The development of imperial technology explains the mechanisms of dispossession better.
Harris, 4—Department of Geography, University of British Columbia (Cole, “How Did Colonialism Dispossess? Comments from an Edge of Empire,” Annals of the Association of American Geographers, 94:1, 165-182, dml)
The emphasis on culture in studies of colonialism tends to obscure other forms of colonial power while making it impossible to contextualize the cultural argument and assess its salience. Rather than focusing on texts, systems of signification, and procedures of knowledge generation, as the colonial discourse literature is wont to do, a fuller understanding of colonial powers is achieved by explaining colonialism’s basic geographical dispossessions of the colonized. In so doing, the issue of power is not prejudged and the particular roles of different modes and theories of colonial power come into focus. I explore these propositions by considering the powers underlying the reserve (reservation) system in British Columbia, a system that, by allocating a tiny fraction of the land to native people and opening the rest for development, facilitated the geographical reorganization of the province. My conclusions are these: the initial ability to dispossess rested primarily on physical power and the supporting infrastructure of the state; the momentum to dispossess derived from the interest of capital in profit and of settlers in forging new livelihoods; the legitimation of and moral justification for dispossession lay in a cultural discourse that located civilization and savagery and identified the land uses associated with each; and the management of dispossession rested with a set of disciplinary technologies of which maps, numbers, law, and the geography of resettlement itself were the most important. Although no one body of theory explains colonial power, several theoretical perspectives yield crucial insights. Key Words: colonialism, colonial discourse theory, deterritorialization, colonial land policies, governmentality, reservations, British Columbia.
Influenced by Michel Foucault’s analysis of the relationships of power and knowledge (1972), by Edward Said’s examination of Orientalism (1978), by textual theory harnessed to colonial discourse analysis, and by many studies of the values and ideologies enmeshed in particular colonial encounters, most postcolonial scholars now identify culture and associated procedures of knowledge generation as the dominant power relations associated with colonialism. Whereas Frantz Fanon (1963) emphasized violence—the power of the gun—and Marx, to the extent that he wrote on colonialism, the aggressive reach of capital, postcolonial research and writing situates the momentum of colonialism in the culture of imperialists and colonists. A central goal, therefore, of colonial discourse theory is to identify the assumptions and representations inherent in colonial culture—in the binary of civilization/savagery, in the erasures of Aboriginal knowledge of time and space, in assumptions about race and gender, in the concept of the land as empty (terra nullius), and so on—and then, insofar as possible, to expose their contemporary manifestations. This work has focused much scholarly energy and has yielded important theoretical and practical results, but it is less clear that it has revealed the principal momentum and power relations inherent in colonialism.
Originating in literary and cultural studies, colonial discourse theory, indeed postcolonial scholarship generally, privileges the investigation of imperial texts, enunciations, and systems of signification. In so doing, it exposes implicit modes of seeing and of understanding that are held to infuse and validate colonialism while imparting much of its momentum. If Said offered broadly inclusive descriptions of colonial culture, and if others, more recently, have emphasized the variety of colonial voices and the importance of a local, contextual appreciation of different colonial cultures (e.g., Thomas 1994), in either case, culture is treated as a primary locus of colonial power. Moreover, as elements of colonial culture are assumed to have outlived formal colonial regimes, their identification becomes an active political project—the decolonization of representation (Hall 2000, 5). In itself, this is commendable enough, but if studies of colonial culture are not contextualized among other forms of colonial power, then it is well nigh impossible to assess the particular work and the relative salience of colonial culture itself. A study of travel writing, for example, may yield an appreciation of the inflected seeing of travelers and of the complicity of such seeing with colonial projects, while not beginning to address the relative importance of travelers’ seeing and writing in the whole colonial enterprise. Given its focus, it cannot. At best, it can yield a nuanced understanding of traveler perceptions and values, and suggestive ideas about their relationships with colonialism. Colonialism’s complexity may be affirmed, so too, perhaps, the discursive construction of reality comments tied more closely to theory than to a situated knowledge of colonial practices and power relations.
