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[MOVED] The LIO is terminally unsustainable---clinging to it causes outside powers to backlash escalating conflicts

Huang 21 — Department of Political Science, University of Florida, Gainesville, FL Huang Q. The Pandemic and the Transformation of Liberal International Order. J Chin Polit Sci. 2021;26(1):1-26. doi: 10.1007/s11366-020-09698-0. Epub 2020 Oct 16. PMID: 33082701; PMCID: PMC7565235. WMK

Considering the liberal international order in its idealized form, it seems to be trapped in a deepening crisis. The first sign of crisis is evident in the decline of the United States and its gradual disengagement from international affairs, especially after Trump took office. During his first term, Trump withdrew from the Paris Accord; the Trans-Pacific Partnership; the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO); and the United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC). Moreover, he has generated tensions with long-term allies in Europe and tarnished the image of the liberal order. As expressed by Trump in his speech at the UN General Assembly, “America will always choose independence and cooperation over global governance, control, and domination” [20]. It seems that the United States is stepping back from its role as a world leader. Some scholars lament that, without a broader vision as defender of the free world, and with a new focus on pursuing narrow national interest, Trump’s America is abandoning its “global leadership” as the “long-time champion” of the liberal international order [21]. Even worse, Trump has launched a direct attack on this order—the system of multilateral trade and alliances that the United States built to serve its interests and attract others to its “way of life” [22]. Cooley and Nexon’s assessment further demonstrates that the unravelling of American hegemony was already underway before Trump’s presidency. Trump only sped up America’s retreat in the liberal international order [23]. Moreover, the doubt cast on America’s leadership by its allies in Europe, the loss of “a vision of how the world is supposed to work”, and the challenge from internal fragmentation all contributed to “the eclipse of the West” [24].

The second sign of crisis is the rise of China and Russia in the international arena. Scholars had already sounded alarms before Trump took office. Besides their military power, challengers like China and Russia threaten the existing liberal order by disrupting it with their own political systems, interests, and ideologies [25]. According to Stephens, the rise of revisionist powers, including China, Russia, and Iran, have posed serious challenges to America’s claims on “both the goodness and the success of the liberal-democratic model”. As these powers become increasingly assertive and ambitious, the U.S.-led order is in deep trouble [26]. Moreover, a larger group of challengers—the emerging economies in the BRICS countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa)—are increasingly undermining the Western dominance, especially after the financial crisis in 2008 [5, 6]. In particular, in recent years, China has moved from a reformist of the liberal international order to a revisionist that seeks to establish “new systems of governance and international cooperation” [27: 14]. The factors behind this change include China’s renewed self-confidence and awareness of a greater role in global arena, the reluctance of the West to reform, the weakening of the United States after the 2008 financial crisis, and the dominant powers’ alienation of developing countries [27]. Although scholars disagree on the extent of disruption that China may bring to the liberal international order, there are evident concerns that the U.S.-led order may be replaced by a new one dominated by China [26–28].

To many Western scholars, these two trends—the retreat of the United States and the rise of powerful challengers—are indeed worrisome, as reflected in their warnings of a “new global disorder” [25] or “a descent into the chaos of a world without effective institutions that encourage and organize cooperation.”2 In Stephens’s words, the only alternative to Pax Americana would be global disorder [26]. And it is likely to bring about “a highly competitive international environment” that may result in “unprecedented global calamity” [29]. The main problem with this line of argument is that, the liberal international order discussed by these scholars tends to mix its normative aspect with the observed reality. Their emphasis on the normative or idealized aspect of the liberal international order often leads to the assumption that this order is a unitary and cohesive whole that needs to be preserved in its original form, including perpetuating the American dominance. As such, any existing alternatives or emerging experiments are considered as disruptive to the order or sowing the seeds of disorder. In particular, an illiberal order would be considered as the opposite of all the good things brought together in the liberal order. It will be “politically and economically divided and closed, authoritarian, uncooperative, coercive, and disrespectful of rules and norms” [30: 5].

