Their threat toward undersea cable systems is exaggerated and a form of fearmongering
Bueger 21 (Christian Bueger, Professor of International Relations at the University of Copenhagen, “Protecting hidden infrastructure: The security politics of the global submarine data cable network”, Contemporary Security Policy, 3/29/21, https://www-tandfonline-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/pdf/10.1080/13523260.2021.1907129?needAccess=true) // EL
Cable security and the problem of threat inflation While the control and security of submarine communication infrastructure were a core issue and part of the security calculations during the two World Wars as well as the Cold War (Hills, 2002; Smith, 2018), in the post-Cold War environment such concerns were less prevalent. The uncontested U.S. naval hegemony and the primacy of non-state threats moved such issues to the margins. The new discourse on the protection of critical infrastructures influenced by the concerns over transnational terrorism of the 2000s did not change this substantially. It is only in the early 2010s, that scholars such as Sechrist (2012), Ross (2014), or Martinage (2015) called attention to the security of the submarine cable network. Since then, a number of studies have documented the relevance of cables for national and international security. Anchored in the wider geopolitical, strategic, and military discourses of the North Atlantic security community, contributors are concerned about the rise of hybrid warfare, the perceived hostility of Russia’s foreign policy, the fear of a large-scale cyber-attack, and the growing technical sophistication of terrorist groups. The focus of such studies is hence the vulnerability of the cable network emanating from deliberate attacks. Observations of Russian submarine activities in territorial waters and in proximity to cable routes, that became public in 2015, triggered much of this debate (Hicks et al., 2016, pp. 3–4). This raised concerns that the Russian navy might tap into the cables for espionage and surveillance, temper with or even cut them as part of a hybrid warfare campaign. Schaub et al. (2017, p. 37) stress that “cables and nodes would be prime targets in a hybrid warfare campaign” instigated by Russia. A former Supreme Allied Commander at the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) suggests that this seems obvious, as “in the case of heightened tensions, access to the underwater cable system represents a rich trove of intelligence, a potential major disruption to an enemy’s economy and a symbolic chest thump for the Russian Navy” (Stavridis, 2016). Similarly, a report by the British think tank Policy Exchange emphasizes that “whether from terrorist activity or an increasingly bellicose Russian naval presence, the threat of these vulnerabilities being exploited is growing” (Sunak, 2017, p. 5). Others suggest that undersea cables are inherently susceptible to attacks from non-state violent groups and terrorism, since their location is usually public, cables tend to be highly concentrated geographically and the level of technical expertise and resources required to damage them are limited (Martinage, 2015; Matis, 2012; Sunak, 2017). These studies are supplemented by governmental reports that examine and assess threats to the undersea cable network. NATO’s military leadership for instance warned that the Russian navy is threatening the undersea cable network (Birnbaum, 2017). It is, nevertheless, not clear whether NATO believes Russia has the capability or the intention of attacking cable networks (Hinck, 2017). In order to mitigate the threats to the undersea cable network, above studies situate cable security in the context of national security strategies and call for a military response. Increased naval patrols, surveillance activities and other measures of deterrence are the proposed responses (Martinage, 2015; Matis, 2012; Sunak, 2017). Other proposals concern national focal points, public-private coordination and the creation of cable protection zones (Davenport, 2015; Martinage, 2015; Schaub et al., 2017; Sunak, 2017). However, neither scholars nor public officials have provided much detailed information about the substance of a Russian or terrorist threat to the cable infrastructure. Hinck (2017), for instance, diagnoses a general lack of information regarding any threats to the undersea cable network, particularly when it comes to the alleged Russian intentions, plans and activities. So far, no intentional hostile disruptions to the submarine cable infrastructure have been reported publicly. The scenarios underpinning the threat discourse hence seem to be built not on prior incidents but on overall assessments of the geopolitical landscape. Arguably, this implies that the threat scenarios could be exaggerated and point to a substantial risk of threat inflation and fearmongering.