No Thucydides trap---peaceful transition is possible---interdependence and MAD prevents escalation. Tensions never spillover
He 22 — Kai He is Professor of International Relations and Director, Centre for Governance and Public Policy, Griffith University, Australia. He is a visiting Chair Professor of International Relations at the Zhou Enlai School of Government, Nankai University, China. Kai He (2022) China’s rise, institutional balancing, and (possible) peaceful order transition in the Asia pacific, The Pacific Review, DOI: 10.1080/09512748.2022.2075439 WMK
The popular ‘Thucydides trap’ argument and power transition theory in IR suggest that a war is more likely to take place between a rising power and a ruling state when their power gap narrows during the international order transition (Allison, 2017; Organski, 1958). I argue that this argument is too deterministic and pessimistic for two reasons. First, nuclear deterrence based on the ‘mutual assured destruction’ logic among great powers will make direct military conflicts unthinkable, if not impossible. Second, the world has been fundamentally changed by the deepening globalization and integrated supply chains. Although some politicians in the United States advocate the ‘decoupling’ with China, it is a politically motivated rhetoric rather than a well-crafted strategy (Farrell & Newman, 2020). As David Ignatius points out, ‘the United States and China have an increasingly competitive relationship, but they need each other, too, like conjoined twins. Hasty attempts at separation could harm them both. Open research made U.S. technology great; making it more difficult for the best brains to live and work here would be folly’ (Ignatius, 2020). In other words, it will be much harder, more painful, and harmful for the United States and China to decouple from one another, economically and technologically.
Then the question is: how will the United States and China compete or ‘fight’ without war when the power disparity continues to narrow between the two nations during the international order transition? In this paper I introduce a new ‘institutional peace’ argument, which suggests that the future international order transition will not feature a military conflict between the United States and China, although diplomatic standoffs and even military tensions might take place more frequently than before. Institutional competition and conflicts among great powers will become a new game (though not the only game) in town during the period of international order transition. Consequently, these institutional dynamics will generate incremental change that may lead to a more peaceful international order transition.
The ‘institutional peace’ argument presumes that deepening globalization and the existing nuclear deterrence situation have changed the nature of international order transition. Both the United States and China, as nuclear powers, will do their best to compete for power and influence, but at the same time, they will avoid direct military conflicts because a nuclear showdown will not only destroy their adversaries, but themselves as well. Therefore, international institutions, one pillar of the international order,2 will become the focal point of competition among great powers, especially between the United States and China, during the order transition.