Free beta access. 50 free AI tokens each week. Optional top-ups available. See what is included
Opening Word document…

Governable stacks are the only solvent mechanism for cybersecurity cooperation. Legal mechanisms for constraining cyberwar are a pipe dream; the proliferation of debates on those terms creates a smokescreen for cybernetic infrastructure to spread across the planet, which makes militarism and nuclear annihilation inevitable. We must reorient the resolutional model of thought towards corporeal care.

Dyer-Witheford and Matviyenko, 19—associate professor of information and media studies at the University of Western Ontario; assistant professor of communication at Simon Fraser University (Nick and Svitlana, “What Is to Be Done?,” Cyberwar and Revolution: Digital Subterfuge in Global Capitalism, Chapter 3, 151-161, dml)

As we have argued, from 1945 on, the hegemonic status of the United States, as the world’s chief capitalist power, was intrinsically related to the development of computers and networks. The role of digital systems in its military–industrial complex, initially tightly coupled with nuclear weapons, spread through other aspects of its war-making system as well as through the general economy. In both aspects, it contributed to the United States’s eventual Cold War victory. In the aftermath of that victory, the United States continued to develop its digital military capacities into the ever more direct weaponization of network, creating the technological human assemblages of what is today referred to as cyberwar. The scope of NSA global surveillance and sabotage programs and the sophistication of the Stuxnet nuclear centrifuge-destroying malware are only the most manifest instances of this process, which is today an integral part of a wider upgrade of U.S. military capacities that ties together a nuclear primacy with the militarization of space and drone warfare. Accompanying and spurring on this process is the additional dynamic of cyberwar adoption by the forces antagonistic to the global dominance of the United States and its allies. These antagonists include the defeated socialist powers, Russia and China, now paradoxically resurrected as capitalist competitors in the world market, or, in the case of North Korea, surviving in a macabre afterlife of state socialism. They also include the forces of militant Islamic jihadism, beckoned into existence by the West as an anticommunist ally, only to become its opponent in the long war on terror. All these actors converge on the militarization of digital networks. Many observers today see a moment that recapitulates the decline of previous imperial hegemons within the global capitalist system—Spain, Holland, Britain—and parallels the moments of extreme instability as old powers and new contenders confront each other.7 The rise of cyberwar is part of this tumult and quite possibly a precursor and preparation for widening and intensifying conflict. Schematically, we can envisage three potentially intertwining trajectories such a process might take:

1. Network degradation. Alexander Klimburg (2017) outlines the possibility of a “darkening web” characterized by persistent and gradually intensifying cyberwar between states and between states and terrorist movements conducted in a variety of registers. Security breaches, aggressive malware, and botnet attacks proliferate. Digital industrial sabotage and critical infrastructure attacks begin to multiply, as do the accidental runaway effects of cyberweapons. Networks are deeply and chronically infected with computational propaganda, fake news, and viral mis- and disinformation. In response to adversarial incursions, states intensify algorithmic surveillance, censorship, and preemptive virtual policing. Cybersecurity provisions become increasingly mandatory and elaborate. Attribution problems, falsification of evidence, and the overlap between military and intelligence forces and criminal networks create a chaotic digital twilight of hacking and trolling, botnets and viruses, malware, surveillance, and bugs, shutdowns, blocking, and filtering, in which uncertainties exacerbate suspicions and hostilities, altogether making the internet increasingly impossible to use. In short, the “darkening web” is what already exists now, only more so. One of the cofounders of Twitter, Evan Williams, offered his diagnosis, suggesting that “the Internet is broken” (Streitfeld 2017). But maybe it’s not. Maybe the internet is finally what it was always meant to be. Maybe it is perfect, but not for us, the excommunicated user-subjects. For cyberwar.

2. Hybrid escalations. Similarly rooted in the present is the likelihood that the simultaneous virtual and kinetic conflicts, such as the Syrian civil war, the fighting in Donbas, and the many branches of the war on terror, continue and break out in new regions, bringing ever higher levels and varieties of cyberweapons, deployed for purposes ranging from intelligence gathering, battlefield surveillance, and munitions delivery to sabotage of enemies’ domestic and military resources. The use of drones and other semi- or fully automated weapons systems expands and takes new directions, such as the development of swarms of small autonomous vehicles—“slaughterbots” (Economist 2017a)—for house-to-house fighting in ruined cities. The biometric and networked tracking of refugees created by such conflicts, and the control and interdiction of their entry to affluent fortressed homelands, becomes a major activity of the nation-state security apparatus. Because present hybrid wars are also in large part proxy wars, where local battlefield actors are directly or indirectly supported by major powers, they are charged with the possibility of abrupt collisions between the most powerful militaries on the planet.

