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Technology doesn’t reduce violence, but obscures it as a failure to take advantage of liberal freedom. The impact is permanent everywhere war.

Johnson, 18—Professor, Environmental History, Loyola University Chicago (Benjamin, “Coded Conflict: Algorithmic and Drone Warfare in US Security Strategy,” Journal of Military and Strategic Studies, Volume 18, Issue 4, dml)

Understanding technology as more than a neutral tool that is exogenous to political and social life has been an important site of intervention for critical theory, especially in understanding how technology interacts with social and political existence to obscure and perpetrate violence. The conceptual, theoretical and discursive underpinnings of the liberal peace have been advanced and critiqued on a number of fronts. For example, these works have focused on the adherence of research to quantitative ‘large-N’ statistical testing where the liberal peace is treated as a scientific phenomenon; 35 the role of liberal peace as a ‘tripartite international discursive environment’ in which superficial technical solutions to resolve conflict are produced; 36 the ‘punitive ethos’ inherent to liberalism’s normative influence on counter-terrorism policy;37 the limits to liberalism’s understanding of actors in terms of states and their institutions;38 the inherent violence of Western modernization and its links to liberal peacebuilding; 39 and lastly the liberal character of empire building through imperial expansion.40

This body of literature has teased out the implicit and explicit forms of violence that underpin liberal internationalism. Violence undertaken in the name of spreading liberal democracy has increasingly been exposed and difficult to ignore, especially as war has expanded through visual representations and made available to people outside of conflict zones.41 James Der Derian has gone so far to argue that with respect to a global liberal project of civilizing the world, “in spite of, and perhaps soon because of, efforts to spread a democratic peace through globalization and humanitarian intervention, war is ascending to an even higher plan, from the virtual to the virtuous.”42 Commenting on the discursive narrative that technology enabled distance has allowed for a peaceful or ‘clean’ type of war, Der Derian goes on to argue that “at the heart of virtuous war is the technical capability and ethical imperative to threaten and, if necessary actualize violence from a distance – with no or minimal casualties” and that “on the surface, virtuous war cleans up the political discourse as well as the battlefield [...] virtuous wars promote a vision of bloodless, humanitarian, hygienic wars.”43

The notion that liberal war has somehow become surgical and bloodless is linked to what a number of authors have identified as a shift from government to governance. Rather than ‘boots on the ground’ and active attempts at state building, liberal interventionism has shifted to emphasize the management of and engagement with populations at a distance. Again, this should not be understood as an altogether new phenomenon. Heathershaw argues that liberal peacebuilding, while theoretically linked to Kant’s notion of a perpetual peace, is more recently linked to discourse that proliferated at the end of the Cold War.44 Democratic peacebuilding was developed by the United Nations (UN) along with its major donors and analysists in the immediate post-Cold War period, which was understood as a “watershed moment akin to 1919 or 1945”, thus spawning the ‘new interventionism’ that dominated policy rhetoric during the 1990s and early-2000s.45

However, along with this discourse there has been a pronounced shift in practice towards increasing forms of bio-political governance in the Foucaultian sense of the term. For Dillon and Reid, “global liberal governance is substantially comprised of techniques that examine the detailed properties and dynamics of populations so that they can be better managed with respect to their many needs and life chances” and where “biopolitics is the pursuit of war by other means.”46 Foucault has made a lasting contribution to the critique of liberal security and war, which becomes especially useful in theorizing current conflict environments. For Evans, life itself becomes the object of political strategies, which holds implications in terms of security. 47 Echoing Dillon and Reid, Evans states that “in the process of making life live, [those general strategies for effecting power] entail the regulation of populations for society’s overall betterment.”48

The notion of ‘bettering’ society is implicated in the idea that freedom must be produced in a very particular manner linked to distant governance.49 The idea that freedom is an actively created condition for life can be related to the work of Mark Duffield, who has offered one of the most comprehensive critiques on liberal interventionism over a number of years. Duffield has demonstrated and analyzed the merging of security, development and humanitarian discourses, all of which are increasingly underpinned by the same logic of ‘governance at a distance’ enabled by network technologies. In particular, security and humanitarianism has taken an explicitly neoliberal turn as disaster affected populations are now expected to self-manage. Duffield explains that the merging of security and humanitarianism within a neoliberal framework has led to the notion of ‘resilience,’ which “focuses on narcissistic and subjective forms of care-of-the-self.”50 Duffield argues that remote technologies for surveillance and bio-political management are part of the neoliberal shift in political economy more widely.51 Within this paradigm shift, affected populations are to be “made free” and to “embrace risk and thereby develop foresight and enterprise.”52 Again, the idea of being ‘made free’ emphasizes the liberal interventionist role of producing freedom, but not in terms of emancipatory conditions circumscribed by a positive commitment to liberty in the philosophical sense, but rather through a contradictory and explicitly negative form of liberty within an absence of formal constraints. A positive form of liberty would imply the need for various forms of material and resource commitment (money, time, people, expertise, etc.), whereas negative liberty simply assumes an ideological and structural commitment to removing obvious obstacles or barriers to expressing one’s freedom. People are made free via the removal of institutional, cultural and other social restrictions (including social protections), thus enabling their own volition.53 For Duffield, “resilience embodies a new biopolitics that differs from the actuarial and protective biopolitics [...] that underpins the great modernist project of Welfare Fordism.”54

This distancing of humanitarianism, development and security should not obscure the violence perpetuated in their name. Just as security begins to appear as an ‘everywhere’ and ‘permanent’ war, populations are abandoned to a state of “permanent emergency.”55 These populations are the same groups that are made the objects of securing against, where “liberalism proceeds on the basis that ‘Others’ are the problem to be solved.”56 The remote management of populations through techniques of biopolitical governance is accomplished with the underlying rationality of risk aversion, which is argued to be intensified by the repeated difficulties encountered by allied Western forces in recent campaigns. There is an explicit relationship between the failures of these campaigns and the growth of remoteness as an ordering logic for state intervention, leading Duffield to argue that ground or “terrestrial” forms of “liberal interventionism now [lie] burie[d] in the ruins of Iraq, Libya and Syria.”57

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