LIO causes miscalc – most likely scenario for war and collapses US-China relations
Glaser, PhD, 19
(Charles, PublicPolicy@Harvard, ProfPoliSci@GeorgeWashington, A Flawed Framework: Why the Liberal International Order Concept Is Misguided, International Security, 43:4, 51-87)
To improve analysis and debate of U.S. foreign policy, scholars, policy analysts, and policymakers should discontinue use of the term “liberal international order” and its variants, including “hegemonic liberal order.” First, for reasons discussed above, the LIO concept provides little analytic leverage; it is inward looking, and certain of its arguments are theoretically weak. Second, the LIO discourse is a source of significant confusion about both the evolution of global politics and U.S. policy. As I argued at the outset, scholars and commentators do not have an agreed understanding about what the LIO includes. More important, the LIO terminology clouds analysis of international policy by obscuring what is actually occurring. Consider, for example, the common observation that the LIO faces growing threats as a result of China's rise and Russia's assertive foreign policies. These dangers, however, have actually strengthened U.S. alliances and, in turn, the LIO. At least until the Trump administration, China's rise was increasing the depth and cohesion of U.S. alliances in Northeast Asia. Similarly, Russia's increasingly aggressive behavior in Ukraine and elsewhere was helping reinvigorate NATO. In short, the United States is facing growing threats to its security, not to the LIO. Although perhaps counterintuitive, it was the early post–Cold War decades that posed the greatest threat to the security elements of the LIO—the lack of major power threats to U.S. security weakened U.S. alliances. It should also be noted that China is much more integrated into the international economy, including importantly via the WTO, than the Soviet Union ever was. Whether China's economic inclusion is a net positive for the United States remains an open question, but it certainly strengthens the economic pillar of the LIO. Third, framing analysis of U.S. policy in terms of the LIO builds in a significant status quo bias. Much of the discussion of the LIO starts from the premise that it is desirable and needs to be preserved.95 During periods of significant change in the distribution of power, however, the United States should be reconsidering whether to preserve its international commitments and exploring how best to achieve its fundamental interests in the decades ahead.96 Fourth, by viewing the LIO as an unalloyed good, U.S. leaders risk failing to appreciate fully that adversaries of the United States view central pillars of the LIO—its alliances, in particular—as a source of competition and threat. For example, the LIO perspective contributed to U.S. enthusiasm for expanding NATO eastward to spread democracy, while giving too little weight to Russia's understanding of expansion's negative implications. Similarly, it likely contributes to U.S. underappreciation of the threat that the U.S.-Japan alliance, especially the broadening of Japan's responsibilities in the alliance, poses to China. These U.S. misperceptions increase the probability that the United States will misinterpret adversaries’ policies by failing to understand them as reactions to threatening U.S. policies. The LIO's status quo bias and its contribution to these U.S. misperceptions are potentially dangerous, because they encourage the United States to exaggerate the threats it faces and to pursue unduly competitive policies. Framing China as a threat to the LIO reflects and combines both of these dangers, and thereby unnecessarily aggravates U.S.-China relations.97 For all of these reasons, scholars and policymakers should use LIO terminology, at most, for descriptive purposes. The LIO would simply refer to the international situation, including the key international institutions, the rules that support them, and the regime types of its members. It would not imply desirability or the ability to generate, even contribute to, specific international outcomes, beyond those generated by its individual elements. Even this usage has disadvantages, among others that there is no agreement on which elements the LIO includes. ADVANTAGES OF A GRAND-STRATEGIC LENS To generate greater clarity about the international challenges facing the United States and its options for confronting them, analysts should employ a grand-strategic lens. By grand strategy, I mean the broad policies—military, diplomatic, and economic—that a state pursues to achieve its vital interests.98 The LIO is simultaneously a product of U.S. grand strategy and a part of U.S. grand strategy. The U.S. Cold War grand strategy of containment called for protecting Western Europe from the Soviet Union; NATO was created for this purpose and is a key component of the LIO. The economic dimension of U.S. grand strategy is the liberal international economic system, which is a second key component of the LIO; it reflects long-held U.S. beliefs in both the economic benefits of openness and the potential of openness to support peace. Adoption of a grand-strategic lens would improve the analysis of issues raised by the LIO discourse by placing them in the wider context of U.S. options for dealing with current geopolitical challenges. It would have three specific advantages. First, it would improve analysis of U.S. interests and threats to those interests. The initial step in any analysis of grand strategy is to identify a state's fundamental interests; typically, security and prosperity rank highest. The next step is to consider threats to these interests. The LIO lens essentially skips these steps by assuming that the LIO is a fundamental U.S. interest; anything that threatens the LIO is therefore a threat to U.S. interests. As I explained at the outset, however, the LIO is not an end/interest; instead, it is a means for achieving U.S. interests. Shifting to a grand-strategic framework should impose the analytic discipline required to avoid these errors. Second, adoption of a grand-strategic framework would require engaging with theories and theoretical disputes relevant to the formulation of U.S. international policy. Grand strategy reflects beliefs/theories that play a central role in identifying threats and provide the logical connection between a state's interests and the available means for achieving them. The LIO concept includes some theories/mechanisms about the nature of threats to U.S. interests and about possible solutions: authoritarian regimes are dangerous, democracies are not; economic engagement can reduce incentives for war; economic growth will convert authoritarian regimes to democracies; and so on. The LIO discourse proceeds as though these theories are widely accepted, when in fact scholarly debate over them continues. In addition, a range of additional theories must be employed to adequately analyze U.S. international policy, including those that address deterrence, power transitions, alliance formation, the security dilemma, and other causes of war. Employing a grand-strategic framework should result in this more complete and transparent theoretical analysis.99 Third, a grand-strategic framework would identify the full spectrum of broad options for achieving U.S. security and prosperity, ranging from neo-isolationist policies that would terminate U.S. alliances to global hegemony that requires intense military and economic competition with China. In contrast, the LIO lens starts with a single option and the assumption that it is desirable. A grand-strategic lens would generate comparisons and assessments of the range of possible grand strategies.