Free beta access. 50 free AI tokens each week. Optional top-ups available. See what is included
Opening Word document…

The alt’s totalizing anti-governance orientation discounts methods of repurposing the stack-layers of governance towards ungovernability in favor of fleeting viral moments of spontaneity.

Schneider, 22—assistant professor of media studies at the University of Colorado Boulder (Nathan, “Governable Stacks against Digital Colonialism,” tripleC 20 (1): 19-36, 2022, dml)

Theorists and practitioners of anticolonial resistance have persistently stressed the centrality of self-governance in everyday life as both the means and the end of their movements, alongside acts of outright insurrection. By self-governance I mean to evoke other terms like autonomy, autogestión, autogestió, community control, self-determination, self-management, self-organising, self-rule, sovereignty, swaraj, and more – together encompassing how groups of people become impervious and intolerable to those who want to govern them by governing themselves. The aspiration to be “ungovernable” has appeared among thinkers ranging from the philosophers Michel Foucault and Giorgio Agamben (Thaning, Gudmand-Høyer and Raffnsøe 2016) to former Black Panther Lorenzo Kom’boa Ervin (Anderson 2020), each seeking to assert the vital personhood of people caught in dehumanising systems. Such systems utilise “governmentality” to extend their power into subjects’ lives (Li 2007). Scholars of governance tend to regard it as something done to – or at best, for – most people, rather than something they do themselves (Levi-Faur 2012). Self-governance against colonialism is something else, something people do to govern while becoming ungovernable.

To become ungovernable under digital colonialism, how should we be learning to self-govern?

I pose this question while observing that the platforms most available for online organising are not well-suited for self-governing; tools for basic group decision-making are not widespread, and nor are mechanisms to hold those in authority accountable (Schneider 2021). The design of social platforms inclines toward enabling the governmentality of platform owners, aided by their user-administrator proxies, rather than user governance that could turn against the owners’ interests. Campaigns of digital resistance often employ the same colonial firms they oppose. Those confronting digital colonialism today might therefore orient their struggles, as past anticolonial movements have, by rediscovering and reinventing the art of self-governance.

Settler colonialism and digital “user experience” both involve what legal scholar Sanjukta Paul (2020) calls the “allocation of coordination rights”. Regimes dictate who has the right to self-organise, or not, and under what conditions. Micro-targeted discrimination singles out individuals for exposure to exploitative advertising, stifling public outcry (Benjamin 2019). Algorithmic decisions about public-service provision make it harder for harmed communities to put collective pressure on individual decision makers (Eubanks 2018). Humanitarian organisations collect data about refugees, which the refugees themselves cannot access while the organisations use it for future fundraising (Madianou 2019). Individual users might have options on a platform to access or delete their own personal data, yet platform companies alone can develop products from the users’ data in the aggregate (Couldry and Mejias 2019a). Platforms impose the developers’ cultural norms, projecting a false universality that leaves little space for user communities to practice their own cultures (Kwet 2019; Milan and Treré 2019; Duarte et al. 2019). And at least as much as platforms might enable activist organising, they introduce new varieties of surveillance and repression (Tufekci 2017; Canella 2018).

“Governance is what we are fighting for”, writes Black Lives Matter co-founder Alica Garza (2020, 273). “We are fighting for the right to make decisions for our own lives and to ensure that right for others”. Her movement’s protests have made whole sections of cities ungovernable through daring, fraught, fleeting attempts to implement alternatives to policing. Progress goes slowly, with setbacks and blowback, until seemingly all at once even those in power no longer have any choice but to build on the fragile experiments from the streets.

What would community-governed technologies look like, and how can they resist exploitation? I introduce the concept of “governable stacks” as a means of ungovernable organising under digital colonialism. From here, this article reviews how anti-colonial leaders and thinkers have thought about self-governance. It then turns to the perils of recent failures among resistance movements to self-govern under digital colonialism. The following two sections present governable stacks in detail as a concept and as a practice.

2. The Trouble of Governance

“Governance is the extension of whiteness on a global scale”, write Stefano Harney and Fred Moten (2013, 56). NGOs are the “laboratories” of governance, which turns democracy into labour. It is a cheap sort of domination because the subjects do it to themselves: “Governance arrives to manage self-management, not from above, but from below” (55). Harney and Moten reply with a politics of refusal and “being without interests”, a call to imagine what it would mean “to struggle against governance” (57): “We are the general antagonism to politics looming outside every attempt to politicise, every imposition of self-governance” (20).

Harney and Moten’s polemic can claim many ancestors. They cite Frantz Fanon, who stressed the “spontaneity” of popular uprisings, the ungovernable reaction of the lumpen-proletariat, “the most spontaneous and the most radically revolutionary forces of a colonized people” (Fanon 1961/1963, 81). They celebrate the ungovernable villages of escaped slaves in the Americas, including the maroons of Saint-Domingue’s high hills, whose raids did not wait for Touissant Louverture’s command but made possible the eventual independence of Haiti (Lebrón Ortiz 2020).