In the hands of some of its most able practitioners, postcolonial scholarship is a potent means of exploring the reworking (‘‘provincializing’’) of European thought at and for the margins of empire (Chakrabarty 2000, 16). However, most postcolonial scholarship is written out of British or American universities and emanates from the heart of a recently superceded empire or of a recently ascendant one that hesitates to acknowledge its own imperial background. American postcolonial scholarship is not preoccupied with America (Hulme 1995; Thomas 1994 172–73). In the background of such scholarship are European theorists, particularly Foucault, Derrida, and Gramsci; in the foreground, European colonial thought and culture. In these circumstances, as many have pointed out, it tends to be Eurocentric—or as the Australian anthropologist Patrick Wolfe puts it, occidocentric (1999, 1). So positioned, it is well placed to comment on the imperial mind in its large diversity, and even—especially in the hands of scholars like Homi Bhabha and Dipesh Chakrabarty who grew up in former colonies—on the ways in which European thought has been inflected and hybridized by its colonial encounters, but not on the diverse, on-the-ground workings of colonialism in colonized spaces around the world. A central claim of the distinguished Indian subaltern historian, Ranajit Guha, is that if British historical writing on the subcontinent reveals something of Britain and the Raj, it reveals nothing of India (1997). Somewhat similar criticisms have been made of much of the postcolonial literature: that it (or parts of it) anticipates a radically restructured European historiography, that it allows for nothing outside the (European) discourse of colonialism, that it is yet another exercise in metatheory and in European universalism (e.g., Slemon 1994; McClintock 1994). As the literary theorist Benita Parry puts it, the postcolonial emphasis on language and texts tends to offer ‘‘the World according to the Word’’ (1997, 12)—and the word tends to be European. But unless it can be shown that colonialism is entirely constituted by European colonial culture (a proposition for which it is hard to imagine any convincing evidence unless the concept of culture is understood so broadly that it loses any analytical value), then studies of colonial discourse, written from the center, must be a very partial window on the workings of colonialism.
The discipline of geography has responded to postcolonial thought in a variety of ways (Clayton 2003). Among others, studies of colonialism itself have come into vogue, most of them written in Britain, a few from the edges of empire. I am struck by how much the character of these studies has been influenced by the locations of their authors. Consider, for example, two recent books by historical geographers: Felix Driver’s Geography Militant: Cultures of Exploration and Empire (2000), and Frank Tough’s ‘‘As Their Natural Resources Fail’’: Native Peoples and the Economic History of Northern Manitoba, 1870–1930 (1996). From opposite perspectives, they treat a fairly similar period of British colonialism. Driver analyzes the culture of exploration, particularly the sites and nature of its production and consumption—as at the Royal Geographical Society. His is a study of the ways in which the British imperial mind, both popular and academic, processed explorers’ information. Tough’s work is embedded in the materiality of a declining fur trade in the northern Manitoba bush. It deals with forts and trade routes; with economies and survival strategies as a twohundred-year-old system of commercial capital vacated the region; and with native livelihoods found in a precarious balance between what remained of a hunting, fishing, and gathering economy and intermittent employment in uncertain industrial resource economies. Each is an authentic study, yet they have little to say to each other, and this is basically, I think, because one is written from London, the heart of an empire, and the other from the Canadian Shield, one of its many colonial margins. At least, as Derek Gregory has put it, ‘‘what seemed plausible in the lecture hall of the Royal Geographical Society in London . . . might well become a half truth on the ground’’ (1998, 21). The distinction, perhaps, is between studies of imperialism and of colonialism: imperialism ideologically driven from the center and susceptible to conceptual analysis, colonialism a set of activities on the periphery that are revealed as practice (Young 2001, 16–17). Only a few geographers have tried to bring both the imperial mind and the particularities of local colonial circumstances into focus (e.g., Clayton 2000 and Lester 2001).