3. “Thermonuclear cyberwar.” We borrow this phrase from Erik Gartzke and Jon Lindsay (2017), who are among several authors currently pointing to a renewed and dangerous rendezvous between cyber- and nuclear weaponry. The last decade of debates between defense intellectuals about cyberwar has split those who see digital attacks a new equivalent of nuclear weapons, capable of disabling whole societies through critical infrastructure attacks, and skeptics who deride such anxieties as hyperbolic and implausible. But “cyber” and “nuke” are not separate. As we have seen, they were twinned at the moment of conception, with the development of each dependent on the other. And the connection is not just historical; it is current. Now cyberwar weaponry is part of a new approach to nuclear war fighting, the left-of-launch approach. Early ventures in antiballistic missile defense, such as Reagan’s “Star Wars” strategic defense initiative, depended on shooting down swarms of missiles as they plunged through the atmosphere toward their target. Left of launch, in contrast, aims to “strike an enemy missile before liftoff or during the first seconds of flight,” using “cyber strikes, electronic warfare and other exotic forms of sabotage” (Broad and Sanger 2017). This doctrine was incubated during the Obama administration and inherited by the Trump presidency. Advocates of the left-of-launch nuclear strategy present it as a defensive measure. However, the doctrine destabilizes basic premises of deterrence that have, since 1945, restrained nuclear weapon use (Cimbala 2017). Deterrence depends on a dread faith by all parties that both their own and their enemies’ nuclear weapons will work. The possibility that nuclear weapons systems might be secretly disabled raises prospects both of overconfidence (trusting one can sabotage an opponent’s system) or panicked preemption (fearing left-of-launch attacks on one’s own nukes and falling into a “use ’em or lose ’em” mind-set). More generally, control and command of nuclear weapons depend on communication systems whose collapse in a crisis situation could have catastrophic results.8 The origin of the internet lay in the U.S. attempt to ensure continuance of such systems in the event of nuclear war; now the weaponization of the internet itself constitutes a possible cause of nuclear war.

Facing such prospects, liberal commentators propose diplomatic measures to control and mitigate cyberhostilities. Klimburg (2017), for example, suggests a series of initiatives to be undertaken primarily by the United Nations and the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN), the long-standing (and controversy-ridden) forum for internet governance. In these venues, he suggests, it should be possible to work out a series of agreements—“digital arms” limitation treaties, comparable to those on nuclear weapons; an “attribution and adjudication” council to assess and arbitrate responsibility for cyberattacks; international cooperation against cybercrime; the promotion within ICANN of “civil society” perspectives to counter those of states and corporations. He suggests that “standing bodies” regulating cyberwar would be comparable to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change and emphasizes the importance of “scientific and authoritative advice from experts to political decision makers on how to avoid disaster” (344).

Such proposals, seemingly eminently sensible, ignore the reality that the tensions driving the rise of cyberwar are also incapacitating the fragile apparatuses and institutions of international cooperation that have existed since 1945. As Jon Lindsay (2012) observes, while proposals for cyberwarfare treaties are “well meaning,” they would, within the current state of international great power relations, be “hacked to bits,” because “cyberoperations, like other types of intelligence and covert operations, take place in the shadows. An international treaty on cyberweapons would be . . . totally unenforceable, since such activity is designed to evade detection and attribution.” The conjuncture in which cyberwar rises, and part of the reason for its ascent, is the breakdown of nuclear arms limitation and nonproliferation treaties. Klimburg’s comparison of the regulation of cyberwar and climate change is unfortunately all too telling, given the failure of global capitalism to generate any binding interstate agreements on carbon emissions and the recent withdrawal of the United States from even the nonbinding Paris accord on global warming. And like slowing climate change, reducing the risk of cyberwar requires deep, systemic social change.

The argument of this book is that cyberwar is a manifestation of the competitive nature of capitalism, which, beneath the surface of globalization, fosters a war of all against all, conducted in the accelerated, automated, and abstracted forms on which this entire mode of production now depends. It follows from this that the prospects for reducing the dangers of cyberwar, and of the other types of war of which it is now part, depend strongly on movements and struggles to constrain and, ultimately, abolish this internally antagonistic order. A recognition of the extreme difficulty of this project is inherent in the point on which we opened this chapter, namely, Noys’s observation that the military high-technology “endocolonization” of society has been a factor in decomposing the traditional industrial working-class movements that were historically the main agencies of socialist and communist projects. However, there is also a possible reversal of this logic, if averting war, including cyberwar, becomes entwined with other issues, such as struggles for social equality and ecological sustainability, a focal point for recomposition of movements looking beyond capital, drawing on new and diverse constituencies. We have indicated some of the issues that we think might be drawn together around resistance to the rise of cyberwar: antisurveillance sentiment, rejection of the secrecy of the security state and its new digital complexes, concern over the corruption of the general intellect by mis- and disinformation, objection to corporate and military criminality, and, of course, revulsion at the exterminatory horrors of war, from the terror of dirty wars to global thermonuclear catastrophe.

