[x] --- COVID
Huang 21 — Department of Political Science, University of Florida, Gainesville, FL Huang Q. The Pandemic and the Transformation of Liberal International Order. J Chin Polit Sci. 2021;26(1):1-26. doi: 10.1007/s11366-020-09698-0. Epub 2020 Oct 16. PMID: 33082701; PMCID: PMC7565235. WMK
The first challenge to the current liberal order comes from the entrenchment of authoritarianism during the pandemic, as characterized by authoritarian resilience, autocratization,4 and the consolidation of competing political-economic models built by leading authoritarian countries. As numerous democracies test the boundaries of freedom and control, authoritarian leaders across the world exploit the coronavirus crisis to tighten control over their people even further. The sweeping measures and institutional arrangements utilized by these leaders to combat the virus will leave significant legacies on both domestic politics and foreign policies. Interpreted in the path-dependence framework, the decisions made at certain “formative moments or conjunctures” can influence the long-term institutional trajectories. These institutions can be “sticky” and resistant to changes [43]. Moreover, riding the wave of autocratization, leading authoritarian countries like China have consolidated their competing political-economic models vis-à-vis the Western-dominated model. As increasingly powerful and ambitious patrons in the global arena, they have provided alternative sources of economic power, security, aid, ideology, as well as institutional platforms to the autocrats and emerging autocrats, without imposing political conditionality that favors liberal values. The pandemic has provided opportunities to consolidate their positions and promote their models worldwide.
The entrenchment of authoritarianism is first and foremost reflected by the durability of authoritarian regimes during the pandemic. To the disappointment of those seeking cracks in the authoritarian regimes hit hard by the pandemic, the autocrats around the world have largely survived the tests resulting from the pandemic. In particular, the resilience of communist regimes, such as China and Vietnam, has provided clear examples of entrenched authoritarianism during the pandemic. In the case of China, confronted with the worst health crisis faced by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), the regime’s capacity is questioned by many scholars and observers. Pei argues that the pandemic has shown the regime’s lack of capacity in responding to the health crisis and exposed the fragility of Xi Jinping’s strongman rule. The regime will be trapped in economic stagnation and increasing social unrest domestically and in great-power competition abroad. As a result, it will start to “unravel by fits and starts” [44]. This assessment is consistent with Pei’s earlier diagnosis of the CCP’s serious illnesses and regime decay, as well as other scholars’ observation of China’s “frozen” political system [45, 46]. However, the evidence so far suggests that the regime has not only managed to survive the crisis but also boosted its legitimacy.
Early in the outbreak, China’s failure to respond was perceived as a manifestation of the breakdown of top-down governance structures [47]. Chinese people were angry at the government’s handling the crisis in its initial response. The authorities chose to withhold information about the virus from the public, punished doctors for “spreading rumors,” and prioritized stability over transparency. When the situation erupted beyond control, the influx of photos, videos, blogs, and diaries on social media depicting the ordeals of Wuhan citizens ignited both anger and fear among the public. The CCP rushed to calm the public, started a massive machine of mobilization, and implemented extreme lockdown measures. Grassroots organizations were also mobilized by the state to enforce quarantines and lockdowns, provide essential services, and collect information and monitor citizens, greatly enhancing the state’s capacity at political and social control [48]. The state soon regained control of the situation, although life was far from being back to normal.
The shock caused by the pandemic was followed by the massive outbreaks in Europe and later the United States, overwhelming the capacity of one country after another. Chinese state media and social media produced vivid stories describing the disastrous responses in many Western democracies, especially their failures to copy China’s “homework” for combating the coronavirus. It looked as though China was the only haven in the world and many Chinese people abroad struggled to find their way back home.
Both authoritarian and democratic countries have demonstrated mixed performances in responding to the pandemic. There are successful cases in democracies, such as that of South Korea, which presents an effective model for combating the coronavirus. There are also failed cases among autocracies, such as Iran, which struggled to contain the outbreak during its initial stage [49, 50]. However, the failures of many democratic countries, especially the United States, to control the virus quickly and effectively helped reverse course in China and boost the CCP’s domestic legitimacy. The comparison led many Chinese to believe that an authoritarian government is a better option for China, especially in times of crisis and during the rhetorical siege by the Western countries. The CCP gladly sells the idea of a better political system to its people through intensive nationwide propaganda, manipulation of social media, and spontaneous expression of national pride by its people. The success story of Vietnam which shares similar political-economic model with China further contributes to the discourse of a superior political system. In a survey conducted in April, researchers asked citizens to rate their countries’ performance in dealing with the pandemic. China ranked highest among 23 countries, with a score of 85 out of 100, followed by Vietnam (77). In the rating of the political leaders’ response to the crisis, both countries (China, 86 out of 100; Vietnam, 82) outpaced major Western countries, including New Zealand (67), Germany (35), the United States (32), the United Kingdom (30), and Italy (25) [51]. Another report based on online surveys finds that trust in the Chinese government was as high as 95% in April [52].
