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Reasonability: You should choose to understand our interpretations as reasonable readings of the resolution. Cyberwar operates at the level of epistemology itself, which means competing interpretations is a regime of veridiction that furthers the militarization of the cybernetic episteme.

Joque, 18—PhD from the European Grad School, researches philosophy, technology and media and is the visualization librarian at the University of Michigan, go blue (Justin, “Spear Phishing: Nodal Subjects,” Deconstruction Machines: Writing in the Age of Cyberwar, Chapter 4, 157-165, dml)

Leaking information, anonymity, and privacy are not only issues of secrecy or its lack but are intimately tied to the subject’s relation to truth. Faced with the contingent and vulnerable nature of these networks and information, any political subject always exists in a complex relation to truth or, at the very least, the veracity of her information. Any political efficacy from leaking information and destroying institutional secrecy requires the production of truth or some sort of truth-effect in the network that would engender a political response. Given the risks that false information could be leaked for the purposes of deception, or produced for other ends, as we saw in the case of Sabu, it becomes difficult to determine the veracity of any individual bit of information. More fundamentally, cyberwar in its very functioning is an attack on truth and its material and epistemic underpinnings. Under the threat of cyberwar, and the possibility that any information may have already been compromised, epistemology and truth become not only philosophical concerns but military-strategic problems as well.

In this light, it becomes difficult to separate any truth from its political and military investment. Derrida in “Plato’s Pharmacy” suggests that “the opposition between the true and the untrue is entirely comprehended, inscribed, within this structure or this generalized writing. The true and the untrue are both species of repetition. And there is no repetition possible without the graphics of supplementarity.”18 Here, for Derrida, the true does not transcend the structure of writing in general. There is no unity but only a relation among units of inscription. The true and the untrue are movements of repetition within and between systems, a movement defined by text and network. Truth and its opposite become emergent effects of networks and texts rather than transcendental or global attributes of systems. Like certificate authorities for verifying identity on open networks, the guarantee of any information is merely deferred to a different level. Truth emerges as a result of the structure and folds of a given system.

This is not to suggest that truth is relative; it is intimately tied to the real and material movement of texts, programs, bits, capital, and so on, through the various global networks and systems at stake.19 Still, what makes information true is precisely its inscription within a given network and its repetition throughout rather than through some preexisting global phenomenon. Lacan’s insights in this regard are especially helpful. He suggests that truth is a function of language.20 Truth is produced by the entire network of signifiers and subjects and always points to the truth of the structure rather than the veracity of an individual statement.21 Thus truth for Lacan is always a question of the symbolic and is never synonymous with the real. The real can never be falsified, for it is always exactly where it is; it is “always in its place.”22 A bit is never on its own true or false; the signifier in the real is, as Kittler suggests, merely a voltage difference.23 It is only through language, interpretation, and software that the bit comes to produce an effect; through the networks of signification, the networks of voltage difference become capable of producing a truth-effect. It is on these grounds that cyberwar becomes so insidious, by threatening to flip bits at the level of the real; underneath language, it demonstrates both the symbolic threat possessed by this real and the inability for the symbolic ever to achieve a full unity or mastery.

Truth becomes an effect of its movements through space and the programs that operate upon it. Any politics that commits itself to truth alone as the grounds for a politics risks merely partaking of the autoimmune violence of undecidability. The end of secrecy cannot in itself be a panacea for political injustice. In August 2010, Reporters without Borders sent an open letter to Assange suggesting precisely that his politics (insomuch as they were a politics of truth rather than of mere destruction) were shortsighted and paid little attention to the chain of effects that followed the dissemination of the “Afghanistan War Logs”:

You have unintentionally provided supposedly democratic governments with good grounds for putting the Internet under closer surveillance. . . .Indiscriminately publishing 92,000 classified reports reflects a real problem of methodology and, therefore, of credibility. Journalistic work involves the selection of information.

Reporters without Borders insists that journalistic work is not simply about providing information but rather about filtering, selecting, and assessing information, in short, about the program that is brought to bear upon information. Even though they may take issue with Assange’s choices of selecting information, his attempts at sharing leaks were also founded on a commitment to selecting information. Still, his selection was significantly more programmatic and consisted largely of sharing all information, except for information about sources (or even knowing, as the technological infrastructure behind WikiLeaks was designed to completely protect leakers); this still constitutes a decision to share only certain information.

Either way, this decision amounts to a political and strategic commitment. Terranova explains the stakes well when she describes the circulation of images as a type of warfare:

The hyperreal does not really involve a metaphysics of being and appearance so much as a kind of information ecology which also includes a dimension of warfare—a warfare to determine the differential power and dominance of some types of images over others.24

Alongside images, all texts and information are subjected to this dimension of warfare that differentiates their efficacy and ability to reformulate flows and networks. It is not merely the bits of information that determine their efficacy but their selection and differential relation.

The specific politics and strategy of pure transparency ultimately turn against themselves on two levels. On the level of truth, such a commitment can never guarantee the secrecy of the leaker while producing technologies that coax information from organizations. The same secrecy tax that burdens corporations and governments also causes individuals to reveal their secrets. On the level of effect, then, any technological and social system for supporting leaks is forced to engage in these complex networks and texts, in short, to decide what individuals’ secrecy matters and what secrecy does not matter. The problem then becomes an undecidable political question. This is not to say that it is a priori negative but that such an act constitutes an opening rather than a necessarily efficacious politics.

