Cybersecurity is an assemblage of knowledge and power. Their interpretation functions as cybernetic obfuscation to hide its operations.
Dyer-Witheford and Matviyenko 2019—associate professor of information and media studies at the University of Western Ontario; assistant professor of communication at Simon Fraser University (Nick and Svitlana, Cyberwar and Revolution: Digital Subterfuge in Global Capitalism) //ansel
These definitional debates are not abstract semantic disputes. As Robert Kaiser (2015) argues, since 2000, cyberwar has named an emergent “knowledge power assemblage,” mobilizing institutional powers, lavish budgets, and lucrative career paths. It has become the core of a discursive “resonance machine,” with its own “catalyzing agents,” “shimmering points” of elaboration, refinement and subtle discrimination, and “centers of calculation,” focused around the materialization of a “new policy object” (Kaiser 2015, 11–20). In 2009, after tortuous bureaucratic infighting between competing governmental departments and military agencies, the Pentagon created a Cyber Command to conduct operations in a “cyberdomain” now deemed as important as land, sea, air, and space. This is a logic being duplicated within national security states around the world. The observation that cyberwar has now become extremely handy for acquiring big funds for research and militarization (Rid 2013) is true, but, with a self-validating circularity, the cyberwar apparatuses built on this promotional discourse not only speak but also prepare and act. Public knowledge of these cyberwar acts is, however, limited and distorted; if the new cyberwar complexes are in one way new “assemblages of knowledge and power,” they are also assemblages of power, nonknowledge and antiknowledge, military factories of ignorance and obfuscation. War always involves secrets, but cyberwars are exceptionally deeply cloaked. As Michael Kenney (2015, 117) observes, “cyber-warfare is typically a covert form of statecraft. Herein lies much of [its] utility as a weapon: states can attack their adversaries without declaring war against them.” If there is one cyberwar cliché more common than “you may not be interested in cyberwar,” it is a redo of Clausewitz’s “fog of war” as “fog of cyberwar” (Valeriano and Maness 2012; Canabarro and Borne 2013; Rantapelkonen and Salminen 2013). Digital war is a veritable fog machine, because operations are usually conducted covertly and are often intended to confuse; hacks are hidden from view and, when discovered, are laden with misdirection; signals intelligence implodes into infoglut. Apparently incriminating traces of hacking tools left at the site of a digital breach may be intentional false flags and what looks like a singular exploit actually a chain of attacks by different actors “piling on” to a discovered system vulnerability. Is a hacking exploit that leaves as a signature the name of the founder of the Soviet secret service a careless, or cavalier, disclosure of national responsibility—or a blatant red herring? As of today, it can be said that all, or nearly all, obvious indicators pointing to a potential responsible party, such as time, specifics of code, politics or other motifs, and cybertactics, can be manufactured to point in a wrong direction. In investigating cyberwar, conspiracy theory is methodologically mandatory. However, not only attribution of attacks but also the distinction between attacks and accidents becomes highly problematic; “fog of war” (ignorance) and “friction of war” (mishap) intermingle. Cyberwar thus tends to “obliterating proof ” (Filiol 2011, 260), sometimes by producing too many proofs, “incessant fluctuations” of proofs, to use Claude Shannon’s phrase for noise, or, in the words of W. Ross Ashby ([1963] 1966), “variety [that] can destroy variety.”
Cybersecurity experts argue that, given sufficient time, it is indeed possible to make a reasonable determination of responsibility for cyberattacks. This process can involve analyzing technical details, such as the design of malware payload or “IP addresses, email addresses, domain names, and small pieces of text” used in the attack; comparing the modus operandi of hackers with the known profiles gathered from other cases; and assessing the likely reasons for an intrusion—but even then, verification is a matter of degree of certainty rather than a binary yes or no answer (Rid and Buchanan 2016). In this book, we often necessarily rely on such “balance of probability” interpretations, but with an awareness that cyberwar is a weaponization of information that always threatens to destroy truth. It is, as Justin Joque (2018, “Foreword”) writes, a force of “machinic deconstruction” that constantly threatens “to sweep away any belief in security.” We write also knowing that, in “a world where it is not clear who is hacking whom” (Ridgeway 2017), the attribution of cyberwar activity can itself become a tactic setting up an adversary for sanctions and retaliation. Academic interpretation, too, can be weaponized; those who stare into the abyss of cyberwar soon find it staring back at them.