No miscalc---both sides are primed for de-escalation and the competition will be non military
He 22 — Kai He is Professor of International Relations and Director, Centre for Governance and Public Policy, Griffith University, Australia. He is a visiting Chair Professor of International Relations at the Zhou Enlai School of Government, Nankai University, China. Kai He (2022) China’s rise, institutional balancing, and (possible) peaceful order transition in the Asia pacific, The Pacific Review, DOI: 10.1080/09512748.2022.2075439 WMK
Challenging a popular view that China’s rise will lead the United States and China to fall into the ‘Thucydides trap’—a possible hegemonic war between the two—this paper argues that the international order transition will be different this time. Instead of using military means to change the international order, China and the United States have relied on various institutional balancing strategies to compete with one another for an advantageous position in the future international order. Institutional competition in the form of institutional balancing among great powers will strengthen the dynamics and utility of international institutions, encourage states to offer new public goods, and eventually ensure a more peaceful order transition in the international system.
Since the end of the Cold War, China and the United States have engaged in institutional balancing in both economic and security orders in the Asia Pacific. By targeting US domination and existing rules in global finance institutions, China’s AIIB initiative has encouraged some intense but healthy institutional competition in the arena of global infrastructure finance. Through multilateral cooperation with the ASEAN states in the ARF and ASEAN-dominated institutions, China has also challenged the legitimacy and dominating role of the US-led hub-and-spokes bilateral system in the regional security architecture. One unintended consequence of institutional balancing between the United States and China is the proliferation of multilateral security institutions, such as the SLD, the ADMM-Plus, and the revival of the Quad 2.0 in the region. The AIIB and ARF cases have shown that the international order transition led by institutional balancing might be more peaceful than previously perceived.
Two caveats, however, are worth noting to support this optimistic view of the international order transition. The first one is that the MAD logic of nuclear deterrence should remain valid among great powers. Interdependence based on the mutual vulnerability in the context of nuclear weapons was the key factor making the antagonism between the United States and the Soviet Union remain ‘cold’ during the Cold War. Given the technological innovations in military weaponry, it becomes questionable whether nuclear deterrence will still be sustained between the United States and China (Christensen, 2012; Glaser & Fetter, 2016; Lieber & Press, 2006; Lieber & Press, 2017; Wu, 2020). As some scholars point out, institutional competition among states might ‘lock in an unjust status quo, produce exclusion, or generate grievances that turn into struggles, they may in fact induce conflictual change’ (Mérand & Pouliot, 2020, p. 129). If one side no longer believes in MAD, military force will become a legitimate mechanism to change the international order, and therefore, a hegemonic war cannot be ruled out.
It is worth noting that Asia is an inherently dangerous place. Soon after the Cold War, some scholars predicted that Asia was ‘ripe for rivalry’ because of the mounting territorial disputes as well as bourgeoning nationalism (Friedberg, 1993). The 1995–1996 Taiwan Strait crisis almost triggered a military conflict between China and the United States. The Taiwan issue might be the most likely reason for China and the United States to go to war in the future. The nuclear tests and missile crises ignited by North Korea remind us that the Cold War has not ended on the Korean Peninsula. The maritime and territorial disputes in the East China Sea and the South China Sea have damaged China’s relations and trust with its neighbors. During the coming international order transition effective nuclear deterrence might prevent China and the United States from fighting a direct war or a hegemonic war; however, it will not stop conventional military conflicts among regional actors or even proxy wars between the United States and China if these security flashpoints are not managed and controlled well (Taylor, 2018). International and regional institutions can potentially help to build trust and alleviate these regional tensions among states. However, in order to make ‘institutional peace’ work, the United States and China—as two nuclear powers in the region—need to reach a strategic consensus, which is to compete fiercely by ‘all measures short of war’ (Wright, 2017).
There is a positive sign that the militaries from the United States and China have remained rational under the logic of MAD. It has been reported that General Mark Milley, the Chairman of US Joint Chiefs, was seriously worried that Trump might ‘go rogue’ and even launch a nuclear war in the final days of his presidency. More importantly, some US intelligence reports showed that ‘the Chinese believed the United States was going to attack them’ (Woodward & Costa, 2021, p. 128). In order to deescalate a possible military conflict or even a nuclear war, Milley secretly called his Chinese counterpart, General Li Zuocheng, on October 30, 2020, four days before the election, to assuage Chinese concerns that the US was planning to attack China. In his own words, Milley said,
General Li, I want to assure you that the American government is stable and everything is going to be okay. We are not going to attack or conduct any kinetic operations against you …. there’s going to be tension. And I am going to be communicating with you pretty regularly … We’re not going to have a fight. General Li said ‘Okay. I take you at your word’.(Woodward & Costa, 2021, pp. 128–130)
It is clear that both the US and Chinese military leaders are fully aware of the catastrophic consequence of military conflicts between the two nations. Nevertheless, civil politicians in both states might still play with fire to escalate bilateral tensions for political gains in the future. Interestingly, the military in both nations might play a ‘peace-guardian’ role in avoiding a war, particularly a nuclear one, between the two nations.