But if the aim is to understand colonialism rather than the workings of the imperial mind, then it would seem essential to investigate the sites where colonialism was actually practiced. Its effects were displayed there. The strategies and tactics on which it relied were actualized there. There, in the detail of colonial dispossessions and repossessions, the relative weight of different agents of colonial power may begin to be assessed. If colonialism is the object of investigation, then Tough’s sparse Canadian Shield is promising terrain. It was not detached from London, of course, and may have been profoundly influenced by elements of imperial thought and culture, but the extent of this influence cannot be ascertained in London. Rather, I think, one needs to study the colonial site itself, assess the displacements that took place there, and seek to account for them. To do so is to position studies of colonialism in the actuality and materiality of colonial experience. As that experience comes into focus, its principal causes are to be assessed, among which may well be something like the culture of imperialism. To proceed the other way around is to impose a form of intellectual imperialism on the study of colonialism, a tendency to which the postcolonial literature inclines.
The experienced materiality of colonialism is grounded, as many have noted, in dispossessions and repossessions of land. Even Edward Said (for all his emphasis on literary texts) described the essence of colonialism this way: ‘‘Underlying social space are territories, land, geographical domains, the actual geographical underpinnings of the imperial, and also the cultural contest. To think about distant places, to colonize them, to populate or depopulate them: all of this occurs on, about, or because of land. The actual geographical possession of land is what empire in the final analysis is all about’’ (1994, 78). Frantz Fanon held that colonialism created a world ‘‘divided into compartments,’’ a ‘‘narrow world strewn with prohibitions,’’ a ‘‘world without spaciousness.’’ He maintained that a close examination of ‘‘this system of compartments’’ would ‘‘reveal the lines of force it implies.’’ Moreover, ‘‘this approach to the colonial world, its ordering and its geographical layout will allow us to mark out the lines on which a decolonized society will be reorganized’’ (1963, 37–40).
Along the edge of empire that was early-modern British Columbia, colonialism’s‘‘geographical layout’’ was primarily expressed in a reserve (reservation) system that allocated a small portion of the land to native people and opened the rest for development. Native people were in the way, their land was coveted, and settlers took it. The line between the reserves and the rest—between the land set aside for the people who had lived there from time immemorial and land made available in various tenures to immigrants— became the primary line on the map of British Columbia. Eventually, there were approximately 1,500 small reserves, slightly more than a third of 1 percent of the land of the province. Native people had been placed in compartments by an aggressive settler society that, like others of its kind, was far more interested in native land than in the surplus value of native labor (Wolfe 1999, 1–3). Figures 1 and 2 illustrate the scale of dispossession.
At these sites of colonial dispossession, it seems particularly fruitful to ask by what means it came about. The common emphasis in the colonial discourse literature is reversed. By starting not with texts, language, and strategies of representation, but with the dispossession of colonized peoples of their land— with, as it were, Figures 1 and 2—the relative weight of different colonial powers is not prejudged, and the question becomes simply: how was colonial power deployed to achieve this geographical effect? Rather than writing from the imperial center, rather than investigating colonial subtexts within a particular category of texts, the analysis turns on the primary effect of a particular settler colonialism and on the gamut of colonial powers that facilitated it. So situated, the distinctive roles of different components of the colonial arsenal should begin to come into focus (including maps like Figures 1 and 2). The cultural discourse of colonialism should begin to be contextualized, and some basis should be established for the evaluation of salience. Moreover, different theoretical points of attachment should come into focus, and it should be possible to sketch the work that particular bodies of theory accomplish.
This article is a rather schematic attempt to undertake such an analysis and, on that basis, to offer some preliminary conclusions. In a recent book on the reserve system in British Columbia (Harris 2002), I provide more texture for those who wish it. Yet the very starkness of an article that surveys an array of colonial powers may serve to emphasize my argument and encourage the discussion of the relationships among different forms of colonial power— and of different ways of theorizing them—out of which, I think, a more balanced geographical contribution to the study of colonialism is likely to emerge. I deal with British Columbia while assuming that my arguments bear, to some fair extent, on other theaters of settler colonialism.