“You know, I love C.L.R. James”, says Moten in passing (Harney and Moten 2013, 155). James, the Trinidadian chronicler of Louverture’s revolution and an instigator of others from Tanzania to Detroit, praised spontaneity as well. His book with Grace Lee Boggs and Pierre Chaulieu, Facing Reality, describes a “most conscious and finished opposition to the parliamentary procedure” found among dockworkers. By their account, “dockers do not like votes”; “they sense the general sentiment and act on that” (James, Lee and Chaulieu 1958/1974, 121-122). What holds sway is a worker’s je ne sais quoi ability to capture the attention of the others, regardless of role or position: decision without institution.

The age of networks has only deepened the allure of spontaneity among radical theorists, as with Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri’s admiration for the “multitude” and the “assembly” against fixed organisational forms (2017), or Manuel Castells’s (2015) “networks of outrage and hope”. Underground tracts from such pseudonymous figures as the Invisible Committee (2009) and the Vitalist International (2019) long for rebellions whose disorder is their vindication, while adrienne maree brown (2017) presents spontaneous self-organisation in nature as a theory of social change. Each seems to profess that organisational forms of revolutions past no longer compute – in part because we now have computers.

An antithesis: over a century ago, Vladimir Lenin (1902/1961) regarded those “who kneel in prayer to spontaneity” as a “fungus” among revolutionaries. Where there is spontaneity among the masses, it obtains power only through an organised and disciplined vanguard party, such as the one he would lead in Russia. Rosa Luxemburg (1904) recoiled at the rigidity of Lenin’s vanguard, one moulded by the discipline of the factory, the army, and the bureaucracy. She called for a movement that would be “supple as well as firm”, capacious enough to hold the full humanity of its participants. Yet a communist regime came to pass in Germany not through her homegrown movement but through Soviet tanks rolling into Berlin. Those tanks emanated from Stalin’s dictatorship; Luxemburg was right to worry about a vanguard modelled on industrial discipline. What she longed for remains so often elusive: a movement firm enough to gain power yet supple enough to wield it humanely.

Now, stop and go back, and reconsider those apparently kneeling before spontaneous resistance, against the strictures of governance. Synthesise the dialectic. Fanon also warned against the “cult” of spontaneity (1961/1963, 130) and stressed that the “enlightening of consciousness” necessary for liberation is “only possible within the framework of an organisation, and inside the structure of a people” (142). He held that spontaneous energies must find institutional cohesion. C.L.R. James affirmed, in his final interview, “I believe you must have an organisation” (Fitzpatrick 1989) in the Leninist sense. He celebrated the Paris Commune as a forerunner of the Russian soviets, regarding that uprising as “first and foremost a democracy” (Johnson 1946). And in “Every Cook Can Govern”, an essay that took its title from a phrase of Lenin’s, James recommends to workers the ancient Athenian method of ruling by sortition, selecting authorities from the citizenry by lot. The anticolonial organisation, in this light, must be creative and accountable, reaching into the lives of those who are self-governing and also outward as a model to others. As Adom Getachew (2019) documents, the independence movements James helped to inspire sought not just nation states but a new order of global governance.

Grace Lee Boggs was long a fellow traveller with James in the factions and divisions of sectarian Marxism, a student and friend of Third World revolutionaries (Boggs and Boggs 1974; Boggs 1998/2016). She and James Boggs thought their way into a “politics of personal development” (King 2017) that rejected partisan orthodoxies in favour of a more iterative “dialectical humanism”, in which political visions and the people who hold them evolve together through struggle. From the systems thinker Margaret J. Wheatley came Boggs’s frequent affirmation of “critical connections” over “critical mass” (Boggs and Kurashige 2012, 50) – a conviction that the germ of seismic change lies in the thick relationality of how people choose to self-organise day to day. She drifted from Leninism, but the imperative of self-governance only deepened.

Later in life, Boggs’s attention turned from achieving state communism to commoning, the work of people continually discovering what they are seeking to achieve by stewarding shared projects and resources. She became a mentor to veterans of the 2011 Occupy Wall Street and its “leaderless” travails. After her passing, Rodrigo Nunes (2021, Chapter 1) in Brazil envisions post-2011 movement organisation with naturalistic language like “nebula” and “ecology”. He confesses attempting to recuperate a kind of vanguardism, a “networked Leninism” – before concluding with an insistence that above all activists should “think and act ecologically” (Conclusion).

