Our arg obviously isn’t that nation-states don’t exist, but that focusing primarily on them is unproductive.
Joque, 18—PhD from the European Grad School, researches philosophy, technology and media and is the visualization librarian at the University of Michigan, go blue (Justin, “Buffer Overflow: The Space and Time of Cyberwar,” Deconstruction Machines: Writing in the Age of Cyberwar, Chapter 1, 31-32, dml)
Throughout the short history of cyberwar, the vast majority of attacks have taken place outside of declared conflicts and kinetic wars. It is striking, then, that if we follow both the media and military establishments in calling these events war, war appears no longer to exist in a specific time or place. If cyberwar is taken in its broadest sense to mean a new mode of war targeted against systems, it then marks a new relationship to the space and time of war and attests to the reconfiguration of global spaces by economic, legal, social, and military forces. While many are quick to see in cyberwar an inevitable apocalyptic catastrophe, and while others dismiss these warnings as pure hype, it is most productive to set aside that particular debate and instead explore the specific logic of cyberwar. Under the logic of computer and network-based attacks, certain tendencies of military and economic thinking about the global space of the twenty-first century come to the fore regardless of the ultimate success or failure of these computerized attacks.
Cyberwar exploits security gaps in digital systems and networks and at the same time leverages the global reach of these networks. The attacks that have been organized under the name of cyberwar create nearly immediate effects at a distance, sending information and malicious code around the globe at the speed of light. Cyberwar exists intimately within what Castells calls “the rise of the network society.”1 These attacks on networked digital systems both speak to and engage with these increasingly connected global spaces. Moreover, even while these attacks exploit the vulnerabilities of programs, they are exploited by and in order to leverage spatial and temporal networks. To understand what is at stake in cyberwar, especially as it moves outside the time and space of declared war, requires us to account for these shifts in geography and for the impact of cyberwar on the continual reconfiguration of geography and networks.
This transformation of global space through networks does not mark the end of geography. Rather, geographic space is supplemented by networks of computers, trade, international law, migrations, and so on, some of which privilege flows, speed, and networked contiguity, while others privilege place, slowness, and disconnection. Cyberwar takes place across and between this entire set of geographic and networked spaces. Twenty-first-century military and political strategy does not give up on geopolitics; rather, it engages a multiplicity of spaces and domains. Within these spaces, certain nodes are selected as sites of intervention for their importance to the multitude of networks of which they are part. In a sense, though territory does not disappear, it becomes another type of node in a global set of interwoven networks. Hence warfare, and especially cyberwar, ceases to be exclusively territorial (if it ever was) and becomes primarily concerned with networks. If territory is merely another node in a variety of networks, then war and politics have always been nodal, but what arises with cyberwarfare is a purposeful attempt to explicate and strategize a nodal politics. Thus we must attempt to interrogate the logic of cyberwar as it fixes upon this networked time and space of global politics.