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Chinese leadership is key to African stability---its seen as more credible than Western aid which makes it uniquely effective

Lammich 19 — Lammich, Georg. University of Duisburg-Essen "Stability Through Multilateral Cooperation: China and Regional Security in Africa." African Conflict & Peacebuilding Review, vol. 9 no. 1, 2019, p. 100-123. Project MUSE muse.jhu.edu/article/726051. WMK

To counter these potential risks to China’s influence and reputation, close collaboration with the AU and other African subregional organizations, that are clearly non-Western actors and seen as mostly independent from US influence, offers a viable solution. The partial syntonization of China’s policies with those of the AU in areas that are either less important or in line with the Chinese security and foreign policy strategy is, on the one hand, deflecting neocolonial criticism and, on the other, balancing the interventionist position of the West. Although China’s stance toward international intervention is far more passive than the principles of mandatory intervention articulated in Article 4 of the Constitutive Act of the AU and the clashes between the Chinese concept of “noninterference” with the AU’s notion of “nonindifference,” both have shown many similarities in their position on national sovereignty and interstate conflicts. China is highlighting those cases where the views of the AU and key African players converge with their own positions and use them as reference points for their military engagement or the absence thereof on the continent (Van Hoeymissen 2011: 102). Thus, in 2008, Beijing justified its criticism of international sanctions against Zimbabwe with the remark that the Chinese position was in line with that of the AU and the SADC, which both opposed sanctions and were regarded by China as the consensus of African countries on the current situation (United Nations 2008a; Van Hoeymissen 2011: 100). Apart from the rhetorical level, there is a growing appreciation of the AU as a capable actor in conflict resolution, and China has emphasized its willingness to take concrete measures to help Africa reinforce its collective security mechanism. Hence, China has supported the AU in various areas related to peace and security, particularly the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and the hybrid UN-AU Mission in Darfur (UNAMID), provided military aid, and conducted several training courses for AU troops and security personnel at the Peace and Security Department in China (Woldemichael 2012: iii). As stated in China’s African policy paper (2006), “China supports the positive efforts by the AU and other African regional organizations and African countries concerned to settle regional conflicts and will provide assistance within our own capacity. It will urge the UN Security Council to pay attention to and help resolve regional conflicts in Africa. It will continue its support for and participation in UN peacekeeping operations in Africa.” A decade after this proclamation, China-AU security partnerships have stretched from soft confidence-building measures and preemptive diplomacy to the development of specific conflict solution mechanisms and direct military support. The security-related dialogue and consulting mechanisms between China and the AU headquarters in Addis Ababa have evolved and several regular exchange formats have been created. In 2008 a strategic dialogue mechanism between China and the AU that deals with “major international and regional issues of common concern” (MOFA 2011) was established. The African Union Commission (AUC) is also participating in the Initiative on China-Africa Cooperative Partnership for Peace and Security (ICACPPS), China’s regular exchange with African foreign secretaries (Huang 2011: 264–65; C. Zhang 2016). China sees the AU as the “premier pan-African institutional actor in relation to peace and security matters” (Ukeje 2018: 304) and is increasingly institutionalizing the relation with the AUC and deepening the interregional linkages. One of the goals of the Fifth FOCAC Ministerial Conference held in Beijing in July 2012, which the AU attended for the first time as a full member, was to strengthen cooperation on African peace and security between China and the AU. The action plan adopted at the conference determined that China would launch the initiative on the China-Africa Cooperative Partnership for Peace and Security, provide financial support for AU peacekeeping missions in Africa and the development of the African Standby Force, and train more AU peacekeepers and officials in peace and security affairs. In September 2015, President Xi announced that China will provide free military aid of $100 million over four years to support the African Standby Force and the African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crisis (Xi 2015). Three months later, at the 2015 FOCAC summit in Johannesburg, China confirmed its commitment to supporting the AU’s capacity for peacekeeping and promised an additional $US60 million in grants to the ASF and the African Capacity for the Immediate Response to Crisis (FOCAC 2015). In addition, to direct financial and logistic support to AU peace missions, China is also contributing indirectly to the AU’s military capacity by tying its bilateral military aid to African countries’ contributions to AU missions. Several countries, including South Africa, Tanzania, Nigeria, Burundi, and Uganda, have thus received additional military aid justified by China, due to their contribution to regional security schemes (Shinn 2008; United Nations 2009). The AU has become a major pillar of China’s security strategy in Africa, and it seems that despite the mixed results of AU missions in Africa, China will continue its support for regional African security solutions. China has shown its willingness to support regional initiatives in Africa despite other multilateral or even bilateral solutions that might, for the time being, also serve its interests on the continent. Whether the AU can also establish itself as the premier partner for issues that border on peace and security (terrorism, climate change, piracy, and migration, to name a few) will depend first and foremost on the ability of the AU to mobilize a broad pan-African consensus on these matters (Ukeje 2018: 307). China’s support for the AU and African security in general is not based on any specific program, which leaves a great amount of latitude in its long-term commitments (Van Hoeymissen 2011: 100). Technical and financial support often reflect current issues of China’s foreign policy priorities or come in the wake of big events like the FOCAC summit or top-level visits from China. The contribution to the AU mission in Darfur can thus be interpreted as a reaction to international criticism of the close ties between Beijing and Khartoum and the contribution to AMISOM as a move to protect international trade routes (Shichor 2007). This flexibility creates some uncertainty on the African side and prevents the reliable long-term inclusion of Chinese support for capacity development in Africa’s security sector.

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