The Power to Dispassess
The problem of reserves in British Columbia arose with the establishment of colonies and settlers some 70 years after people of European background began to frequent its coastal waters. After commercial capital reached the coast in the 1780s and 1790s, and the interior in the first decade of the 19th century, trade became the basis of the relationship between natives and nonnatives. The relationship was frequently mediated by violence, sexual liaisons of various sorts, and cross-cultural borrowing, but land was not at issue. Except for the few acres within their palisaded forts and, in some cases, a little land beyond for a farm or two, traders did not need it. For their purposes, it was sufficient to insert a handful of outsiders in ships or forts into native space.
But a territory had become known to the outside world, and its outline had been mapped. In French sociologist Bruno Latour’s terms, such ‘‘inscriptions’’ were transported to distant ‘‘centers of calculation’’ (1987, ch. 6). Sketchy information about a distant corner of North America was processed, thousands of miles from its source, within complex calculuses of diplomatic ambition, ideology, cultural stereotypes, and raw geopolitical power (Clayton 2000). Spain relinquished any claim to sovereignty along the north Pacific coast in 1795. Britain and the United States contended much longer, an intricate diplomacy at times verging onwar thatwas settled only in 1846 when the border between British North America and the United States was extended along the 49th parallel to the Pacific. This agreement, the Oregon Treaty, was a legal understanding between distant governments ‘‘respecting the sovereignty and government of the territory on the northwest coast of America.’’ It did not mention native people. In the eyes of the governments involved, the issue of sovereignty was settled. Three years later, in response to the American settlement of Oregon and the news of gold in California, the British government established the proprietary colony of Vancouver Island. Then, in 1858, following a rush of underemployed miners from California to the Fraser River, it established the crown colony of British Columbia. As Daniel Clayton puts it, ‘‘native space was reproduced as an absolute space of British sovereignty,’’ (2000, 236) although initially, in the aftermath of the Treaty of Waitangi and judicial rulings in New Zealand, officials in the Colonial Office were uncertain about the extent to which British sovereignty in these colonies was burdened by native title (Harris 2002, 15–16).
With the creation of these two colonies, land was framed in a new problematic. Colonies entailed settlers, and settlers required land, which could be got only by dispossessing native people. A relationship based on trade was replaced by one based on land. As their land was taken away, native people had to be put somewhere. A solution with many precedents in other settler colonies was to put them on reserves. Dispossession began in the 1850s and continued through the rest of the century. Physical violence, the imperial state, colonial culture, and self-interest all underlay it.
Violence. The establishment of colonies on Vancouver Island and the mainland changed the nature of violence there. It had long accompanied the fur trades. Coastal trading ships bristled with arms, greed was rampant on both sides, cross-cultural misunderstandings were frequent, and killing was the common result (Clayton 2000, ch. 6; Gibson 1992, 163, 170). In the interior, an axiom of the land-based fur trade was that perceived assaults on the personnel or property of the traders would be met with quick, spectacular displays of violence—sovereign power in the Foucaultian sense, though without a validating regime of rights (Harris 1997, ch. 2). Nor was the gold rush peaceable. Miners arrived with the latest weaponry (including six-shooters and spiral-bored rifles) and tactics of Indian fighting worked out in the American southwest. At the first sign of trouble, they organized themselves into companies, elected officers, and advanced in paramilitary formation. But with the creation of settler colonies, a new level of organization and calculation—the British military—was built into the equation of violence (Gough 1984). British warships operated along the coast; a detachment of Royal Engineers was sent out to survey land and maintain order. Such power was more often displayed than used—a few quick and very public hangings of suspected murderers after summary trials on the quarterdeck of one of Her Majesty’s warships, or a few villages shelled and destroyed—spectacles intended to instill fear. Officials considered such power ‘‘a grand persuasive.’’ Some held that it saved lives by preventing settler–native wars. Frequently, they judged it sufficient to anchor a warship just off a native village and ostentatiously prepare the guns.
