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China led order is impossible---social constraints

Allan 18 — Bentley B. Allan is an Assistant Professor of Political Science and an affiliate of the Environment, Energy, Sustainability, and Health Institute at Johns Hopkins University. Srdjan Vucetic is Assistant Professor at the Graduate School of Public and International Affairs, University of Ottawa. Theodore Hopf is an American academic and a leading figure in constructivism in international relations theory. Allan, B., Vucetic, S., & Hopf, T. (2018). The Distribution of Identity and the Future of International Order: China’s Hegemonic Prospects. International Organization, 72(4), 839-869. doi:10.1017/S0020818318000267 WMK

What are the prospects for the Western hegemonic order in the face of China’s rise? Broadly speaking, there are three possibilities. The order could remain stable under the leadership of either the US or a coalition of great powers. The order could dissolve without being replaced. Or, China could lead a hegemonic transition, either by joining and transforming the current order or by constructing an alternative order from the outside. To assess which of these is most likely, we return to the three theoretical expectations about the dynamics of hegemonic order we outlined earlier. We conclude that the first two possibilities are more likely than a Chinese-led transition, given the distribution of identity.

First, does the distribution of identity bolster Western hegemony? The evidence shows that while some aspects of Western democratic neoliberal hegemony are contested, the distribution of identity among the great powers provides strong support for Western hegemony. Masses and elites in the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Japan, Brazil, and India clearly identify with democracy. While the masses in some of these countries reject neoliberalism, elites identify with liberal policies. This suggests that the hegemonic order is likely to remain stable even in the face of a relative decline in American power. Other states would likely be willing to support the order and either bolster American leadership or form a coalition akin to Snidal’s k-group that could maintain most existing rules without a hegemon.

Second, what does the distribution of identity imply for China’s ability to join and transform the existing order? Among the great powers, Chinese elites are alone in openly opposing the democratic element of Western hegemony. This poses an important obstacle to any Chinese global hegemonic project because Chinese elites would have to abandon a fundamental aspect of their own self-understanding to become full members of the current order. There is unlikely to be an American-Chinese hand-off similar to the shift from British to American hegemony because China is not likely to join the existing order as a junior partner. Thus, China is unlikely to lead a transition within the dominant norms of the existing order.

Third, what is the likelihood that China will be able to form an alternative counterhegemonic bloc that would challenge or displace the current order? Again, since all the other great powers save Russia identify as democracies, it is unlikely China can build an ideology that would simultaneously satisfy its domestic needs and appeal to others. So elites and masses in the other great powers would have to reject their democratic identities in favor of a Chinese alternative. This seems unlikely given the strong support for democracy in India and Brazil. To make a nondemocratic hegemony possible, China would have to delegitimate or displace the democratic elements that dominate identity discourses in the other great powers. While this is a possibility, the mass-level support for democracy means any effort to cultivate an alternative, nondemocratic distribution of identity is likely to take a long time. Moreover, China is portrayed negatively in other great-power discourses on this point. In Germany, Chinese authoritarian socialism is linked to a rejected Nazi and Soviet past.Footnote115 Some Indian texts worry that India’s democratic identity will bring it into conflict with a Chinese power hostile to democracy.Footnote116 Elsewhere, China is viewed ambivalently as an economic marvel or competitor, but is never represented positively as a leader or model.

China’s identity discourse contains little else that could be extrapolated into a compelling vision or ideology in support of an alternative international order. Because its national identity discourse is insular, it is hard to imagine how Chinese identity categories could be universalized so they would appeal to others. Given that the masses in all countries except for the UK have ambivalent or negative attitudes toward capitalism, markets, and neoliberalism, one possibility is that China could lead an anti-neoliberal, nationalist, counterhegemonic coalition. There is a latent alternative “historic bloc,” to borrow Gramsci’s terminology, in search of an ideology backed by sufficient global material power to make it hegemonic. But it is difficult to see how China would offer a compelling alternative to neoliberalism. Europeans and others seem ready for social democracy, but China is unlikely to offer that alternative.

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