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Extreme post-pandemic politics incites resistance that coopts the alt.

Bratton 21 – Benjamin Bratton’s work spans Philosophy, Architecture, Computer Science and Geopolitics, He is Professor of Visual Arts at University of California, San Diego, Program Director of The Terraforming program at the Strelka Institute, and author of several books including “The Stack: On Software and Sovereignty.” “The Revenge of the Real - Politics for a Post-Pandemic World.” June 2021. AG

The rapid but awkward appearance of face masks in the West entails an even more radical confrontation with the limits of the subjective per se . It makes clear that regardless of one’s subjective ethical intention, good or bad, one remains a contagion vector just the same. As said, it doesn’t matter if one wishes to do good or harm, one’s biological proximity to others will cause good or harm regardless. Subjective intent is irrelevant.

A source of confusion for many is a shift in ethics from a position that calibrates subjective moral will to one that recognizes one’s self and body as an object in a cause-and-effect relationship with the world. It is often presumed that agency and subjectivity (if not also identity) are interchangeable, but the consequentialist ethics of being an object (less a subject) works differently. Outcomes are not a mirror of an internal mental state. They are not directly dependent on public demonstration, performance, and ritual to effect physical change. The implications for other biopolitical and ecopolitical conditions, such as combating climate change, are decisive.

The main misapprehension so common in the mask war—that risk can be privatized—is not unexpected if considered in the context of how social ethics is already predicated on moral subjectivity. As opposed to the epidemiological conception of society, this practice sees ethics as the individual calculus of risk, reward, and consequences. The naked-faced do not mean harm, one assumes, and may even imagine themselves as bearing the burden of risk for everyone. This confusion between subjective and objective ethics cuts both ways, in that someone with a positive moral subjective disposition may imagine that the absence of harm they bring by wearing a mask is somehow due to their personal intention of goodness. It is not. To be contagious is not to be a bad person, but it does mean that, irrespective of one’s wishes, one may cause objective harm to others. The harm that one person may bring to another person has nothing to do with the affective bond or antagonism they feel.

The revenge of the real arises in the ethical challenges posed by the realization that the virus is indifferent to the moral projections we might make upon it. A viable post-pandemic politics cannot be predicated solely on the calibration of subjective intention because subjective intention is not the only cause of the effects we wish to realize or prevent. This is a challenge to political philosophy as well, in that it demands the conceptualization of an ethics of being an object , not of being a subject, which is, obviously, difficult for everyone and insulting for many. That is in no small part because of how many people have been long subordinated into positions by which their social identity is erased or diluted by being made into a human object.

And yet, the private vocality of subjective determinism cannot hold. The extreme subjectivism that asks you to “be the change you wish to see in the world,” as if internal mental states cause the external world to come into being, is not the solution to neoliberalism; it is its pinnacle.

This shift to the objective has everything to do with the biopolitics of medical care and the relation between immediacy and abstraction. The body as a medical object is a real thing, flesh and blood and tears. Each of us, at different times, lives in a body as a medical object. When needed we assume this objectivity and receive care accordingly. When someone’s temperature is taken or they are intubated, or their internal organs are monitored by the puncturing of the skin and the externalization of their blood, which is then analyzed for telltale traces, the care is not based entirely on the testimony of symptoms of this one body, but rather on this particular body as exemplary of a larger abstraction of medical knowledge about all the bodies that exhibit a similar pattern of symptoms, and all the bodies through which the virus has passed. That abstraction, the transference between the particular patient and the generic human, is the stuff of both high-tech and high-touch expertise.

This also underscores the role of modeling abstraction in positive biopolitics more generally. The capacity to provide care to the singular body in front of you requires the moment in which it becomes any body , to which a model medical abstraction, based on years of pattern recognition, must be applied as care. This is an epistemological relation, not just an affective one. Through the medical professional, it is a model sensing and acting back upon the world recursively through careful expertise that would be impossible by sheer reckoning. The doctor may care deeply for their patient on an interpersonal level, but more likely they are able to care for them because they are able to see them as an object.

Taken seriously, the implications are profound. One’s sense of bioethics would extend then not only to the protection of personal privacy and the prevention of the violence of being treated like a mere object, but also to the deliberate and ethical self-objectification as a responsible participant in the model abstractions through which the care of others is realized. An overemphasis in bioethics on the sanctity of the sovereign individual, and the protection against over-intervention, over-sensing, and over-objectification, may obscure the ethical problems of under-intervention, under-sensing, and lack of access to medical care based on exclusive models of the whole and, consequently, limited access to intervention. Those in socio-economic positions that prevent them from receiving the medical care they need may be less concerned about the psychological insult of being treated like an object by medical abstraction than they are about the real personal danger of not being treated at all. For this reason, among many others, the broken sensor layer and the inability to cohere inclusive and equitable biopolitics is itself a form of collective violence.

When model abstractions built over years of expert care and collaborative honing become a matter of life and death, a more nuanced approach comes into focus, regarding both what is and isn’t invasive “surveillance,” and how a society should undertake sensing and modeling so that it can compose itself deliberately. The same can be said for climate models, which will demand a similar reckoning with a social “ethics” that is not based on coaxing enough subjective moral gestures to change planetary geochemistry but on more direct interventions in a composite condition.

To be sure, the ways that this post-pandemic politics complicates deep cultures of individualism, subjectivism, and experientialism now at the center of conception of the common good, will invite vociferous reaction and resistance. These habits and impulses reside at the core of Western social thought, so why would they be anything but stubborn? One assumes as well that this resistance will come not only from the obvious political right-wing cultures that have hitched themselves to sovereign power over biopower until the literal end of the world, but also, I am sorry to say, from philosophers to whom people have looked for guidance as to what the interrelations between biology, politics, and the body have been and should be.

Behold the fear in this voice, already introduced above: “At stake here is nothing other than the new and ‘normal’ biopolitical relation between citizens and the State. This relation no longer has to do with free and active participation in the public sphere, but instead concerns the routine inscription and registration of the most private and most incommunicable element of subjectivity, the biopolitical life of the body ” (emphasis mine). So wrote Italian philosopher Giorgio Agamben. Once more, the “biopolitical life of the body” is not incommunicable, nor the basis of a private subjectivity, as should be obvious to anyone with a rudimentary interest in modern biological knowledge, let alone epidemiology.

Perhaps we should have seen it coming, but what happened next was one of the most cataclysmic and grotesque self-owns in the history of philosophy.

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