However, to understand the depth of the crisis of liberal international order, it is necessary to examine the differences between the normative order and the empirically observed order. As Rosenau notes, to be insensitive to their distinctions will “run the risk of either clouding sound analysis with preferred outcomes or confounding preferred outcomes with empirically faulty recommendations” [31: 10]. Scholars need to distinguish observations of the reality of the international order from judgments and visions of such order. In Buzan’s words, adopting the normative aspect of such a concept could be seen as an effort to consider what is possible and advocate what is desirable [32: 300]. However, it is necessary to acknowledge that the reality on the ground may not approximate the desired ideal. Regarding the current liberal international order, its advocates often offer a narrow and highly selective view of history. They tend to ignore aspects of coercion, violence, and instability in the post-war era, while emphasizing the order’s unwavering support for democracy, freedom, and human rights [1]. This tendency has led to what Allison calls the “myth of the liberal order”. In his words, the liberal international order is essentially “an imagined past in which the United States molded the world in its image” [33]. Moreover, the nostalgic view of the liberal order is ahistorical as it ignores the process of ordering that was marked by episodes of violence, coercion, and resistance, as well as the imperial prerogatives of the United States that had often disregarded rules and accommodated illiberal forces [30].

Beneath the surface of “stability” and “peace”, the liberal international order is rife with tensions, the first of which comes from the competition between different political-economic models. That is, the liberal model, supported by dominant Western powers, is challenged by the so-called illiberal models promoted by major challengers like China. These models are by no means pure in their forms and practices. There are evident contradictions within each model. Just as the liberal model has elements of coercion and violence, the illiberal model also contains elements of cooperation and rule. The second tension arises between states seeking to assert their agency against the seemingly inexorable and homogenizing forces of globalization promoted by the liberal order. States refuse to be hollowed out by the globalizing forces and seek to assert their authority and legitimacy both within their territorial boundaries and in transnational processes. In the context of external shock and rising nationalism, states would prioritize their national interests and make choices that are most aligned with their material and ideological preferences. Finally, the third tension lies between the defenders and challengers of the existing order. Countries with increasing military and economic power may seek to transform the current international order to better reflect their own ideologies and serve their interests. The competition between major powers could be intensified by triggers like financial crisis or pandemic crisis.

The Challengers’ Perspectives

If the existing order rests upon widening economic discrepancies among actors, there will be growing pressure for change. If the material conditions, including the distribution of resources among actors, undergo substantial change, the current arrangement could potentially reconfigure, leading to a breakdown or restructuring of prevailing order [31]. Moreover, the image presented by the liberal world has been and will continue to be questioned by the emerging powers, further deepening the ideological divisions between them. The rising powers could also promote their images and profiles globally, provide political, economic and military goods to their clients and partners around the world, and rally support for their alternative political-economic models in the global arena. In other words, they compete with each other to sell their models in the global market of economic resources, security, aid, and ideology.

By highlighting the influence of ideas on the international arena, the constructivists’ account of international relations has filled in the gap left by the liberals and realists and it offers important tools for scholars to analyze the changing dynamic of the international order. According to the constructivists, ideas can generate identities and interests, help states and other actors find common solutions to problems, and shape their understandings of threats and expectations of the others’ behavior [34]. The influence of ideas can work through at least three pathways: Beliefs can serve as roadmaps for decision-making; shared ideas can serve as focal points in facilitating cooperation; and ideas, enhanced by the international norms and rules and embodied in the institutional frameworks, can constrain the actors’ choices [14]. Being embedded in the dense networks of international social relations, states could be “socialized to want certain things” [35: 2].

In other words, states and other actors can choose to play the game in the current order, respond to the changing environments, or develop their own rules of the game to suit their purposes. The circulation of different beliefs and ideas about how the world should be organized has turned the international arena into a contested field. Instead of conforming to the expectations by dominant Western countries, powerful challengers may push for more space for multiple models of governance in the international order. The convergence of beliefs and ideas can reinforce the popular appeal of certain models and could serve as focal points for different actors to coordinate their actions and reshape the international norms. Moreover, the creation and extension of international social networks by new institutional platforms or linkages can facilitate socialization between states and encourage state leaders to “want certain things”, which could include access to alternative sources of economic power, security, aid or ideology.

The rising challengers have benefited from the Western-dominated order. But they also challenge the mythologized liberal international order and expose the contradictions in the dominant Western model which often needs to reconcile its proclaimed liberal values with illiberal behaviors. The idealized image of liberal international order does not always align with reality, especially in the case of the order’s most powerful leader. As Strange [36: 573] observed, there was a clear gap between America’s rhetoric in preaching liberalism, internationalism, and multilateral decision-making, and its “inconsistent, fickle, and unpredictable” conduct of foreign policy. Other scholars have noted that, there were plenty of illiberal behaviors by the countries that proclaimed liberal values. For instance, the United States supported authoritarian rulers throughout the Cold War, and afterwards; it also dismantled the Bretton Woods, and invaded Afghanistan and Iraq, etc. [1, 37]. Some scholars suggest that the so-called liberal international order has “never existed”. Even after the end of the Cold War when liberal principles were promulgated to more countries, the liberal international order only “got closer to having a liberal quality but never quite passed the threshold” [38].

