NATO missed the real significance of the Bronze Night, which was not simply that it was vulnerable to a new form of warfare, but that it was fundamentally outdated in the face of the cybernetic transformation of the planet, as it was founded on the relevance of geopolitical factors like nation-states and physical boundaries like the “North Atlantic” which hold no sway in the digital era. NATO did get one thing right, though: there’s no going back.
Joque, 18—PhD from the European Grad School, researches philosophy, technology and media and is the visualization librarian at the University of Michigan, go blue (Justin, “Buffer Overflow: The Space and Time of Cyberwar,” Deconstruction Machines: Writing in the Age of Cyberwar, Chapter 1, 38-43, dml)
While Moonlight Maze was declared a cyberwar by a few individuals, a row between Russia and Estonia in 2007 is often mentioned as one of the earliest all-out cyberwars.17 On April 26 of that year, Estonia moved the Bronze Soldier, a memorial to Soviet soldiers killed during World War II, from the center of the Estonian capital Tallinn to a cemetery on the outskirts of town. Russians within both Estonia and Russia protested. Riots broke out in Tallinn, killing one and injuring more than a hundred people.18 In response, the Russian parliament called for the resignation of the Estonian government and stopped rail service from St. Petersburg, train shipments of oil through Estonia, and even heavy vehicles from crossing a major bridge from Russia into Estonia.19
At the same time, a host of computer-based services in Estonia were hit with a distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attack. A DDoS attack involves overwhelming a server with traffic such that it is no longer able to respond to legitimate requests. It is relatively easy to automatically block computers that are sending inordinate numbers of requests to a server, so most DDoS attacks must be distributed across a large number of machines to succeed. This is achieved either by maliciously taking over machines to create what is called a botnet, some of which have involved tens of millions of computers, or by convincing people to voluntarily lend their machines for the purpose of an attack. These voluntary or commandeered machines are then turned against servers to overrun them with requests and disable them. DDoS attacks thus do not require breaking into a machine and do not compromise private data that may reside on the server; rather, they disable the server for as long as the botnet can continue sending requests.
In Estonia, these attacks targeted government websites and critical businesses such as banks and newspapers, shutting down ATMs and some means of communication within the country. These attacks were especially symbolic because, at the time, Estonia was one of the most well-connected countries in Europe, with more than 90 percent of bank transactions completed online. The country even allowed Internet voting by this point. Seven years prior, in 2000, the Estonian parliament declared Internet access a human right.20 Estonia was ultimately unable to counter the attacks and responded by shutting off Internet connections to other countries. This allowed services to resume within the country but prevented access to those outside the country. The attacks finally slowed down two weeks later. The Russian government denied any responsibility, and a number of security specialists have speculated that the attacks would have likely been more destructive if there had been direct government or military involvement, but there were extensive calls on Russian Internet for participation and instructions for how to join the attacks against Estonian institutions.21
The attacks on Estonia were carried out with a clear intent to disrupt the country in response to moving the Bronze Soldier, but beyond that and some technical details of the attack, little is discernable. The underlying purpose and the actors involved remain largely unknown, as Russia has refused any cooperation with Estonian law enforcement in finding and apprehending those responsible, despite a treaty guaranteeing mutual legal assistance. While it seems unlikely that the Russian government or military directly organized the specifics of the attacks, they have offered it their tacit approval by refusing to assist in any investigations. Thus the attacks against Estonia appear most likely to have been a “war” carried out by patriotic hackers not officially affiliated with the military, but perhaps with military support, and clearly outside the bounds and means of traditional kinetic warfare.22 As much as it is possible to discuss the purpose of these attacks that were carried out by a variety of unidentified individuals, the attacks were aimed directly at disconnecting Estonia from the global Internet and economy. In addition to the DDoS attacks, the other provocations all served to disconnect Estonia. Cutting rail and heavy truck connections to Estonia act in this light as physical denial-of-service attacks. To return to Castells’s point mentioned earlier, exclusion from global networks is perhaps now one of the gravest threats that could be wrought upon a nation. A denial-ofservice attack, in both its digital and physical forms, relegates the target to the space of place, severing its connections to global networks. While cyberwar functions through a variety of modes, it seems one goal that is often invoked is to disconnect one’s enemies from global spaces of flow.