With the belief in an abstract machine that moves unwaveringly toward the end of secrecy or the belief that this decision can be avoided through technology, we risk that information becomes its own truth. Leaks become, as raw data, an objectification of the sociopolitical relations that produce, use, and manipulate information and thus mark and measure truth itself. Information thus becomes what Foucault describes as a regime of veridiction, which “in fact, is not a law of truth, but the set of rules enabling one to establish which statements in a given discourse can be described as true or false.”25 Information and the technologies of antisecrecy establish both the truth and the very rules enabling one to ascertain the truth. The regime of transparency in an informational economy becomes not about the quality or effect of information but about its mere possession, existence, and exposure. This is not to downplay the importance of these leaks or to minimize the great risks and costs individuals have taken on to bring this information to the public but rather to insist that this information alone does not guarantee an effective politics.

RESISTANCE AFTER THEORY

In this light, we can understand the media as “tactical” insomuch as all sides of these conflicts seize upon media, their reuse, and their reconfiguration for the purposes of war and conflict. Raley, commenting on the Critical Art Ensemble and Lovink’s, among others’, conception of tactical media, states, “Tactical media comes so close to its core informational and technological apparatuses that protest in a sense becomes the mirror image of its object, its aesthetic replicatory and reiterative rather than strictly oppositional.”26 While the focus of tactical media is largely on art and protest practices, with cyberwar, media become tactical to all involved, including states and armies. Despite these different forces who are now involved in using media tactically, all of them appear caught in this system that Raley outlines, where the use of these media requires that one mirror the object of intervention. When media become objects of war and tactics, it becomes impossible to step outside these processes of mediatization and its disfiguration in the face of this violence.27

To understand the media as tactical under the constant siege of cyberwar requires taking the McLuhanesque insight that “the media is the message” in the most deconstructed sense possible. There is no longer any meaningful way to separate the two. Perhaps before the rise of computers, when command functioned on the level of a physical machine and data could not touch it (e.g., no message could be sent over the radio that would turn it off—or worse yet, turn a car off while one is driving), a separation could be made between media and message. The rise of reprogrammable media that combine data and command requires abandoning any distinction between media and message. Subjects and truth are produced through the topologies and texts that send various messages through a multiplicity of media. Tactics in relation to media can then truly no longer be oppositional, for there can be no transcendental space from which a stable space of opposition could be constructed. Rather, the only tactical movement that remains is to discover the outsides that are folded inside texts, networks, and the unstable interface between them. But, the translation of local information to global networks always risks perversions, corruptions, and interventions.

Despite, or perhaps even because of, the difficulty of acting or deciding within these complex global networks, there is a great appeal to the possibility of controlling situations through instantaneously knowable surfaces. Data appear as a vast field of computable truth. But the coherence of these surfaces is always belied by the vulnerability and contingency they contain within and the instability of the subjects whose traces exist in these vast fields of data. Still, many discourses, including those of information transparency, continually claim the efficacy of managing surface effects. Rather than recognizing those forces, which resist control, a host of actors increasingly seek out finer-grained modes of analysis, holding on to the fallacy that everything today is flowing and visible.

Chris Andersen, a prominent technology journalist, has stated the belief in these analytic modes of knowing in its most radical and succinct form. In an argument analogous to Greenberg’s claims of a coming transparency, Andersen states that the age of huge data sets means that we no longer need models or theories of the world and instead can “run the data” in real time:

Out with every theory of human behavior, from linguistics to sociology. Forget taxonomy, ontology, and psychology. Who knows why people do what they do? The point is they do it, and we can track and measure it with unprecedented fidelity. With enough data, the numbers speak for themselves. The big target here isn’t advertising, though. It’s science. The scientific method is built around testable hypotheses. These models, for the most part, are systems visualized in the minds of scientists. . . . But faced with massive data, this approach to science—hypothesize, model, test— is becoming obsolete.28

For Andersen, we do not need to know why things happen but merely be able to predict them in real time: no theories, no models, no interpretation, just a pure flow of data. In many ways, it is the scientific version of Bill Gates’s fantasy of frictionless capitalism, but for Andersen, the signifier of capital is gone too. His is a fantasy of an infinite flow of information processed in real time, and the world constantly re-created anew out of predicting algorithms. It is a utopia, a nonplace, with no slowness and no topography that could hold information into a theoretical system. Beyond theory, we no longer need categories, only momentary statistical conglomerations. In this world, one need not know or theorize gender, class, or even individual subjects; everything becomes an individual record in a large-scale database.

It is, in short, the fantasy of a world without cyberwar, a world beyond cyberwar. This utopian vision would only be possible if computation and data were perfectly secure and always represented the world exactly. These descriptions of a pure world of data-driven discovery rest on the fantasy that all being and becoming can be perfectly encoded as data. This utopia requires that all data be perfectly secure and no accident, gap, or military force affect this correspondence. At the same time, it is a fantasy of the utter success of cyberwar, insomuch as it requires that technicians, politicians, scientists, and bankers are able to extract data from every system. In sum, Andersen hopes for a cyberwar that would end all cyberwars, an impossible cyberwar that would defeat all resistances.

Andersen is not alone in this vision of the future. A whole field of “hypothesis-free science” has gained traction in several disciplines.29 Advertisers, high-frequency stock traders, and security agencies all mine massive stores of data to find customers, profits, and criminals with no interest in theorizing what is being sought. Even Latour’s actor network theory appears committed to the tracing and recording of surface-level phenomena that provide no theory aside from the method of following an individual actor’s own theory.30 Here, again, information becomes its own veridiction. As long as the variables correlate, it does not matter why or how, and if the correlation is off, the algorithm updates automatically to improve accuracy for the next round.

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