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The affirmative’s need for militaristic innovation upholds the drive for capital investment in harmful technologies

Wilson 20 (Neil Wilson, Master’s at Utrecht University, “Understanding the Battle for AI in Warfare through the Practices of Assemblage: A Case Study of Project Maven”, Utrecht University, 8/2/20, https://studenttheses.uu.nl/bitstream/handle/20.500.12932/37392/Neil%20Wilson%20MA%20Thesis%20%281%29.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y) // EL

4.1.1. Military-Technological Complex “To overcome challenges to our military superiority,” declared the US Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel in 2014, “we must change the way we innovate, operate, and do business.” Noticing tides of change lapping at his feet, Hagel recognised that new ways of war required new ways of business. From his perspective, the problem of AI in defence was one of access: the technology existed, but was out of reach of the DoD. Cooperation with new industrial partners would be essential to developing these new technologies and, in turn, maintaining American military superiority. To understand why the Department of Defense needed to forge new alignments with industry, it helps to consider previous practices of military research and development (R&D) and their (un)suitability for purpose. In the post-WWII era, a “Military Industrial Complex” emerged among the civilian industrial conglomerates (e.g. Boeing and General Motors). Simultaneously, significant public investments into military R&D boomed and led to several technologies now commonplace in the civilian sphere, such as GPS. In fact, this cross-pollination of public funding and technological innovation between the military and civilian spheres transformed Silicon Valley’s from a “landscape of fruit orchards into a hub of electronics production and innovations.” At the conclusion of the Cold War, the Military-Industrial Complex lost its raison d’etre. Fifty-five billion dollars of acquisitions and mergers followed, as many engineering companies parted with their defence businesses, consolidating the defence industry into five “titans.” Concurrently, DoD procurement practices became cumbersome and convoluted, resulting in $46bn wasted between 2001 and 2011 on weapons systems that never entered production. Most acquisition programes took years or even decades to reach the battlefield. Tightening belts and a slow production line blunted the technical edge of the Military-Industrial Complex. Today, most R&D investments are dominated by the private sector. By 2014, when Hagel announced the Third Offset Strategy, it was clear that digital technologies were the future of defence. As the leader of Project Maven Jack Shanahan noted, “the future battlespace is constructed of not only ships, tanks, missiles, and satellites, but also algorithms, networks, and sensor grids.” Hagel obliquely referred to LAWS with his warning that the US army “could one day go into battle confronting a range of advanced technologies that limit our freedom of maneuver.” Deputy Secretary of Defense Bob Work, by contrast, was more explicit: “10 years from now if the first person through a breach isn't a fricking robot, shame on us” Moreover, the official DoD directive on LAWS declared its intention to develop autonomous weapons with “appropriate levels of human judgment” that would satisfy “the law of war, applicable treaties, weapon system safety rules, and applicable rules of engagement.” From this, it appears the problem was perceived not in the technology itself but in developing it to a certain standard. It could not do so alone. Technological innovation took centre stage in the Third Offset Strategy but would require new actors, by Hagel’s own admission: “[The] DoD no longer has exclusive access to the most cutting-edge technology or the ability to spur or control the development of new technologies the way we once did. So we will actively seek proposals from the private sector… those firms and academic institutions outside DoD’s traditional orbit.” Technology companies, by contrast, were not as public in their intentions of working with the DoD. Despite Silicon Valley’s government-funded roots, its radically different working culture of “disruption” and willingness to “fail fast, fail often” were institutionally alien to the DoD. Beyond these normative issues, many technology companies regarded the Pentagon as too small a customer to work with, especially given the bureaucracy involved. Similarly, the huge sets of training data required to make useful machine-learning algorithms are hard to come by for defence purposes. Notably, well before Project Maven was even established, Google was making significant inroads in robotics development but appeared unwilling to work with the Pentagon, however it was unclear whether this was driven by ideological or market considerations. Nevertheless, it was clear that for many tech companies the problem was perceived in a technical manner similar to the DoD: the issue was not necessarily developing the technology but establishing the partnerships.

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