Algorithmic warfare expands mass techno-inflicted violence across the globe and risks nuclear extinction.
Johnson, 18—Professor, Environmental History, Loyola University Chicago (Benjamin, “Coded Conflict: Algorithmic and Drone Warfare in US Security Strategy,” Journal of Military and Strategic Studies, Volume 18, Issue 4, dml)
The notion that people can be killed ‘incorrectly’ represents the dominant concern in military appropriation of civilian technologies and replicates the same troubling issue that is identified by post-colonial critiques of drone warfare: that implicitly there is a ‘correct’ and therefor ethical way to kill people at all. However, even the post-colonial focus on how surveillance and kill targets are ‘Othered’ and the violence encountered through that process is only part of a larger set of issues raised by the focus on algorithmic warfare. Given that security discourse is beginning to re-emphasize the importance of long-term interstate competition and a security strategy predicated on information-decision cycle dominance through algorithmic superiority, the implications posed go beyond the violence of surveillance and killing.
For one, the increasing militarization of everyday life supports the normalization of drones and weapons, which in turn legitimates their use in regimes of violence. This in and of itself is not a departure from the liberal way of war but a strengthening of its underlying rationality – that peace must be secured through force.
Second, while the focus has also been on the role of algorithms in shaping autonomous weapons without the perceived ethics of a human consciousness (which itself is a problematic position), the implications of algorithmic decision making go much farther than autonomous weapons. The most recent security strategy rhetoric, which defines its adversarial advantage in terms of decision-making cycles, shares a similar but amplified form of the game-theoretic rationality that underpinned Cold-War thinking under the rubric of ‘mutually assured destruction’ (MAD). However, unlike MAD, which theoretically maintained a balance of power (however uncomfortable) between the US and USSR, the new logic of decision cycle advantage has been combined with an equal shift towards a rhetorical need for weapons that exist below the threshold of non-use (whether because of their destructive capability or cost). While the National Defense Strategy states an overall strategy of interaction “below the level of armed conflict,”131 there is a troubling scenario presented when decision making is theoretically collapsed into the instantaneous without humans necessarily ‘in the loop.’132 Combined with a rhetorical stance that has emphasized a need for new weapons and a modernized nuclear arsenal with ‘small-yield’ warheads, which are argued to introduce a measure of ‘limit’ and tactical capability within US nuclear deterrence,133 the expansion and normalization of algorithmic violence seems a likely future for societies across the globe. Dillon and Reid have already alluded to the possibilities encountered in this environment. They argue that:
endless war is underwritten here by a new set of problems [because] these wars no longer benefit from the possibility of scoring outright victory, retreating, or achieving a lasting negotiated peace by means of political compromise. Indeed, deprived of the prospect of defining enmity in advance, war itself becomes just as complex, dynamic, adaptive and radically interconnected as the world of which it is part. That is why ‘any such war to end war becomes a war without end [...].134
This is not to suggest that the future looks like the totalitarian and apocalyptic scenarios of fiction. However, the ‘unending’ and ‘everywhere’ war does imply, following Focault’s interest in the continuation of war once peace has been declared, that the spatial and temporal parameters of conflict are increasingly escaping even the foggiest notion that peace and war are inseparable. Shaw has argued that failing to conceive of artificial intelligence in terms of its behavioural agency (which is implicitly limited to humans) fails to consider how artificial intelligence and robots will transform the global political order independent of their instrumental use by.135 At its most seemingly innocuous end in terms of the spectrum of possibilities encountered, the set of issues posed suggest that war and security will increasingly become a routinized, normalized and indeed biopolitical in terms of its structure for even the smallest processes of everyday life across multiple spaces. At the other end of this spectrum towards the seemingly impossible nightmare scenarios encountered in fiction, algorithmic warfare is posed to extend the liberal rationality of ‘peace through force’ into the realm of totalitarianism and the threat of mass techno-inflicted violence across the globe.
Conclusion
The notion that war is now ‘never-ending’ has a two-fold dimension. The first is that in order to retain advantage over one’s opponents, one must be continuously adapting and innovating, especially as those opponents are able to play ‘catch-up’ at an increasing speed. The second dimension is that, as a consequence of the first dimension, the life-worlds of individuals and societies will be increasingly subjugated to a particular militarized and securitized logic of adaptation and innovation, such that human life itself risks being lost to totalitarian governance or even total destruction. This of course is a dramatization of the latent possibilities in a ‘permanent’ and ‘everywhere’ war. However, as a great deal of research has shown, these latent possibilities are already actual realities for an increasing number of people across the globe. Thus, the potential consequences of these dramatic possibilities should not be discounted.
As a brief summary of the expansive discussion made above, this article has argued that drone and algorithmic warfare are an expression of and an indivisible tool for the ‘never-ending’ war that is now propelling US security strategy rhetoric. These technologies and the never-ending war itself are not ‘new’ in the sense that there is a clean break between the conflicts of yesterday and today. However, modern warfare is not the same either. Rather, these technologies and the rationalities that underpin them are part of a much larger set of practices that are historically rooted with linkages to the Cold War, the World Wars, and even to the Napoleonic Wars, but have increasingly penetrated the lives of everyone in new and complex ways. In this respect, drone and algorithmic warfare represent a particular configuration of a simultaneous evolution in technological capability and an acute faith in that capability to mitigate the risks of uncertainty, which paradoxically appear to be increasing as a result of globalized networks. Fukuyama’s ‘end of history’ it seems gave birth to the very conditions that are undermining its own stability. While the policies and technologies associated with counter-terrorism have formed and will undoubtedly continue to form a major part of this security environment, the return of ‘great power competition’ entails much wider implications stemming from an intensified focus on distance and autonomy. If the recent US security strategy is to serve as an indicator for where history will go, it will be a race to not only decide more than the ‘Other’, whoever that may be, but to know, decide and, if necessary, strike faster – to essentially collapse the spectrum of domains and dominate a singular domain of space-time. To accomplish this may require a totalizing endeavor not dissimilar to the complete and total mobilization of society needed to wage the World Wars, the culmination of total war. However, unlike the blurring of the civilian and military spheres along with the mass mobilization of labour and industrial capacity, total war in the ‘never-ending’ sense implies that it will happen in the networks and minutia of everyday life, perhaps without us even knowing it.