The affirmative’s obsession with the efficiency of remote warfare mystifies conflict into a “war without bodies” entrenching a cycle of violence
Wilson 20 (Neil Wilson, Master’s at Utrecht University, “Understanding the Battle for AI in Warfare through the Practices of Assemblage: A Case Study of Project Maven”, Utrecht University, 8/2/20, https://studenttheses.uu.nl/bitstream/handle/20.500.12932/37392/Neil%20Wilson%20MA%20Thesis%20%281%29.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y) // EL
2.2. Remote Warfare The best indication of warfare’s near future can be found in its recent past. With this in mind, LAWS can be contextualised by the ascendancy of “remote warfare.” Defined as “a strategy of countering threats at a distance, without the deployment of large military forces,” remote warfare takes a variety of forms, including the use of technological (e.g. drones) or physical (e.g. partner forces, private military contractors) proxies. By considering remote warfare from strategic-political and tactical-technological perspectives, LAWS can be considered a natural continuation of technologically-enabled warfighting among risk-averse Western states. The technologies of remote warfare - particularly drones - cannot be fully understood without attending to the strategic and political impetus for their use. “Stand-off” warfighting runs deeper than any single technology. At the turn of the millennium, Ignatieff’s analysis of the “Virtual War” in Kosovo noted that Precision-Guided Munitions (PGMs) promised “speedy, risk-free victory.” Contemporaneously, others noted the ascendancy of of “riskless x warfare” and “risk-transfer militarism” establishing a trend towards the asymmetrical deployment of force in Western Military operations. Patterns of risk-aversion among Western forces observed at the turn of the millennium have since accelerated. A combination of past failures, budgetary constraints, and increased political and popular scrutiny mean Western militaries exercise even greater caution in their troop deployments today. Risk-aversion has not precluded military engagement entirely, but has prompted states to consider alternative means of projecting influence without committing large ground forces. In his conceptualisation of “vicarious warfare,” Waldman therefore notes the pre-eminence of delegating force (to proxies and partner forces) and danger-proofing personnel (through airstrikes and remotely-piloted weapons systems) in contemporary military interventions. Delegation and danger-proofing respectively constitute the social and material forms of mitigating risk to US troops. Similar dynamics have been observed among other NATO members. Put simply, the strategic appeal of remote warfare is perceived as efficiency: risking less and achieving more. From a tactical perspective, the efficiency engendered by remote warfare was made possible by technological innovation. For this reason, a burgeoning field of scholarship has emerged around the technologies of remote warfare, particularly drones - “the most visible application of the information age to contemporary warfare.” Chamayou’s seminal treatise on Drone Theory takes an expansive look at the political, ethical and legal implications of drone warfare, concluding that “remote war is a war of human machines against the human body… one side loses people; the other side loses toys.” While this analysis does consider the human impact of this technology, it remains overwhelmingly focused on the drone itself. Some argue this “fetishisation” of drone technologies (predominantly by military actors but also in academia) mystifies their human relations. Myopic focus on technologies alone thus risks presenting a false image of “war without bodies.” Scholars of remote warfare are not alone in their tendency to perceive technology deterministically. Despite the centrality of technology to IR, its study too-often assumes it is either entirely controlled by humans or distinctly separate from human agency. In line with Latour’s concept of the Black Box, “technical work is made invisible by its own success,” leaving us unaware of its broader significance. As Flusser quipped, however, “technology has become too serious a matter to be left to technicians.” There is thus a need to apprehend the complex socio-technical systems that produce and are served by technologies. Or, as Hoijtink and Leese invite, to “render them political” and consider “the politics that go into technology, as well as the politics that emanate from technology.” In such socio-technical systems, accounting for the interaction of humans, technologies and structures invites analysis of how agency and power may be produced, distributed and transformed.