In his reflections on Marxist theories of war and revolution, Balibar (2002) remarks on the coexistence within this body of thought of two contradictory elements, one stressing the idea of “revolutionary war,” the other of “revolutionary peace.” The first stresses “armed struggle against capital,” the second “the refusal of capitalist wars”—“in many respects this class war is therefore also a non-war, or an anti-war” (11). If, in the title to this chapter, we invoked Lenin’s What Is to Be Done?, it is partly to remember that, though Lenin is today primarily thought of as a theorist of revolutionary war, perhaps the major decision of Leninism was one for peace (even if his later adoption of Trotsky’s formula of “no war, no peace” resonates with today’s state of cyberwar). The outbreak of World War I precipitated a schism in the international socialist movement. Leading European socialist democratic parties all too rapidly discarded their longheld view that war exemplified the irrationality of competitive capitalism, forgot their commitments to peace and worldwide worker solidarity, rallied behind their governments, and joined the march to mass slaughter. Only the faction of what is sometimes known as the Zimmerwald Left (Nation 1989), led by Lenin, continued to speak out for internationalism. It was thus not just revolt against exploitation but rejection of the holocaust of World War I, a program of “bread and peace,” that gave communism a moral claim to universality. Terrifying contemporary parallels to the pre1914 years today demand an updated strategy for “bread and peace,” with “bread” understood as a securing of ecological conditions for species life and “peace” as elimination of systemic social violence.

One of the slogans of the Zimmerwald Left was “Krieg dem Krieg,” “war on war,” and it is tempting to take this up, in a very literal sense, and propose a “cyberwar on cyberwar.” As we have seen, there is a hacking front to both the struggles against digital militarism and contemporary anticapitalist movements. They have exposed the workings of the cyberwar complex and brought it to light. Their main figures are defectors from that complex. More broadly, over recent decades, many critical theorists have argued for forms of “cyborg” dissent and for deployment of the arms available to “immaterial labor,” whether in the networked mobilization of protest or in more direct digital disruptions of war making. Cyberwar on cyberwar is both a metaphorical and practical possibility, and we have seen situations when “Krieg dem Krieg,” in the most concrete sense, is the only effective response to murderous attack.

However, we would suggest that to conduct “cyberwar on cyberwar,” though it may sometimes be necessary, is to fight on unfavorable terrain. We have seen that hacktivism suffers problems of accountability, transparency, provocation; can itself be compromised and ensnared within the exploits of the military–internet complex; and is ultimately highly vulnerable to the police and intelligence apparatus. And, as Noys (2013) observes, even reliance on the speed with which networks can circulate struggles tends to discount how much more advantage such velocity today gives capital’s military–security complexes (in this respect, we note that the huge, worldwide, and digitally mobilized protests against the Iraq War in 2003 must be reckoned a tragic failure of networked activism). Cyberwar on cyberwar is a method of fast politics, and speed is where the user-subjects ultimately lose, encountering the inhuman acceleration of machinic processing power. To succeed, such resistance requires a break from the mainstream paradigm of today’s “platform capitalism” with all its repetitious “Twitter revolutions,” “Facebook revolutions,” or “Snapchat revolutions,” slogans that should remind us that, as Lacan once notoriously noted, an ultimate misconception of revolution is as a desire for a new master or a master in a new form that leads away from the systemic change rather than not toward it. Here we disagree with the conclusion of Brian Massumi’s (2015, 243) otherwise excellent study of the new “ontopowers” of military networking, where, discussing the logic of speed and preemption, he suggests that countermovements have no choice but to “go forward, with the flow.”

