Empirics and theory---transition doesn’t cause war UNLESS China is excluded from the international order
Shifrinson 20 — Joshua Shifrinson is an Assistant Professor of International Relations at Boston University. Joshua Shifrinson (2020) The rise of China, balance of power theory and US national security: Reasons for optimism?, Journal of Strategic Studies, 43:2, 175-216, DOI: 10.1080/01402390.2018.1558056 WMK
Despite the prevalence of these assumptions, however, there are both empirical and theoretical reasons to question whether rising states are prone to prey upon declining states. Few studies examine the evolution of rising state attitudes towards declining states.18 That said, a large literature examining the relationship between power shifts and war – an outcome one might expect if rising states were primed to challenge declining states19 – finds only a tenuous link between shifts in the distribution of power and conflict.20 Rather, this research suggests that only rising states ‘dissatisfied’ with the existing international order and holding ‘revisionist’ attitudes are prone to challenge declining states and provoke conflict.21 Otherwise, rising states tend to pursue policies that do not result in war22 and may even try to avoid courting conflict.23
Similarly, even in cases where rising states notionally hold revisionist or dissatisfied preferences, it is ambiguous whether such attitudes drive rising state strategies towards particular declining states. Not only do notionally revisionist actors often seek allies among the existing great powers – meaning that they may cooperate with decliners to court them as partners – but rising state strategies towards decliners do not always align with judgments of risers’ intentions and motives.24 For instance, Wilhelmine Germany – a state seen by many scholars as a prototypical dissatisfied, revisionist actor – nevertheless supported Austria-Hungary before 1914; likewise, a surging and equally revisionist Soviet Union still attempted to align with the United Kingdom after World War Two.25 In short, not only is there an incomplete link between rising state preferences and conflict during a power shift, but risers’ revisionist or dissatisfied proclivities do not determine the more focused policies used to guide their relations with declining states.
More importantly, there are also theoretical reasons rooted in balance of power realism to question whether rising states are inveterate predators. To be clear, ‘balance of power realism’ is not a single theory so much as a family of arguments that are themselves divided over when and why states compete by manipulating the distribution of power.26 Nevertheless, as a group, balance of power theory is driven by core understandings that (1) states are the primary actors in international affairs, with the great powers the most important among this set; (2) to obtain security – whether defined in terms of minimising threats to their survival, aggregating power, or other objectives – states tend to offset and oppose one another; (3) opposition – including the possible resort to force – tends to grow more intense the more another state is seen as particularly powerful or threatening; and (4) states carry out this opposition by balancing and aggregating capabilities by arming themselves (internal balancing) and/or forming alliances (external balancing).27
Although different iterations of balance of power theory carry different assumptions as to the frequency and intensity of balancing, the approach as a whole underlines two reasons why rising states may avoid preying upon decliners and – under certain conditions – engage in supportive strategies. First, states threatened by another actor can arm, ally and threaten war to protect themselves.28 Hence, rising powers that challenge their relatively declining peers are apt to provoke counterbalancing.29 In fact, rising states that expand precipitously and overtly threaten declining states may catalyse a significant counterbalancing coalition, court insecurity spirals with threatened rivals, and even encourage one or more declining states to lash out in a preventive conflict.30 Rising states are therefore incentivised to anticipate these dangers, cap their foreign ambitions and limit the risk of counterbalancing so long as other states can penalise their aggrandisement.