In Boggs we see the origins of passages about mycelia and butterflies and trees in the writing of her disciple adrienne maree brown (2017). brown’s “emergent strategy” for activists revels not in conflict with corporate opponents but in apparitions of friendship in online threads and tips for weaving consensus processes. Seeking to transcend “protest politics”, Boggs described her mentorship of younger organisers as

projecting and initiating struggles that involve people at the grassroots in assuming the responsibility for creating new values, truths, infrastructures, and institutions that are necessary to build and govern a new society (Boggs and Kurashige 2012, 68).

Fred Moten acknowledges the Boggses’ influence as an example of unpayable debts (Harney and Moten 2013, 153). What he and Harney offer in place of governance is “study”, a term of art that is also resolutely plain, in reference to the learning and planning that takes place among groups of people in spaces that are ungovernable by reigning institutions. Like the maroons of Saint-Domingue or the American South, study surely involves an order of its own, apart from the colonial university, a practice of insurgent self-rule. The maroons of study, for Harney and Moten, are never-settled communities of criminal exodus. But their maroons undertake “fugitive planning”. They study to plan, they plan so they can find the space and time to study. To do either, and therefore both, there must be something of the self-governance Harney and Moten seem to disavow.

These anticolonial thinkers see the trouble with governance in the sense of governmentality, a back-door aid to domination. And yet they also assert the otherwise troublesome kind of self-governing, the kind that is ungovernable and opaque and maroon from the vantage point of the imperial capitals – and, now, of the colonial platforms. The next section recalls how platforms have enabled their users to feel ungovernable and powerful for a time. But without the means of self-governing, those sensations have been fleeting.

3. Virality as a Colonising Strategy

I once entered the office of a labour organiser to find her there, head in her hands. She was running a campaign in the ever-shifting, just-in-time, atomised theatre of urban retail. Why so down? The workers were migrating to Instagram. At least on Facebook, you could corral them into groups, you could post updates. On Instagram, every message had to be hilarious or enraging or gorgeous if you wanted it to reach them. Sometimes the information an organiser needs to share is not any of those. But isn’t it still important?

Without persistent groups or organisations, Instagram’s eminent form of shared experience is the viral image, which circulates an affective impression of shared experience. To spread, the image must be the kind of image that would spread, according to the tastes of the poster’s followers and the secret churning of the platform’s engineering. An announcement for next week’s union meeting may not qualify. An organiser trying to strengthen workers’ bonds isn’t interested in infecting them like a virus.

The rise of ubiquitous social media rode on waves of protest, from the Battle of Seattle to the Arab Spring. Individual voices, linked with hashtags, seemed to herald collective liberation (Papacharissi 2015). And yet, despite the outpourings of promise and hope and near-term victories, those digitally mediated uprisings have fallen under the police of Mohamed Morsi and the bombs of Bashar al-Assad, the famines of the Yemeni civil war and the warlords of Libya. ‘Pirate’ political parties arising out of online protest have tended to collapse upon their first encounter with power, if they ever get there.

At the Occupy Wall Street encampment in 2011, reporters would arrive and be transfixed by the media centre – the nerve centre, the centre of power because it was media (Schneider 2013, 36). And media was powerful indeed, as it drew thousands upon thousands of people into what began as a small, precarious protest. Videos of police attacking activists, in particular, bred sympathy and participants, and a feeling that the movement might be on the brink of sparking some kind of revolution. At least at first. By the following year, the videos didn’t work the same way. As an activist monitoring the analytics data noticed at the time, “Riot porn is losing its luster for mass online consumption” (Schneider 2012). As the social-media attention waned, so did the movement’s confidence.

The likes of Vladimir Putin, Donald Trump, and Xi Jinping discovered how to outlast digital insurgencies, obscuring outbreaks of dissent under a deluge of obfuscation. Spontaneity is a commodity online, and empires can produce it for themselves.

Experience with multitudinous networks has led their early enthusiasts to call for more self-ordering. Hardt and Negri (2017) clarify their embrace of leaderless movements by stressing the need for “the institutionalization of free and democratic forms of life”, organised enough to be “able to take hold of the common” (xx). To Zeynep Tufekci (2017), the networked “signal” of movements can be self-defeating without organisational “capacity”.

The classic strategy of imperial domination – divide et impera, divide and conquer – proposes to dominate by training subjects to feel an illusion of power through their conflicts with one another. On colonial platforms, too, users direct their energy for and against each other, gaining influence and affirmation through their jousts and, in so doing, identifying themselves ever more deeply with the non-transferable reputation they obtain on the platforms. Virality is fleeting if it ever happens, but the possibility is there, so we pursue it. Before long we have recapitulated the final scene of the 1954 McCarthyist blockbuster On the Waterfront, in which the dockworkers flee from their union’s problems into the arms of the boss, newly able to experience their collective exploitation as individual liberation.

Sign in to recut, update, or save this card.