No Korea war.
Post ’21 [Daniel; 1/29/21; PhD Candidate in IR @ Brown University; “Deterring North Korea,” https://warontherocks.com/2021/01/deterring-north-korea/]
With these principles in mind, can deterrence continue to work vis-a-vis North Korea? In short, yes. Throughout the evolution of the U.S-North Korean deterrence relationship, vulnerability has played an important role in the nuclear strategies and policies of both sides. The vulnerability of U.S. allies and assets in the region to North Korea’s intermediate-range missile and artillery barrages has almost certainly been a check on a more aggressive U.S. strategy, whether geared toward nonproliferation or regime change. It is certainly plausible that in the absence of this vulnerability the chances of the U.S. preventively attacking North during the Trump administration would have been higher, especially considering the extremely hawkish views of his national security adviser in 2017. As a result of this vulnerability, the U.S. routinely demonstrates its dedication to security agreements with allies in word and deed. Strategic bomber flights and military exercises, for example, demonstrate to North Korea their own vulnerability to U.S. and allied power in the region. Conversely, although the Kim regime would like nothing more than to unify the Korean Peninsula under North Korean leadership (dubbed the “holy grail of North Korean statecraft” in a recent report), it has refrained from overt and aggressive military action in pursuit of this goal. There is no doubt that Kim, like his predecessors, is wary of such behavior in the face of U.S. and allied military capabilities. Today, North Korea remains vulnerable to U.S. nuclear attacks, while the United States and its regional partners remain vulnerable to nuclear attack or retaliation from North Korea. This mutual vulnerability necessitates caution on both sides.
Recent progress in North Korean missile technology have made portions of the U.S. mainland vulnerable, giving the U.S. further reason to avoid unnecessary provocation. In 2017, North Korea conducted several tests of intercontinental ballistic missiles, two of which demonstrated the capability to potentially reach the continental United States. More recently, North Korea has successfully tested a submarine-launched ballistic missile and has showcased a new and larger submarine-launched ballistic missile at a recent parade. As a result, the United States continues to invest significantly in homeland missile defense, as well as to deploy missile defenses to defend allies and assets in the region. Missile defenses likely contribute to increased feelings of vulnerability among Kim’s regime, which may see the build-up as a prelude to a military offensive. Though imperfect, these attempts to reduce vulnerability enhance deterrence by potentially denying North Korea the expected military gains from a limited missile attack, even as fully effective missile defenses might contribute to strategic instability. Regardless of their effectiveness, Kim will have to factor in these defensive capabilities when assessing the success of engaging in conflict and will question the ability to achieve even limited goals through limited means. For example, in order to ensure the success of a missile attack, Kim would have to increase the size of the salvo in order to compensate for missiles likely to be shot down by U.S. and allied defenses. But knowing that a larger initial attack would be perceived as particularly aggressive and would likely invite a larger counter-attack, he might be deterred from pursuing whatever limited gains a smaller attack might have achieved. From Kim’s perspective, U.S. military capabilities are more than sufficient to make military success for North Korea in any conflict appear difficult and costly. Vulnerability to severe retaliation and punishment from U.S. strategic forces is also currently unavoidable for Kim. In fact, this very vulnerability has driven the North Korean nuclear program toward a capability to directly threaten the U.S., thereby demonstrating its own acknowledgement of vulnerability. In sum, both sides are vulnerable to each other. Most importantly for U.S. decision-makers, there is no likely development in the near to medium term that might remove this sense of vulnerability from Kim’s mind.
There is also great uncertainty in the nuclear capabilities and red lines of each side, in particular concerns about what might cause Kim to feel existentially threatened, and concerns over what might trigger the United States to exercise nuclear defense on behalf of its allies in the region. Kim consistently expresses concerns about regime survival and fear of a U.S. attack, and recent U.S. regime change operations in other states only strengthen this fear. While the United States should be careful not to inadvertently increase this threat level to a point where Kim believes he must start a major war, the threat of nuclear retaliation should be maintained. Such a scenario is far from implausible (nuclear scholar Jeffrey Lewis sketches out a hypothetical nuclear war between North Korea and the United States in a recent novel). Missile defenses also add an important element of uncertainty to the relationship. Uncertainty about the effectiveness of these systems should induce caution on both sides because neither can be completely sure about how effective the systems will be (though these systems may also strengthen resolve on the part of the U.S. if deemed very effective, as Robert Powell suggests). Although the United States has been clear in its statements regarding North Korean nuclear use, for example stating in the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review that “there is no scenario in which the Kim regime could employ nuclear weapons and survive,” uncertainty remains about which actions beneath the nuclear threshold might trigger a larger response. This uncertainty will undoubtedly induce caution in even lower-level conflict behavior. The U.S. explicitly includes some level of ambiguity and uncertainty in its declaratory statements, such as when describing possible conditions for nuclear use, saying, “Significant non-nuclear strategic attacks include, but are not limited to, attacks on the U.S., allied, or partner civilian population or infrastructure, and attacks on U.S. or allied nuclear forces, their command and control, or warning and attack assessment capabilities.” This type of statement leaves plenty of room for adversaries to question what might trigger a response and makes any aggression against the U.S. or its allies a risky proposition.
Last, both Kim and leaders in the United States and its allies appear to remain rational actors despite recent bombastic behavior and inflammatory rhetoric (which may be plausibly attributed to clumsy signaling attempts). Kim may be a cold and brutal oppressor, but his behavior should be seen as quite rational if you make the very supportable assumption that, like most political leaders, his primary goal is keeping his regime alive and keeping himself in power. As others have noted, “Kim is a tyrant, but I don’t think he is suicidal.” Kim continues to build and enhance his nuclear weapons capability in reaction to real and proximate threats to his very survival. The United States frequently conducts exercises with South Korea and Japan, and North Korea frequently decries these exercises as hostile and reckless. Kim sees these exercises as practice events for an eventual attack on North Korea. The United States has also stationed missile defense capabilities in South Korea and Japan, as well as on ships in the region. Kim’s continued pursuit of enhanced nuclear capabilities in response is as rational as it is for the U.S. to want to mitigate its own vulnerability. Frequent military deployments to the region, and overflights of U.S. strategic (nuclear capable) bombers also serve to enhance the perception of threat on behalf of Kim. These security dilemma dynamics have certainly contributed to Kim’s rational pursuit of an enhanced nuclear weapons capability. On top of these very visible military measures, recent dramatic increases in hostile rhetoric from former President Donald Trump, such as his “fire and fury” remarks, have only served to solidify Kim’s perceived need for a nuclear deterrent to potential U.S.-backed regime change. Of course, deterrence requires clear communication and credibility, which includes demonstrating capability. Kim is well aware that if he were to engage in any sort of large scale aggressive military behavior against his neighbors, this could spell the end of his regime. He also has no reason to doubt the U.S. capability and opportunity to respond to threats from North Korea. Assuming, as I do above, that Kim desires to remain the leader of his country and to preserve his regime, he has little incentive to test the U.S. nuclear deterrent. Whether his eccentric and brutal behavior leads to some other inadvertent escalation is a different question. As far as U.S. leaders are concerned, assuming Kim is rational enough to know what he wants and to recognize how he can lose it seems to be a safe bet.