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*China is also committed to a rules-based order---their argument is US hypocrisy

Walt 21 — Stephen Walt. “China Wants a ‘Rules-Based International Order,’ Too” Foreign Policy. March 31st, 2021 https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/03/31/china-wants-a-rules-based-international-order-too/ WMK

But the distinction between the United States’ supposed commitment to a system of rules and China’s alleged lack thereof is misleading in at least three ways. First, it overlooks the United States’ own willingness to ignore, evade, or rewrite the rules whenever they seem inconvenient. If we are honest with ourselves, we have to acknowledge that Washington sometimes thinks it is perfectly okay for might to make right and for winners to take all. The collapse of the Soviet Union, when the United States took full advantage of a weakened post-Soviet Russia, is a perfect example.

Second, as Harvard University’s Alastair Iain Johnston has shown, China accepts and even defends many principles of the existing order, although of course not all of them. That situation may change in the future, of course, but even a vastly more powerful China would undoubtedly seek to retain whatever features of the present order serve its interests.

Third, statements such as Blinken’s imply that abandoning today’s rules-based order would leave us in a lawless, rule-free world of naked power politics, unregulated by any norms or principles whatsoever. This is simply not the case: Scholars of widely varying views understand that all international orders—global, regional, liberal, realist, or whatever—require a set of rules to manage the various interactions that inevitably arise between different polities.

Examples can be found throughout the international relations literature: 44 years ago, theorist Hedley Bull defined an “international society” as “a group of states … bound by a set of common rules” and the University of Chicago professor John Mearsheimer recently referred to international orders as “an organized group of international institutions,” which he says “are effectively rules that the great powers devise and agree to follow.” The statesman Henry Kissinger argues that all world orders rest on a “set of commonly accepted rules” and the Princeton University professor G. John Ikenberry’s many works on the U.S.-led “liberal” order all emphasize its “rules-based character.” The political scientists Beth Simmons and Hein Goemans agree, writing, “any intergroup order must be defined by rules of group membership and … political authority.” Even skeptics of the liberal order, such as the scholar Patrick Porter, acknowledge the role that rules played within that system, while emphasizing how the United States has used its superior power to compel other states to comply with the rules it prefers.

In short, the issue is not the United States’ preference for a “rules-based” order and China’s alleged lack of interest in it; rather, the issue is who will determine which rules pertain where. Or as the Rand Corp.’s Michael Mazarr recently put it, “At its core, the United States and China are competing to shape the foundational global system—the essential ideas, habits, and expectations that govern international politics. It is ultimately a competition of norms, narratives, and legitimacy.”

The differences between the American and Chinese conceptions are relatively straightforward. The United States (generally) prefers a multilateral system (albeit one with special privileges for some states, especially itself) that is at least somewhat mindful of individual rights and certain core liberal values (democratic rule, individual freedom, rule of law, market-based economies, and so on). These ideals may be applied imperfectly at home and pursued inconsistently abroad, but the U.S. commitment to them is not just empty rhetoric. Among other things, it underpins U.S. efforts to persuade or compel other states to alter their own domestic arrangements. Not surprisingly, the United States also likes many existing institutions (the IMF, NATO, the World Bank, the reserve role of the dollar, to name a few) because they give the United States greater influence.

By contrast, China favors a more Westphalian conception of order, one where state sovereignty and noninterference are paramount and liberal notions of individual rights are downplayed if not entirely dismissed. This vision is no less “rules-based” than the United States’, insofar as it draws on parts of the United Nations charter, and it would not preclude many current forms of international cooperation, including extensive trade, investment, collaboration on vital transnational issues such as climate change. China is also a vocal defender of multilateralism, even if its actual behavior sometimes violates existing multilateral norms. Nonetheless, a world in which China’s preferences prevailed would be different than one in which the U.S. vision proved to be more influential.

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