We must turn to the question of the dream in politics and the question of politics in dreaming. The alternative is radical nonpreference – a radical formulation of subjectivity that dwells in the gap between individualism and individualization to create new collectivites and embrace the contingency of the world.
Gray and Eloff, 22—School of Philosophy at North-West University (Chantelle and Aragorn, “Fabulation in a Time of Algorithmic Ecology: Making the Future Possible Again,” Technology, Urban Space and the Networked Community, Chapter 5, 105-133, SpringerLink, dml) //ansel recut [pharmakon=something which is both poison and cure simultaneously]
The answer to our problems does not lie in primitivism or any other return to a (mythical) better past. We are here; we need to find ways to deal with now if we are to rescue the future. The answer, equally, does not solely lie in reform. Rather, we need to ask what we want our societies to look like—and here we can look to the past for some ideas without returning to it. In short, we need to foster new forms of collectivity in the maze of individualism and individualisation. This requires radical new formulations of subjectivity that take into account our contemporary situation. Like Bartleby, it might consist of a preference not to, which is neither refusal nor acceptance: it simply “posits an impossibility” (Deleuze 1997, 71). This impossibility or nonpreference produces a tension, an ambiguity that creates a path for escaping the neurosis of the world. That is, the little fissure it creates gives way to a mapping of trajectories away from subjugated groups and towards new types of group subjects that do not merely concede to the present, either in terms of an eschatology of techno-singularitarianism or hikimomori-style withdrawal. For Guattari, this involves processes of resingularisation, where singularisation refers to a self-organizing process that at its most basic level concerns bringing together ensembles of diverse components (material/semiotic; individual/collective), that is, assemblages … that deploy their own intrinsic references (inventing relations with the outside as well), and the analysis of their effects (especially transformations) on the formation of subjectivity beyond the individuated subject and prefabricated versions of him/her. [them](Genosko 2001, 129)
Far from the homophile groups of online life, this requires, as Guattari foresaw, an injection of heterogeneity where individuals can be confronted with ideas dissimilar from their own and opportunities to talk this through rather than reactively cancelling 27 someone. It requires forms of offline life that nurture transgenerational, intergenerational, interpersonal, personal and pre-personal long-circuits in order to reach the Neganthropocene, a place of dreams. As Stiegler puts it: we must turn to the question of the dream in politics and the question of the politics of dreaming—where dreams would be the resource of any neganthropogenesis, that is, any exosomatic organogenesis such that it would preserve its future by maintaining its noetic capacity. (Stiegler 2019, 162)
These new social practices of liberation—yes, of dreaming—cannot be based on new hierarchical relations. Instead, one of the main goals needs to be the creation of new alliances, a transversal politics, “that confers to these initiatives a character of living subjectivation and irreplaceable experience, that ‘is worth being lived’, that ‘gives meaning to life’” (Guattari and Negri 2010, 125). In short, we are looking for health. Interestingly, for Deleuze and Guattari, as for Nietzsche before them, health is not opposed to illness; rather it is the “immanent process whereby illness brings about its own autocritique and self-overcoming” (Tynan 2010, 155). The illness of our time therefore needs to be transmuted in order to create new ways of living again—and this is of course the schizoanalytic practice. The aim is to see our current algorithmic articulations as a pharmakon—that, precisely, is Bartleby’s stance. It is a productive paradox, an affirmation of life and the future, rather than a negation of it. Importantly, though, it is only with the pharmakon that knowledge takes care of the pharmakon … the whole manifold of life-knowledge—which passes through rituals as well as habitus, trades and forms of worship [cultes] that are found in any society insofar as it consists in a social cohesion that is a collective individuation, cultivating, through these always diverse pathways, the organic and organological solidarity in which it consists. (Stiegler 2019, 224)
The individualist, individualising societies we currently find ourselves in have not only lost their means of tertiary protention, but a memory of what a society is and can be: that which allows the development and co-creation of individual and social freedom; where material goods are produced in order to meet the physical needs of everyone in a society, rather than satisfy the insatiable requirements of capitalism; where free and equal social relationships are fostered so that people can flourish mentally and emotionally and, in turn, develop their ethical and creative capacities.28 If this is the basis of our society, algorithms would have a very different function and that, we hold, is more important than reform.