**Should we copy paste China-Russia Alliance bad here?
Kim and Kim 22 — Sung-han Kim a Graduate School of International Studies, Korea University, Seoul, Republic of Korea & Sanghoon Kim b Center for Maritime Security, Korea Institute for Maritime Strategy, Seoul, Republic of Korea (2022) China’s contestation of the liberal international order, The Pacific Review, DOI: 10.1080/09512748.2022.2063367 WMK
Despite conventional wisdom that the AIIB represents a challenge to the liberal international order and Chinese ambitions to establish a Sinocentric international order, the AIIB is an example of contested multilateralism. Specifically, it is a strategy of competitive regime creation to better reflect the interests of China in the multilateral development sector without challenging the constitutional structure and the fundamental institutions of the liberal international order. In fact, the AIIB has been working collaboratively with parallel institutions within the regime complex such as the World Bank, the IMF, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), and the ADB. In assessing whether the AIIB signifies deconcentration and delegitimation of the U.S.-led liberal order, it is too early to tell whether the AIIB will evolve into a multilateral development bank that serves as an instrument to export a Chinese model of economic statecraft such as state capitalism. Moreover, this paper examines only the AIIB as an example of Chinese contestation of the liberal international order and future research can test the contestation-challenge distinction of revisionist state behavior with other case studies in different issue-areas to corroborate the argument laid out in this paper. Moreover, the task remains on sophisticated ways to distinguish contestations from challenges in the security domain.
Certainly, the developmental model, emphasizing export promotion with a high degree of state intervention, is touted as an alternative pathway to achieve economic growth, especially after the experiences of the 1997 Asian financial crisis and the 2008 global financial crisis. However, it is hard to disregard the possibility of China using these infrastructure projects as ways to promote Chinese interests, by exporting excess capacity in domestic industries while paving the way for increased connectivity along the lines of land and sea communications. After all, even if China had the intention to construct a regional sphere of influence and an exclusive China-led international order, the success of such endeavor would rely on China’s ability to continue its material rise and to buy voluntary compliance of secondary powers, earning legitimacy of a renewed Chinese leadership in the region by presenting an alternative order. An early assessment of Chinese efforts at order-building in the multilateral development domain, reveals that secondary powers are, gradually, finding the shortcomings of China-led initiatives, ranging from the lack of transparency to the incurrence of exorbitant national debts. At the same time, the introduction of the ‘Build Back Better World (B3W)’ partnership, by the Biden administration, may restore U.S. leadership in the global infrastructure development sector with emphasis on liberal values such as transparency, good governance, and environmental safeguards (The White House, 2021).
If China is contesting, not challenging the liberal international order, the countermeasures of the United States, as the guardian of the liberal international order, become equally dependent upon the question of whether China will transform into a ‘revolutionary’ revisionist power from today’s ‘reformist’ revisionist power. A strategy of ‘hard’ containment and the use of coercive measures to suppress Chinese influence in the region will further aggravate Chinese dissatisfaction towards the liberal international order. This will motivate China to actively seek counter-hegemonic military coalitions with strategic partners, such as Russia, to challenge the United States at all levels. Therefore, it is important for the United States to accommodate China’s legitimate demands within established institutions that reflect the changes in the distribution of capabilities.