While tactical resistance can involve any and all of the “memes of production” (Deterritorial Support Group 2012), a reconstitution of the left today must ask, what is the opposite of cyberwar? To this, we would answer that the antithesis of cyberwar is corporeal care of the subject achieved through the “balanced conceptions of space and time within culture” and “awareness of spatial and temporal dynamics [that] keep state and market power in check” (Sharma 2013, 314). It is from this perspective that we need to recognize cyberwar’s production of time and space and envision different times and spaces—those of the care of bodies. This orientation against the social destruction, physical, psychological, and infrastructural, of cyberwar does not mean totally abandoning the digital—which, because it so much composes the very texture of everyday life, would be not only difficult but often politically fatal. But it does mean its rearticulation to a set of purposes radically different from those of digital capital. In particular, this strategy requires theoretical reconsideration and practical subversion of the addicted, complicit digital user, the figure envisioned by neoliberal Silicon Valley, by way of desynchronization and emancipation.

This can be described as recognizing a position in and against the military environment of cyberwar in which all of us are now imbricated and finding ways to develop subjectivities that are simultaneously of the network and off the network. It requires the “slow” time necessary for the in-person (rather than online) organization of antiwar collectives, movements, and alliances; defection from compulsive social media use; trammeling corporate capacities to intensify and maintain such addictive behavior; the patient defense and reconstruction of the basic public institutions of corporeal care—free health services; the cultivation of mental health; the recovery and deepening of the legacy of a semidestroyed (or, in many places, never created) welfare state in a new “commonfare”; universal education provisions; worker–community control of workplaces and the means of production; ecological protections—and the assertion of such priorities against the expense and logic of networked militarization. In this work of solidarity, the subject exploited and excommunicated by digital capitalism can transition from alienation toward reciprocity. And to those who say that the accelerated logic of cyberwar means we don’t have time to do all this before catastrophe arrives, we just say, you may be right, but still we have to do it anyway! We can build a “counterwar machine” constructed on the diagonal line that runs between waging cyberwar on cyberwar and fostering the caring corporeality that is opposite of cyberwar.

At the end of her study of world labor activism, Beverly Silver (2003, 176) notes a major reason for the shortage of militant working-class movements in the early twenty-first century. Neoliberalism’s restructuring, globalization, and financialization, with its “growing structural unemployment, escalating inequalities and major disruptions,” has repeated the crisis patterns of previous eras of capitalism, with one crucial exception. The missing condition is large-scale armed conflict. This “global political–military context contrasts sharply with . . . that [which] produced radicalized and explosive labour unrest in the first half of the twentieth century.” As Silver notes, war then involved the mass mobilization of populations that characterized total war. States depended on their working classes to provide not just millions of soldiers but labor in munition plants, shipyards and aircraft factories, hospitals, and farms. When mass mobilization met the horror of mass deaths and mutilation, revolutionary social turmoil could result.

As Silver (2003, 175) observes, advanced capitalism’s turn to high technological weaponry apparently breaks this link between war and worker revolt. Cyberwar can be seen as an extension of this “automation of war.” Nonetheless, as we have suggested, the tendency of digital militarization to liquidate the labor of war is not yet completely fulfilled. Humans remain as the indispensable conscious links and relays within the networks and nodes of digital conflict. Indeed, what we have seen in this book is the surprisingly wide diffusion of participation in cyberwarfare, from the highly specialized military and intelligence units at the cutting edge of advanced cyberoperations to strata of mercenary and criminal proxies, online vigilantes, patriotic hackers, corporate and criminal marketers of cyberweaponry, cybersecurity personnel, and on to the corporate content moderators and state censors and surveillance agents now indispensable to the prosecution of war waged in cyberspace and across scores of hybrid battlefields. To these more or less intentional contributions to the mechanisms of cyberwar must be added the unknowing (or partially unknowing) participation of network users, whose online activities and addictions provide the vital vectors for the memes, exploits, and hijackings of subterranean cyberconflicts and whose reconstitution as data-subjects habituated to ceaseless state and commercial surveillance constitutes the inevitable accompaniment to such operations.

Surveying this field, we can say that military mobilization has not so much been abolished from cyberwar as reconfigured in subterranean, etiolated, and unfamiliar forms. This decomposition of the labor of war, equivalent to Virilio’s state of “endocolonization” by the apparatus of high-technology militarism, may, as we have proposed in this chapter, contain potentials for reversal. If, to date, cyberwar is not, at least in the centers of capitalism, producing the massive havoc of earlier forms of war, the migrant refugees of hybrid conflicts around the world, fleeing algorithmically directed drones, social media–activated death squads, and cybernetic strikes at social utilities, bear witness to its potential to do so. Already, even in ostensibly secure zones of the planet, the costs of militarized and criminalized networks, in terms of escalating social paranoias, crumbling confidence in everyday communication and polarizing social relations, becomes daily more apparent. If this course persists, unforeseen forms of unrest by the new workforces of cyberwar may interrupt its inhuman trajectory.

Sign in to recut, update, or save this card.