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Cyberwar distorts the idea of the nation.

Dyer-Witheford and Matviyenko 19(Nick and Svitlana, Associate professor at the University of Western Ontario, Professor of Communications at Simon Fraser University “Cyberwar and Revolution”, Chapter Two, CS) [redacted a slur said in a quote, denoted by brackets]

A state’s interpellation of its subjects, or of the subjects of another state, is in part a question of its cyberwar apparatuses’ access to or interdiction from specific platforms. Though platforms may be more or less global or local in scope, they are also national, in terms of ownership and legal governance and relations to a homeland state security apparatus. This is a dynamic around which the profit interests of specific blocs of digital capital and political interests of security state apparatuses mutually revolve (Google/Facebook/Twitter for the United States; VKontakte/ Yandex for Russia; Weibo/Baidu/Tencent for China). “National” interpellation of state subjects is manifestly in play in the banning by the Ukraine government of Russian social media and search engines in the midst of an ongoing war. It may also, however, manifest when military conflict is merely anticipated, as we saw in chapter 1 in regard to the “Sino-Google war” (Bratton 2016, 112) and its imbrication in intensifying China–United States hostilities. However, cyberwar subjectification is not simply a question of demarcating “national” platforms and “national” identities. The profit dynamics of Web 2.0 capital demand both an ever-enlarging user base and the self-activity (and hence self-revelation) of users. Because of this, it is possible to construct within social media interpellative micromachines, that is to say, specific user communities, as a sort of “partisan” presence inside ostensibly foreign digital territory. Within Facebook, one can form a nation, or a caliphate, or perhaps even an assembly or commune. Platforms owned by capital of another state, even an adversary state, can be seeded with subversive practices or used as digital territories across which wars are fought between other competing states, as the Gaza conflict was digitally fought out across Twitter. The truly global social media platforms, owned by U.S. capital, are particularly liable to this process, precisely to the degree that their huge profitability depends on amassing global users. This cyberwar seeding of subjectification involves agents. These are of various kinds: state military public relations agencies, such as the IDF’s Spokesperson’s Unit (now being widely copied by other militaries); clandestine troll armies, such as those of Russia’s Internet Research Agency; U.S. military “sock puppets”; or ISIS militant recruiters. The efforts of such agents may also be articulated with autonomous interpellative processes, such as those of dissenting movements within foreign states or citizen journalists with a spontaneous patriotism for the homeland. Agents may work positively, as “friends”; negatively, harassing enemies; or in contradictory, chaotic directions, generating a paralyzing anomic blur. Each of these comes with its own interpellative processes. For example, one can contrast the careful cultivation of the subject of an ISIS recruitment process with trolling practices associated with Russian hybrid warfare. In the former process, recruiters “monitor online communities where they believe they can find receptive individuals,” sifting through visitors to militant sites. They then create a warm virtual microcommunity around potential recruits, saturating them with messages that, depending on the orientation of the target, may emphasize religious devotion, the appeal of violent action, grievances against racism, religious discrimination, poor economic prospects, or positive depictions of life in militant-held territories. At the same time, they encourage the potential recruit to isolate himself from other contacts. At a certain point, communication shifts from public forums into private and encrypted channels. It is in this phase that options such as emigration to ISIS territory, as a civilian or fighter, or attacks at home are discussed. The cycle is a sustained, modulated “hailing” of an identified data subject as a supporter of the caliphate, a data relation that then translates into corporeal action (Berger 2015a, 2015b).9 Cyberwar trolling is an interpellation that reverses the logic of recruiting. An enemy, rather than a friend, is identified, vilified, enraged, exhausted, and metaphorically (and sometimes literally, through “doxing” and the like) destroyed, silenced, intimidated, or forced offline—with the correct subject position established negatively, in contrast to that of the unfortunate and despicable victim. While the term is loosely applied to many forms of online harassment, it is often more specifically used to characterize a strategy of escalating rancorous dissensus, for example, making a provocation that can be bootstrapped into intensifying abuse and insult. In this form, trolling is sometimes analyzed as having a distinct sequence; the lure, the catch, reeling in, and so on. It may be practiced solo or in teams (with one troll reinforcing another or making an apparently innocent conversational setup that can later be exploited) and can involve a number of gambits (such as professing support for a position but then undercutting it with damning “concerns”). Thus, for example, on a nationalist Ukraine internet forum, pro-Russian trolling can ramp up from an apparently measured remark about U.S. support for Ukraine to intensifying attacks on Ukraine’s corrupt incapacity for self-governance, Western homosexual degeneracy, ubiquitous fascism, cowardice, and inevitable defeat. The subjectifying address is “if you are like that, you are worthless; you don’t want to be like them, the [redacted]/fascists/CIA dupes, but like us, your brave Slavic brothers” (Szwed 2016).

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