and corporations to manipulate sociotechnical systems for advantage, sometimes illegally through outright fraud but more commonly through legal “gray zones.” Nurtured by legal fictions, aporias, and other vagaries, hacking can blur the boundaries between military and corporate intelligence programs, between national and international legal systems, and between corporations and clients. Hacking can catalyze changes in multiple domains and across related subsystems, often in a “cascading” fashion that can escalate the scale of their effects (Landau 2013, 160). Since interconnected networks increasingly are essential to the state’s political and economic functions, they are considered to be among the state’s strategic defense interests. Yet national legal regimes are riddled with inconsistencies that reduce their effectiveness in coordinating social systems and may even exacerbate social risks of hacking.

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