Beyond China, other authoritarian leaders exploited the crisis to further tighten control over their people. In Russia, which closely monitored its neighbor’s tech-driven model of control, the pandemic provided an opportunity for Russian authorities to develop new surveillance capabilities equipped with facial-recognition and geolocation tracking systems [53]. In Iran, the hard-liners leveraged the massive pressures from the pandemic to consolidate power. Members of the Revolutionary Guards were dispatched to enforce strict quarantine measures, while ramping up efforts to monitor and silence citizens on the basis of “national security” [54–56]. Moreover, conservatives capitalized on the missteps made by the moderate, civilian-led government. They launched campaigns to undermine it, portraying the Revolutionary Guards as “the guardian of public health and the champion of the fight against the invisible enemy” [57].
Coupled with authoritarian resilience, a wave of autocratization has surged around the world during the pandemic. In Hungary, a country already experiencing rapid erosion of freedoms and democratic norms in recent years, Prime Minister Viktor Orbán secured an indefinite state of emergency that allows him to rule by decree. Journalists can be jailed for up to five years for spreading misinformation that hinders the government’s response to the pandemic [58]. Similarly, in the name of maintaining order and combatting disinformation during the pandemic, extraordinary emergency powers were invoked in both Thailand and the Philippines. These powers allowed the Thai authorities to censor or shut down media and the latter to imprison those accused of spreading false information on social media and other platforms [59, 60].
By late April, more than 84 countries had enacted emergency laws to give executives more power to handle the coronavirus [61]. Previous researches already found that states of emergency often associate with a heightened risk of autocratization [62]. Before the pandemic, more than one-third of the world’s population already lived in autocratizing countries. Moreover, for the first time since 2001, the majority of countries in the world are autocracies (92 in total) [63]. The pandemic has reinforced anti-democratic trends, with 48 countries at high risk of pandemic backsliding and 34 others at medium risk [64]. While the urgency and presence of the coronavirus will eventually dissipate, the effect of the authoritarian measures and the institutional legacies will likely remain, influencing both domestic politics and foreign policies.
Rather than witnessing “the end point of mankind’s ideological evolution and the universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government” [11], the world is now seeing a regime landscape mixed with thriving authoritarianism and democracy. To complicate the matters further, the challengers to the current order have exploited the pandemic to assert their political systems and ideologies, which are seen as incompatible with the Western standards and values. Ikenberry asserts that neither China nor Russia has a model that is appealing to the rest of world [10]. However, because of the ideological divergence, authoritarian political-economic models built by these two countries are increasingly welcomed by sitting dictators and emerging autocrats. China and Russia have already become alternative providers of goods such as developmental assistance and military security, which used to be monopolized by major Western powers [23]. Now, they are using such leverages to rival the liberal order led by the United States, building “parallel structures of global governance that are dominated by authoritarian states and that compete with older, more liberal structures” [65].
In comparison to Russia, China has maintained more extensive institutional networks. China has created, expanded, and led important international institutions (such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank), regional forums (the Forum for China-Africa Cooperation), security organizations (the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation), and infrastructure investment projects (the Belt and Road Initiative). These institutions have become the cornerstones of its alternative political-economic model. In this model, the powerful and ambitious patron provides alternative sources of economic power, security, aid, ideology, as well as institutional platforms for the dictators and emerging autocrats, without imposing political conditionality that favors liberal values.
The pandemic allows these challengers to consolidate their positions and promote their political-economic models globally. In the case of China, it has sought to build a “health silk road” by sending medical teams and resources to numerous countries around the world. According to a report released by China’s State Council Information Office, the country had offered or provided assistance to 150 countries and 4 international organizations as of June [66]. Major Western powers have widely criticized these efforts for their intention to capitalize on the pandemic and project China’s influence globally. But China has won many hearts in the region where it has projected its economic and diplomatic influence through the Belt and Road Initiative in recent years. Countries that welcome China’s growing influence include major autocratizing countries in Central and Eastern Europe, including Serbia, Hungary and the Czech Republic [67, 68]. As a result, China can utilize its reciprocating relations with the receivers of medical goods and to garner additional support for its authoritarian political-economic model vis-à-vis the Western liberal model. Moreover, the exacerbation of nationalism in both democracies and autocracies further reinforces the consolidation of authoritarianism and authoritarian political-economic models during the pandemic.