By treating the potential change in the current international order as a crisis, many prominent scholars reveal their Western-centric, and especially the U.S.-centric, views of IR. As Hobson points out, many IR scholars continue to reproduce the discourse of power through their own works. For instance, one prominent scholar who signed the public statement has argued on another occasion that, humanitarian interventionism and structural adjustment programs are essential for keeping the non-Western world on track toward Western-style liberal capitalism and democracy. Without interventions by the West, these countries are denied the opportunities and “privileges” to imitate the advanced Western model [39: 17–18]. This argument echoes the tone in the public statement, which emphasizes how the existing order has served the United States and its allies well for more than seven decades and brought unprecedented levels of prosperity and peace to the world.3 In the meantime, there is no mention of what kind of reform and change is needed.

In the challengers’ eyes, such reform has been delayed for too long. The pressure on the current international order began building during the financial crisis in 2008. Before that, advanced countries in the Group of Seven (G7) promised to give more voices to emerging economies in international institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF). But they failed to deliver on promised reforms. Instead of embracing “the dawn of a new era of multilateralism”, the world is witnessing “the last gasp of an old-fashioned concert of great powers” [5: 51]. Another example is the World Bank, which Weaver [4: 3] illustrates as mired in “bureaucratic ‘pathologies’, dysfunctions, and legitimacy crises”, unable to make substantive changes in its structures, policies, ideologies, and behaviors. As a result, a new order less reliant on these traditional international institutions, such as the IMF and the World Bank, may be emerging.

Similarly, Stephen argues that existing international institutions are often too “sticky” to adapt to the new distribution of power and the preferences brought by the diverse group of emerging powers. The challenges from the BRICS countries may bring about an order that is “strongly contested, less universal, less liberal, and more fragmented” [6: 484]. Ikenberry notes that the old U.S.-led order may be in the “crisis of transition” whereby “a new configuration of global power, new coalitions of states, new governance institutions” will emerge [10: 8]. As Acharya observes, a key driving factor to this fragmentation is “the outdated system of privilege enjoyed by the Western countries and their abuse of existing rules and norms and resistance to the lack of reform of multilateral institutions” [3: 457]. In a post-hegemonic multiplex world, the United States must relinquish certain privileges and share its power and authority with emerging powers [40]. However, the United States has already shown its reluctance to share its power and privileges, despite its gradual retreat from global leadership.

In a white paper that focuses on the relation between China and the world, China criticizes the theory that assumes China will seek hegemony as it gets stronger and pose serious threat to the world. The report points out that this interpretation is driven by “cognitive misunderstanding, deep-rooted prejudice, a psychological imbalance brought about by the prospect of falling power, and deliberate distortions by vested interests” [41]. One the one hand, the report emphasizes China’s contribution to the world economy as “a stabilizing force and power source” and “an important promoter of global openness and a dynamic market”. It further states that, China has benefited from the international community and in return provides it with more and better public goods. On the other hand, the report points out the dangers of blindly copying or being forced to adopt the Western model, which had led to “social unrest, economic crisis, governance paralysis, and even endless civil war”. The report proposes to build “a global community of shared future” that opposes “the law of the jungle, power politics and hegemonism” [41].

As stated in the report, in a new model of international relations, there should be 1) mutual respect based on equality among all countries and respect of other’s political systems and developmental paths; 2) equal right and equal access to opportunities and proper balancing of national interests and contribution to international community; and 3) mutually beneficial cooperation. More importantly, the world should uphold the international order or global governance system with the United Nations as its core, rather than the United States. According to the report, China has no intention of replacing the United States. But the United States also needs to “abandon the Cold War mentality, and develop a proper understanding of itself, China, and the world”, adapting to the development and prosperity of other countries and living in harmony with them [41]. If it fails to do so and tries to maintain its strength by suppressing other countries, any serious strategic miscalculation may lead to conflict and confrontation between major countries.

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