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Cybernetic capitalism makes US-china war so inevitable

Dyer-Witheford and Matviyenko 19—associate professor of information and media studies at the University of Western Ontario; assistant professor of communication at Simon Fraser University (Nick and Svitlana, Cyberwar and Revolution: Digital Subterfuge in Global Capitalism) //ansel

These companies’ collaborations with the U.S. security apparatus include their acquiescence to the NSA PRISM surveillance program, an episode they are now energetically attempting to live down. It also includes their lucrative provision of services to U.S. military and intelligence agencies, ranging from massive data storage and processing facilities (Amazon and Google) to space-based “geospatial visualization services” (Google) to “wearable tech” for the armed services (Apple) as well as surveillance systems for the private military contractors that now constitute the sizable penumbra of Pentagon operations (Alexander 2015; Gregg 2017; Levine 2014a, 2014b).8 This reciprocity also involves the “revolving door” between high-level Silicon Valley and Pentagon managers and their shared culture of global “problem-solving” think tanks, typified by Google’s Jigsaw, and a willingness to censor internet material at the behest of the U.S. government, once only sporadically disclosed but now in full swing after the 2016 election hacking scandal (Assange 2014; Levine 2014c; Greenwald 2017b). Yet the United States has cyberwar vulnerabilities. Paradoxically, these result from its historically advantageous “home game” (Segal 2016; 35) advantage: a highly networked military and economy susceptible to hacker attack. This problem is intensified by the neoliberal form of capitalism the United States champions. Free market zealotry is at once governmentally embraced and on occasion makes it difficult for the U.S. state to enforce cybersecurity provisions on private capital, around issues ranging from the reporting of cyberattacks to mobile phone encryption. It is largely in reaction to U.S. strengths and weaknesses that Russia and China have developed their own capacities and strategies. In particular, rather than seeing cyberwar as a distinct sphere of military operations, it is for these nations’ military forces subsumed within a larger category of “information warfare” that comprehends forms of psychological operations and propaganda. This orientation, taken together with the different historic levels and paths of technological development, has led to distinctive approaches to conflict in cyberspace.

The People’s Republic of China (PRC) was until recently the main object of popular U.S. cyberwar anxieties: depictions of transpacific wars fought with digital weapons abound in both fictional entertainments and serious political scenarios (Singer and Cole 2015; McCoy 2017). Yet although China’s digital policies and practices have been presented in the most ominous terms in U.S. media, they may be as much a sign of weakness as of strength (Lindsay 2014; Lindsay, Cheung, and Reveron 2015). An important factor driving the leaders of the Chinese Communist Party to open their country to the world market at the end of the 1970s was the perception of massive and intensifying technological backwardness vis-à-vis the West. As the PRC confronts the question of whether, in the global market, it will be an economic “head servant” (Hung 2009) to the United States or risk conflict over issues of trade and political dominance in the Pacific, this awareness shapes China’s concept of cyberwar. Thus, for the Chinese state, a major concern is, notoriously, maintenance of ideological control over a population perceived as vulnerable to terrorism, to separatism, and to “foreign influences” of the sort projected by U.S. digital “soft power.” This control is exercised through the elaborate and continually evolving apparatus of digital censorship, surveillance, and preemption shorthanded as the “Great Firewall of China.” This system combines blackouts of proscribed websites, algorithmic filtering and monitoring of email, and interventions by internet militias (the so-called Fifty Cent Army, named for the alleged pay rate for each posting) or bureaucrats to divert or disrupt controversial discussions with pro-government cheerleading with digital surveillance of, and attacks on, overseas sites and groups attempting to evade censorship (Lindsay, Cheung, and Reveron 2015; Klimburg 2017). Administered via the collaboration of private-sector internet service providers with state authorities, the system has been characterized by a changing, erratic enforcement that by its very uncertainty increases the risk to dissenters. The Firewall, which has undoubtedly contributed to China’s unenviable record of large-scale imprisonment of social activists and journalists, has been a frequent target of Western criticisms for violations of internet freedom, though these have subsided somewhat post-Snowden. China’s possible larger plans for an extensive “social credit” system based on monitoring of internet practices and “scoring” of social and perhaps political behavior would represent the logical consolidation of this system (Economist 2016a).

The overlap between issues of hard and soft power in a cyberwar context is demonstrated by what Bratton (2016, 112) terms the “Sino-Google war.” Between 2002 and 2010, Google was involved in protracted and complex disputes with the PRC over that state’s internet censorship. These intensified when, in 2006, Google set up a Google China subsidiary, headquartered in Beijing. After oscillating between compliance and noncompliance, and having suffered highly sophisticated hacking attacks, which the NSA offered to help counter (Levine 2014b), Google China closed its mainland office in 2010 and, though it continued operating from Hong Kong, now holds only a tiny share of China’s search activity. This episode can be interpreted in several ways: as a clash between internet freedom and authoritarianism (the version favored by Western politicians, internet pundits, and media); as an intercapitalist dispute between Google and China’s major domestic, and state-championed, search enterprise, Baidu; or, as Bratton describes it, as a collision between rival concepts of the internet’s relation to the state, one giving the former primacy over the latter, the other reversing that priority.

Although there is something to be said for all these perspectives, they overlook the one Bratton explicitly rejects: “superpower” conflict. Yet the period of the “Sino-Google war” was one of mounting tensions between the United States and China, including the unfolding aftermath of China’s earlier capture of a U.S. spy plane (Hersh 2010); American accusations of large-scale digital espionage, both economic and military, by Chinese hackers (Segal 2016); NSA “implants” in the networks of China’s giant telecommunications company (Hsu 2014); and widespread expectations that Sino-American tensions could trigger the first full-scale cyberwar (expectations still widely held, even if Russia has lately publicly supplanted China as an object of U.S. suspicions). In this context, it is hardly surprising that the issue of a giant U.S. internet company not only skirting China’s Great Firewall but also amassing massive information about China’s data subjects, and establishing itself as gateway to global networks, was extraordinarily tense.9

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