China can’t become a hegemon
Yue 21 — Yue, J. (2021). The limits to China’s peaceful rise – Deep Integration and a new Cold War. Global Policy, 13(1), 91–106. https://doi.org/10.1111/1758-5899.13040 WMK
The Chinese regime’s peaceful rise rhetoric reveals the country’s developmental quandary in the age of globalization. Rampant corruption as well as the regime’s strong links with Wall Street finance and intimate collaboration with Western industrial capital have fostered a thriving system of crony comprador capitalism (Ho, 2013; Meisner, 1996, p. 300; Pei, 2016),28 characterized by unprecedented state capture by public and private institutional interests who not only are ‘self-serving’, but also ‘serve the interests of global capital’ (Kwong, 2006; Yue, 2018a, pp. 271–331).29 With this ‘worst form of capitalism’ becoming solidly entrenched, the current campaign waged by the seemingly all-powerful paramount leader Xi Jinping against the ‘ultrarich and famous’ high-tech oligarchs, is motivationally dubious, which has in no small part more to do with affirming ‘politics in command’ (zhengzhi guashuai, 政治挂帅) than with reversing ‘state capture’ by private interests.
In fact, from 2002 onward, the liberal globalization approach to economic development has undergirded the CCP’s guiding ideology of ‘building a socialism of (changed from “with”) Chinese characteristics’,30 symbolizing that the country’s dependent pathway of development has since been fully institutionalized (Yue, 2018a, pp. 111 & 317). The ruling elites are so obsessed with the alleged benefits of globalization as to make the country’s embrace of global capitalism a ‘political correctness’. Since under most circumstances globalization is not open to criticism, China’s commitment to the techno-nationalism that it is widely perceived to have embraced remains deeply in doubt.31
The seemingly grandiose ‘Made in China 2025’ initiative,32 as some Western observers have put it, is ‘an act of desperation’ rather than a plan to dominate’.33 Viewing China’s rise as more hype than reality, Michael Beckley (2018), who has measured power as the ‘function of net resources’, convincingly argued that ‘the United States’ economic and military lead over China is much larger than typically assumed – and that the trends are mostly in America’s favor’. Inspired by Susan Strange’s IPE-based inquiry into American structural power, Sean Starrs (2013), by factoring in the critical role of transnational corporations (TNCs) ‘in the era of transnational modular production networks’, empirically confirmed that ‘American economic power has not declined – it has globalized’. A most recent review done by LSE IDEAS (a policy think tank) asserted that ‘China is not yet a military challenge in the same way as Russia (or the Soviet Union) was during the Cold War’ (Watkins, 2021).
But perception matters in practical terms, whether it is genuine or feigned. In the face of China’s perceived ‘rise’, the US administration, from Obama’s second term in office onward, felt increasingly justified in reinforcing the containment of China to complement its engagement policy, and even began, after Trump’s rise to power, to contemplate decoupling from China, given mounting uncertainty about the regime’s intentions and the security challenge posed by China’s economic rise, increasing military expenditure, and more aggressive international posture.34 That scenario seems a good fit with the ‘The Tragedy of Great Power Politics’ paradigm espoused by John Mearsheimer, who has compared China to the autarkic empires of Germany or Japan before 1945.
Comparisons of this kind are far less relevant to reality than they seem. For one thing, the perceived ‘power transition’ (2011–20) was ‘occurring’ when the rising or risen China still lagged far behind the declining USA scientifically and technologically, and seemed destined to remain so into the far distant future. This stands in stark contrast with the power transition from Britain to Germany in the 1901–1910 decade, in which imperial Germany emerged as a superior scientific powerhouse (Table 1). The fallacy of the power shift model is further confirmed by a series of astounding or even humiliating concessions on market access China was obliged to make on a unilateral basis to both the USA and EU in 2020, the year in which the alleged ‘power transition’ to Chinese dominance was complete.35
The prevailing power transition theory (PTT) wrongly assumes that emerging powers are inevitably dissatisfied with the status quo, and are poised to overturn the existing international order. Odd Arne Westad (2021) has refuted this cliché, contending that ‘there is little evidence that the regime is out to destroy the international system designed by and still dominated by Western power. Rather, it seems intent on getting more out of it’. This is due to the brutal fact is that its entrapment in semi-peripheral development has made China not a solid superpower candidate, but rather a fragile great p ower. The country’s elites’ universally uncritical embrace of global capitalism, especially the leadership’s tireless championship of free trade, is a vivid reflection not of the Chinese economy’s structural strength but of its substantial structural weakness.
Moreover, the intellectual background of the post-Mao leadership, including Deng, ‘has given them neither proper knowledge of, nor real insights into, what the current liberal order meant, how it came about, and in what way could it be overturned’ (Yue, 2018a, p. 16). China today is so tightly enmeshed in the international system that it lacks both the will and ability to challenge the USA through any sort of hard-balancing approach. Its lack of ‘potent soft-power sources’ also makes it no match for either the Third Reich or the USSR, which in every sense constituted competing alternatives in their respective eras (Nye, 2015, p. 68). Far from having achieved parity with the USA in terms of relational capabilities – posing competing and more accurate understanding of what it means to be powerful (Quinn & Kitchen, 2019) – China, as Kitchen and Cox (2019) contend, ‘will remain a rule-taker’ unless a new ‘world-making moment’ befalls that equips it with the requisite structural power to wrest international leadership from the USA.
That is not to deny that China’s foreign and security policies have stiffened over the past decade or more, particularly after its success in hosting the 2008 Olympic Games and the coming of the 2007–09 financial crisis. Its increasing assertiveness in the region and the wider world are in large part a consequence of Chinese policy makers’ grave misjudgment of the USA: especially the belief that the financial crisis marked the point of no return in an accelerating US decline. With the USA’s subsequent ‘rebalancing to Asia’, and despite continued nationalist rhetoric, China silently reinstated Deng Xiaoping’s ‘bide time to build up strength’ strategy – also known as the ‘24-character strategy’ – in the closing years of Hu Jintao’s tenure.36
After his accession to power in late 2012, Xi Jinping became fully aware of how corrupt and incompetent the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) had become, whose ‘first and paramount mission is (and will continue to be) preserving the power of the Chinese Communist Party against China’s own people’ (Frum, 2021).37 Xi also took note of the fact that China was far more dependent on the USA than vice versa, that it still lacks effective alternatives to escaping from dependency and thus can ill-afford a complete decoupling, especially in technological terms. Xi fully recognized that an all-out trade war, much less a military conflict with the USA, were not viable options for China and must be avoided at all costs. He was entirely candid at his first meeting with Trump at Mar-a-Lago in April 2017: ‘There are a thousand reasons to make the China-U.S. relationship work, and no reason to break it’.38
Thus despite frequent saber-rattling and a cosmetic toughening of China’s foreign policy aimed primarily at domestic opinion,39 the Chinese Communist leadership has viewed continued bandwagoning on the liberal order as crucial to the country’s economic dynamism and thus to the regime’s own security ‘at the critical juncture of painful structural adjustment for fulfilling the desired economic transition’ (Yue, 2018a, p. 312).