In the interior, the space beyond the reach of a ship’s guns, the military equation was more balanced. In the 1870s, as settlers were moving in and preempting land, many natives leaders talked of war. Settlers feared, perhaps with justification, that a native uprising could wipe all of them out in a single night. But, as the chiefs knew, a shortterm victory was one thing; keeping at bay settlers and the armies that, sooner or later, would back them up was quite another. The results of wars across the border in which native warriors (some from British Columbia) had fought federal U.S. troops, was evidence in hand. Those who counseled war did so out of desperation. One chief put it this way: ‘‘A war with the white man will end in our destruction, but death in war is not so bad as death by starvation’’ (cited in Harris 2002, 206). Overall, the balance of physical power lay overwhelmingly with the state.
The imperial state. From the vantage point of London, Vancouver Island and British Columbia were two remote and relatively inconsequential colonies. Imperial attention focused, rather, on India and Ireland. After the advent of free trade in 1846, the role of settler colonies in the imperial scheme of things had become increasingly murky. Earl Grey, secretary of state for the colonies when the colony of Vancouver Island was created, held that colonies returned important image value for a great power and also that the honor of the crown required it to protect British settlers overseas (who had chosen to settle within the British empire) and also to protect native people from settlers who, left to their own devices, would probably exterminate them (Grey 1853, vol. 1, letter 1). Yet the coffers of the Lords of the Treasury opened reluctantly for honor, and British settler colonies around the world were expected to support themselves. Moreover, the duty of the crown to protect native people from settlers conflicted with the Colonial Office’s growing willingness to accord responsible government. As liberal humanitarian sentiments about the essential oneness of human kind and the opportunity to create a world of civilized, Christian people faded, responsible government came to dominate protection in Colonial Office thought (Metcalf 1996; Porter 1999). In settler colonies, where access to land was the predominant issue, only a hollow form of responsible government would exclude land policy from colonial jurisdiction. In effect, by the late 1840s and 1850s, the Colonial Office had no clear, consistent native policy. As a result, when the colony of Vancouver Island was created, it was readily inclined to turn over the management of native people to the Hudson’s Bay Company (which, it thought, had handled them much better than the Americans) and to rely on the judgment of the fur trader-cum-governor (George Douglas), who managed both colonies until his retirement in 1864. Thereafter, land policies were formulated by local settler politicians. The Colonial Office hardly interfered, and in 1871 when BritishColumbia became a Canadian province, land policy, now constitutionally a provincial responsibility within the Canadian confederation, remained in the hands of these same politicians. The state created a framework for the ordered development of a settler society, but did not, itself, provide the momentum for the development of that society or for the dispossessions and repossessions of land that accompanied it. When power passed to local politicians, they reflected the values and interests of their constituents.
Culture. The assumptions about the colonized other analyzed in the colonial discourse literature were pervasive in early modern British Columbia. Hardly a white person questioned the distinction between civilization and savagery or the association of the former with Europeans and the latter with native people. Nor did they question the proposition that civilized people knew how to use land properly and that savages did not. From these assumptions it followed that until Europeans arrived, most of the land was waste, or, where native people were obviously using it, that their uses were inadequate. Nor was there room for alternative understandings of civilized modernity. Rather, thought about native people focused on a simple binary: civilization and savagery with little of consequence between. From this it followed that if native people did not become civilized, and if, in a changing world, it was no longer possible for them to be savage, then they would die out, a common prediction in British Columbia well into the 20th century.