All these attacks function at the same time to allow a level of plausible deniability. The physical infrastructure disruptions were claimed to be due to lack of passengers, repairs, and safety concerns rather than retribution. The cyberattacks were attributable to unknown patriotic hackers rather than a government or military group that could be held accountable. While in some cases it may be that governments and militaries truly were not involved, in the cases in which they were and attempt to deny their involvement, it is likely in many cases that this is due to fear of being cut off from global networks themselves. Ene Ergma, the speaker of the Estonian parliament at the time, claimed in an interview that “attacking us is one way of checking NATO’s defenses. They could examine the alliance’s readiness under the cover of the statue protest.”23 While Estonia did not invoke Article 5 of the NATO treaty, which outlines countries’ responsibility of mutual defense, NATO responded by creating the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence in Estonia’s capital.24 The creation of the Centre of Excellence served to reassert Estonia’s position in a network of mutual defense, from which it was believed that Russia was attempting to sever Estonia. Thus this conflict can be read as a series of actions aimed at severing and reasserting Estonia’s connection to global flows of information, capital, people, military assistance, and goods.
It is also clear from these attacks that we are witnessing a significant blurring of the distinction between civilian, military, and political spheres. Just over a year after the Estonian crisis, when Russia entered a kinetic war with Georgia over South Ossetia, a wave of cyberattacks against Georgian targets followed Russian physical attacks. Like the Estonian attacks, the degree of Russian involvement was largely indeterminable. These attacks followed a similar logic of attempting to disconnect Georgia from global networks and also to assert the legitimacy of the Russian cause, perhaps with the hope of winning the global media’s blessing and thus support for maintaining global connections.25 In both these conflicts, it is evident that cyberwar does not merely seize upon an increasingly connected world but rather intervenes directly in global space itself to attempt to define, create, and undermine spaces of connection and disconnection. The increasing military and state interest in cyberwar is, then, not simply a result of the rise of global networks but rather an active force that both promotes and attacks such connections. Although the attacks in Estonia and Georgia were in response to geopolitical (and networked) change, they sought actively to reshape a set of interconnected networks and spaces.
OPERATION ORCHARD AS MICROSCOPIC WAR
A few months after the attacks against Estonia, on September 6, 2007, Israeli fighter jets attacked a supposed nuclear installation in Syria. The jets entered Syrian air space, destroyed the site, and returned without being fired upon. Despite the two countries technically being at war since 1948, both downplayed the event, which is now known as Operation Orchard.26 One of the most noteworthy elements of the attack was that a state-of-the-art radar system completely failed to detect the Israeli airplanes. Although it is unclear why the radar system failed, a number of commentators have suggested that the most likely cause was an advanced electronic attack on the system. Some sources even suggested it was possible that the computer chips that ran the radar system were fabricated with a “back door” so that they could be forced to malfunction.27
Even if this was not the case in the Israeli attack on Syria, chips being compromised during their production is becoming a growing military concern. The U.S. military has been working to create verified production facilities within the United States, but the growing number of commercial chips used in military equipment has complicated these efforts. There have been attempts to create systems to verify chips after production, but with current technology, it is nearly impossible to guard against a back door that is only triggered under specific conditions.28
There arises in cybersecurity a numbers game that generally favors attackers over defenders. For instance, microchips have become so complicated that a few transistors arranged in such a way that they can be activated for some malicious purpose are almost impossible to detect in chips now made of billions of transistors.29 Furthermore, even if it were possible to check chips for insecurities, it would be possible to limit the number of compromised chips to a small number in a production run, requiring that nearly every chip be checked to guarantee security (and one would, of course, have to guarantee that the system that checked the chips had not been compromised itself).
