African civil wars are the only scenario for great power conflict --- bipolarity stops wars except those motivated by fears that civil wars will threaten resources essential for state survival
Yeisley 11 (Mark O. Yeisley – PhD in IR from Duke University, assistant professor of IR @ the School of Advanced Air and Space Studies. <KEN> “Bipolarity, Proxy Wars, and the Rise of China,” Strategic Studies Quarterly. Spring 2011. DOA: 11/19/19. http://www.au.af.mil/au/ssq/2011/winter/yeisley.pdf)
Volumes of scholarly literature detail China’s rise to great-power status and the likely implications thereof.37 Given its prodigious economic growth, it is natural to question whether such a rise will be accompanied by US-Sino conflict. Such an outcome is unlikely, primarily because of a return of nuclear parity within a bipolar environment.38 There are concerns over China’s increasing need for fuel imports to support its expanding infrastructure. China shows little concern with the political ideologies of regimes with which it trades; yet, its willingness to deal with states like Iran and Sudan could worsen relations with the United States.39 China’s ongoing military modernization also appears designed in part to deny the United States the ability to deter it in the near future through strategies focused primarily on interruptions of its oil supply via area denial or control of critical eastern sea lines of communication. China is expanding its web of regional alliances via arms transfers and other inducements that may result in a wall of allies the United States will find difficult to penetrate to protect its interests in the Eastern Hemisphere.40 China is also willing to protect those interests militarily where necessary; some aver the 1996 Taiwan crisis indicated China may be prepared to take Taiwan by force in a preemptive attack.41 Yet, evidence suggests its neighbors welcome the economic opportunities China presents to them and believe its intentions are peaceful and focused on domestic stability and growth rather than regional dominance.42 Since it is unlikely that any regional attempts to balance a rising China are forthcoming, at least in the near term, it falls to the United States as the peer competitor to do so. While US military preeminence is still clear, trends appear to indicate the United States will find it increasingly difficult to compete with China for strategic resource requirements as China’s geostrategic influence expands. Bipolarity, Nuclear Weapons, and Sino-US Proxy Conflict in Africa It is likely China will achieve economic and then military parity with the United States in the next two decades. China currently possesses 240 nuclear warheads and 135 ballistic missiles capable of reaching the United States or its allies; that number of nuclear warheads is estimated to double by the mid 2020s.43 As during the Cold War, a bipolar system in which war between the United States and China is too costly will lead to policy decisions that seek conflict resolution elsewhere.44 [Insert Footnote 44] 44. Aaron Friedberg, “The Future of U.S.-China Relations: Is Conflict Inevitable?” International Security 30, no. 2 (2005): 17–19, argues that the costs of such conflict will cause both sides to carefully avoid direct conflict. [Exit Footnote 44] But why would China’s rising necessarily lead to geostrategic competition with the United States, and where would this most likely occur? Unlike the Cold War, access to strategic resources rather than ideology would lie at the heart of future US-Sino competition, and the new “great game” will most likely be played in Africa. Despite Communist Party control of its government, China is not interested in spreading its version of communism and is much more pragmatic in its objectives—securing resources to meet the needs of its citizens and improve their standard of living.45 Some estimates show that China will overtake the United States to become the world’s largest economy by 2015, and rising powers usually take the necessary steps to “ensure markets, materials, and transportation routes.”46 China is the leading global consumer of aluminum, copper, lead, nickel, zinc, tin, and iron ore, and its metal needs now represent more than 25 percent of the world’s total.47 In contrast, from 1970 to 1995, US consumption of all materials, including metals, accounted for one-third of the global total despite representing only 5 percent of the world’s population.48 China is the largest energy consumer, according to the International Energy Agency, surpassing the United States in consumption of oil, coal, and natural gas in 2009.49 As the two largest consumers of both global energy and materials, the United States and China must seek foreign policy prescriptions to fulfill future resource needs. While the United States can alleviate some of its energy needs via bio- or coal-based fuels, hydrogen, or natural gas alternatives, China currently lacks the technological know-how to do so and remains tied to a mainly nonrenewable energy resource base. Since the majority of these needs are nonrenewable, competition of necessity will be zero-sum and will be conducted via all instruments of power.50 Africa is home to a wealth of mineral and energy resources, much of which still remains largely unexploited. Seven African states possess huge endowments of oil, and four of these have equally substantial amounts of natural gas.51 Africa also enjoys large deposits of bauxite (used to make aluminum), copper, lead, nickel, zinc, and iron ore, all of which are imported and highly desired by China. Recent activity serves to prove that China seeks greater access to natural resources in Africa by avidly promoting Chinese development in a large number of African nations. South Africa, the continent’s largest economy, has recently allowed China to help develop its vast mineral wealth; it is China’s number one African source of manganese, iron, and copper.52 Chinese involvement in Africa is not wholly extractive; the continent provides a booming export market for China’s goods and a forum to augment its soft power in the region by offering alternatives to the political and economic baggage that accompanies US foreign aid.53 Of primary interest is open access to Africa’s significant deposits of oil and other energy resources. For example, China has 4,000 military personnel in Sudan to protect its interests in energy and mineral investments there; it also owns 40 percent of the Greater Nile Oil Production Company. 54 Estimates indicate that within the next few decades China will obtain 40 percent of its oil and gas supplies from Africa.55 Trade and investment in Africa have also been on the rise; trade has grown more than 10 percent annually in the past decade. Between 2002 and 2004, African exports to China doubled, ranking it third behind the United States and France in trade with the continent. Chinese investment is also growing; more than 700 Chinese business operations across Africa total over $1 billion. Aid and direct economic assistance are increasing as well, and China has forgiven the debt of some 31 African nations.56 Africa is thus a vital foreign interest for the Chinese and must be for the United States; access to its mineral and petroleum wealth is crucial to the survival of each.57 Although the US and Chinese economies are tightly interconnected, the nonrenewable nature of these assets means competition will remain a zero-sum game. Nearly all African states have been independent entities for less than 50 years; consolidating robust domestic state institutions and stable governments remains problematic.58 Studies have shown that weak governments are often prime targets for civil conflicts that prove costly to control.59 Many African nations possess both strategic resources and weak regimes, making them vulnerable to internal conflict and thus valuable candidates for assistance from China or the United States to help settle their domestic grievances. With access to African resources of vital strategic interest to each side, competition could likely occur by proxy via diplomatic, economic, or military assistance to one (or both) of the parties involved. Realist claims that focusing on third-world issues is misplaced are thus fallacious; war in a future US-China bipolar system remains as costly as it was during the Cold War. Because of the fragile nature of many African regimes, domestic grievances are more prone to result in conflict; US and Chinese strategic interests will dictate an intrusive foreign policy to be both prudent and vital. US-Sino proxy conflicts over control of African resources will likely become necessary if these great powers are to sustain their national security postures, especially in terms of strategic defense.60 What does this mean for the future of US grand and military strategy, foreign policy prescriptions, future defense acquisition priorities, and military doctrine and training?