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State rhetoric under the illusory guise of technological solutionism covertly perpetrates structural violence.

Félix Tréguer 19 – PhD in political studies from the School for Advanced Studies in the Social Sciences, associate researcher at CNRS and post-doctoral researcher at CERI Sciences Po in Paris. “Seeing like Big Tech: security assemblages, technology, and the future of state bureaucracy.” Taylorfrancis. Mar 2019. https://research.gold.ac.uk/id/eprint/24517/1/9781315167305.pdf#page=156&zoom=100,0,0, AG

Stopping the machine? That begs the question of how best to challenge these new security assemblages.

For one thing, it is worth stressing that Big Data bureaucracies might not be that good at doing what they are supposed to. We can therefore oppose the arguments of those legitimising these new governance models on the grounds of accuracy and reliability. There are reasons – and growing evidence – to doubt that the new “regimes of truth” championed by “Big Data security assemblages” will in any meaningful way provide solutions to security issues (Aradau and Blanke 2015). Technological solutionism in the age of data governance, bolstered by marketing discourses, might only be recreating a veil of illusion of technocratic control, while putting evermore distance between bureaucracies and the social world they wish to make more orderly. After all, history tells us, bureaucracies tend to fail. By disregarding “all the subtleties of real social existence,” “reducing everything to preconceived mechanical or statistical formulae,” bureaucratic dispositifs like “forms, rules, statistics, or questionnaire” – even when fuelled by complex algorithms and troves of data –, remain abstract simplifications that might only reinforce the forms of structural violence they are said to alleviate or even solve (Graeber 2015, p. 75; see also Eubanks 2018, O’Neil 2016).

Bureaucracies often fail to meet their alleged goals but still, they strengthen the power of those who invest in them. They transform the social world and can go awfully wrong (Scott 1998). If, following Tim Mitchell and critical security scholars, we refuse to “see the state and private organizations as a single, totalized structure of power,” another complementary way of resisting these assemblages is to build on the conflicts that inevitably occur “between different government agencies, between corporate organizations, and within each of them” (Mitchell 1991, 90). We can amplify the words of those who denounce the oppressive and manipulative use of modern computer technologies, applaud tech workers opposing the direct involvement of their company in the military-industrial complex, or support security professionals seeking to automate intelligence oversight so as to catch up with large-scale surveillance systems and mitigate abuse. We can, and we should.

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