Two important phenomena emerge from the insecurity of supply chains in a digital and globalized world. First, the space and time of war spread outside war itself in an even more insidious way than we saw previously. Cyberwar, especially as it includes physical points of intrusion into chips, requires, in a sense, that the war start before the war. The trap must be laid long before a conflict breaks out. The war then extends along the entire supply chain. Any place that weapons, infrastructure, or any systems containing chips are designed, assembled, and stored becomes a potential battle space in a future conflict. Though sabotage has always been a threat for warring parties, the globalization and commercialization of the computer chip market mean that a country may end up fighting the very country that designed and manufactured the majority of its computing power. Prior to the growth of computerbased weapons, it may have been possible to sell low-quality armaments or steel to a potential future enemy, but hiding such built-in failures was difficult. Now the situation is inverted, and the work required to find faults and back doors in chips is substantially greater than the work involved in creating and hiding them. It is, then, not only that a nation or group can be disconnected from global flows but also that these global flows can be turned against an adversary, quickly turning supply chains and capital flows into potential threats.
Second, new, more complicated gaps open between knowing and seeing. The military reliance on more and more complicated technology has, over the course of the past century or so, pushed military operations beyond the field of sight. With the introduction of computer chips, and especially chips that could be attacked or sabotaged, the battle space now includes the microscopic. Moreover, technologies like radar and other advanced warning systems now rely exclusively on these technologies, and thus attacks that are imperceptible and microscopic can disrupt one’s ability to see on a macroscopic level. This is precisely what is believed to have happened in Syria. As Richard Clarke said of the attacks, “the view seen by the Syrians bore no relation to the reality that their eastern skies had become an Israeli Air Force bombing range. Syrian air defense missiles could not have been fired because there had been no targets in the system for them to seek out.”30 While war can now happen at every level from the microscopic to the global, defeat on one level easily spills over to all the others. Not only does war expand into cyberspace as a new domain of battle but other domains with their own geographies—including the macroscopic geographies of supply chains and the internal microscopic geographies of chips themselves—become realms of war and localized battle spaces.
War becomes rhizomatic and spreads out in all directions, including downward to the microscopic and imperceptible. Supply chains have always been important to war efforts, but what has changed is both the depth and breadth of global supply chains. Following World War II, the European Coal and Steel Community was created with the express purpose of tying French and German markets together to prevent another war, but this relied on the products of coal and steel being perceptible and war being a macroscopic phenomenon.31 Now supply chains are intertwined on an imperceptible, molecular level, making their interdependency a potential source of instability rather than stability.
While nuclear weapons harness the microscopic power of atoms to create unprecedented levels of destruction, they are anathema to any type of precision, rendering them useless in any conflict short of all-out warfare. Cyberweapons act to counter this lack of precision. Instead of releasing the maximum power from atoms, bits are manipulated, corrupted, and destroyed with exacting precision. Not only are precise sites and types of machines selected for destruction but levels of destruction are dialed in to precisely determine the possible responses. This is not to say that these political calculations are always, or even often, done well or to the benefit of anyone. Nor is it to say that what is precisely chosen and destroyed will not create results that will spiral out of control. Still, interventions are weighed and aimed at specific nodal sites in global networks, moving these calculations away from geopolitics toward a nodal politics.32 This networked political calculus does not replace the geographic but rather embeds geopolitics in what Virilio calls “metageophysics.”33 Ultimately, war in this new nodal space spreads out in every perceptible and imperceptible direction, intertwining with the civilian and the everyday. It follows the supply chains of advanced industrial nations all over the world, increasing the possibility that an imperceptible war could be fought unbeknownst to all observers. War then atomizes and moves along these multiple geographies, both spatial and aspatial, exploiting global flows and seeking infinitesimal advantages.