These social constructions were assumed, not debated. They pervaded thought about native people in the Colonial Office, in political, administrative, legal, and missionary circles in British Columbia, and in the settler mind. An Indian reserve commissioner, charged with laying out reserves, said this to a native audience on Vancouver Island in 1876:
Many years ago you were in darkness killing each other and making slaves was your trade. The Land was of no value to you. The trees were of no value to you. The Coal was of no value to you. The white man came he improved the land you can follow his example—he cuts the trees and pays you to help him. He takes the coal out of the ground and he pays you to help him—you are improving fast. The Government protects you, you are rich—You live in peace and have everything you want. —(cited in Harris 2002, 108)
At the time, few if any white settlers would have disagreed. There were arguments about how quickly native people could be assimilated and, therefore, about how much land should be allocated to them. Some settlers, biological racists to the core, considered natives utterly lazy, degenerate, and unredeemable; but a few found much to appreciate or pity in native lives, were well disposed toward native people nearby, and now and then supported their pleas for more reserve land. But even kindness— tinged by an educated, romantic appreciation of nature and, therefore, of lives assumed to live close to nature— was situated within the assumptions of the civilization/ savage binary. So was salvage anthropology, which in the influential presence of Franz Boas reached the coast late in the 19th century, there intent upon recovering the uncontaminated primitive condition. Boas had little interest in the native societies around him(which, he thought, were becoming civilized), except insofar as they supplied informants about earlier, precontact times.
These values had not been invented in British Columbia. As a considerable literature has shown (e.g., Seed 1995; Hulme and Jordanova 1990; Buckle 1991; Arneil 1996), some of them were as old as the European connection with the New World and had surfaced in the first European theorizing about their rights there by the Spanish theologian Francisco de Vitoria in the 1530s, or by the Dutch legal theorist Hugo Grotius a century later. They were powerfully and influentially elaborated by John Locke ([1690] 1947, ch. 5) in his labor theory of property. Locke held that God’s gift of land to Adam and his posterity acquired value only as labor was expended on it, and that labor justified individual property rights. Those who did not labor on the land wandered over what Locke called unassisted nature, land that yielded little and lay in common. This, he thought, was the condition of America before European settlers arrived. The land was ‘‘a wild common of Nature,’’ the original condition of the world before labor was expended on land and benefits accrued therefrom. Hence his famous dictum: ‘‘In the beginning, all the world was America.’’ In all the early settler colonies, ordinary (frequently illiterate) settlers—people who had never heard of Vitoria, Grotius, or Locke—held unsophisticated versions of these views.
By the mid-19th century, these old and pervasive ideas were powerfully reinforced by an increasingly strident racism and the achievements of industrial production. These years were the high water mark of ‘‘scientific’’ racism. The ideas of phrenologists, craniometricians, and polygenesists were in the air, and after Darwin’s The Origin of Species (published in 1859), it could be argued that, even if humans shared a common origin, there had been ample time for evolution to take different courses and produce different peoples. The very achievements of industrial society were the measure, it seemed, of an evolutionary advantage. The lurid tales of the massacres of English women and children at Morant Bay in Jamaica, or, later, at Lucknow and Cawnpore during the Indian Mutiny, confirmed in many minds the absurdity of treating natives as the equal of whites. Such judgments reached British Columbia. Even more important, I think, as the historian Michael Adas has pointed out, was the growing technological gulf between Europe and the rest of the world and the tangible measure it provided of the disjunction between civilization and savagery (Adas 1989). European weaponry and military discipline had made conquest relatively easy (Headrick 1981). Contrasts between Europeans and others seemed obvious: machine power versus animal or human power, progress versus stagnation, science versus superstition. The whole material paraphernalia of European modernity was a tangible yardstick of superiority, and the idea of progress, conceived in these material terms, was in the air as never before. Moreover, as the historian Mark Francis has shown, if civilization and progress came to be equated with technology and material wealth, then a measurable standard had been invented that native people could not attain (Francis 1998). They could be mannered, but they could not match European technologies or material wealth. Nor did they have the Europeans’ growing ability to dominate nature, another measure of progress. People who marked the land lightly and lived within the rhythms of nature were obviously unprogressive and backward. If civilization were measured in these terms, then native societies must be savage. For British Columbians of European background, the conclusion was obvious, and the rhetoric surrounding civilization, savagery, and unused land awaiting development was pervasive and uncontested.