Free beta access. 50 free AI tokens each week. Optional top-ups available. See what is included
Opening Word document…

Gender is the core concept of the protection racket – the idea of “saving women from men” is the justification of the violence. This is why masculine qualities are to have hypermilitarized compounds that are ready to fight and “save” the feminized subjects. There is no problem, they were the ones who are insecure about other nations and want to perfect them by securing them.

Peterson 07 Peterson, V. S. (2007). THINKING THROUGH INTERSECTIONALITY AND WAR. Race, Gender & Class, 14(3), 10-27. Retrieved from ttp://search.proquest.com/docview/218850466?accountid=14709 rishi

INTERSECTIONALITY AND "FEMINIZATION AS DEVALORIZATION" For a variety of reasons elaborated elsewhere (Peterson, 2005), I find the theory/practice emerging from feminist and critical race scholarship particularly fruitful for analyzing intersectionality. On the one hand, feminisms have transdisciplinary and complex analytical resources for investigating and theorizing about identity, difference, and structural hierarchies. On the other hand, differences among women have forced feminists (too often reluctantly and always uncomfortably) to reflect critically on the meaning of feminism, operations of power among women, the politics of representation, and the dangers of overgeneralizing. As one consequence, feminist scholarship has contributed to a richer understanding of analytics and politics, or theory and practice, as interdependent. Key to this development is understanding gender as both an empirical and analytical category. The former refers to the embodied and ostensibly biological binary of male-female sex difference. Understood empirically, gender can be deployed as a variable to investigate, for example, how women and men are differently affected by, and differently participate in, political and economic practices. This is the more familiar use of gender in contemporary research, especially in the social sciences. Analytical gender is less familiar; it refers to the signifying system of masculine-feminine differentiations that constitutes a governing code. The claim here is that gender pervades language and culture, systemically shaping not only who we are but how we think and what we do. As historically constituted, the dichotomy of gender codes masculine qualities as oppositional to and more highly valued than feminine qualities. Understanding gender analytically then generates a crucial and transformative feminist insight: the (symbolic, discursive) cultural privileging of that which is identified with masculinity is key to naturalizing the (symbolic, discursive, cultural, corporeal, material, economic) power relations that constitute multiple forms of subjection. This knowledge allows for more adequately theorizing, and hence politicizing, intersectionality. More specifically, feminist research documents the contingent and historical "normalization" of gender as a systemic code valorizing that which is characterized and privileged as masculine (reason, agency, control, objectivity, etc.) at the expense of that which is stigmatized as feminine (emotion, passivity, uncertainty, subjectivity, etc.). Two points are key. First, gender is relational, so that privileging who and what is masculinized is inextricable from devaluing who and what is feminized. Recognizing the interdependence of masculinity and femininity-one "requires" the other-provides particular analytical leverage. It displaces the prevailing tendency to think gender is primarily about women, insisting instead that gender necessarily and invariably involves masculinity as much as femininity. Similarly, it reminds us that gender is systemic, so that manifestations of gender are less individual "choices" than effects of codes, institutionalized norms, and rules. second, the privileging of masculinity does not privilege all men or only men. The claim is rather that gender-with its lauded masculinity and denigrated femininity-pervades language and culture and devalorizes all feminized statuses, including those occupied by subordinated men. Romanticism notwithstanding, the more an individual or a social category is feminized, the more likely (not invariably) that its devaluation is assumed, or presumed to be "explained." In short, diverse hierarchies are linked and ideologically "naturalized" by feminizing those who are subordinated. I understand this insight as key to advancing intersectional analysis. The insight involves several interactive "moves." In one sense, casting the subordinated as feminine devalorizes not only the empirical gender category of women but also sexually, racially, culturally, and economically marginalized men (e.g., "lazy migrants," 'primitive natives," "effeminate gays"). Underpinning this claim is the observation that, while structural hierarchies vary by reference to the "difference" emphasized and modalities of power involved, they typically share a common feature: the denigration of feminized qualities attributed to those who are subordinated (lacking reason, agency, control, etc.). Invoking the "natural" inferiority of the feminine plays a powerful, though not exhaustive, role in legitimating these hierarchies. In a second sense, and understanding gender analytically, not only subjects (women and marginalized men), but also concepts, desires, tastes, styles, "ways of knowing," cultural expressions (art, music), roles, practices, work, and nature, etc., can be feminized-with the effect of reducing their legitimacy, status, and value. Importantly, this devalorization is simultaneously ideological (discursive, cultural) and material (structural, economic). Consider how "women's work"-whether done by women or marginalized men-is typically under paid, or frequently not paid at all; and we hardly notice, in part because the depreciation of feminized activities is so taken for granted. This devalorization normalizes-with the effect of "legitimating"-the marginalization, subordination, and exploitation of feminized practices and persons. Oppressions differ, as do attempts to explain and/or justify them. As Wendy Brown (1997:86-7) states, "not simply the content but the modalities of power producing gender, race, or caste are specific to each production," even though "these powers of subject formation are not separable in the subject itself." Because oppressions take various structural forms, feminization is not the only "normalizing" ideology in operation. I argue, however, that what distinguishes feminization and renders it so ideologically powerful is the unique extent to which it invokes a deeply internalized and naturalized binary-the essentialized concept of sex difference-which is then "available" to naturalize diverse forms of structural oppression. This warrants clarification. Even as sex and gender are increasingly ambiguous to some, most people most of the time take a categorical, essentialized distinction between male and female completely for granted: as biologically "given," reproductively necessary, and psycho-socially "obvious." Yet constructionists argue not only that sex difference itself is produced-through contingent, historical practices and institutionalizations-but also that sex difference as an essentialized binary and masculinism as a system of asymmetrical power are co-constituted. In other words, the deeply sedimented concept of sex difference and historically institutionalized practices of gender hierarchy are mutually constituted. As one effect, the "naturalness" of sex difference is generalized to the "naturalness" of masculine (not necessarily male) privilege, so that both aspects come to be taken-for-granted "givens" of social life. The given cultural code of reason, control, agency, etc., as masculine, and irrationality, weakness, passivity, etc., as feminine is then ideologically available for legitimating other forms of domination as well. Common sense becomes a two-pronged justification of hierarchy. On the one hand, subordinated individuals or groups are devalorized by feminization; depictions range from lack of capacity and being weak or irrational, to being offensive or posing a danger. On the other hand, responding appropriately to such individuals or groups "requires" masculinized practices; these range from patronizing and protectionist behaviors to disciplinary measures and violent coercion. In short, not only are the subordinated devalorized by feminization, but the qualities they "lack" are typically just what the dominating (masculinized) group has to offer, or is "compelled" to practice. This conveniently justifies both the "necessity" of rule and who should rule. The common sense of privileging the masculine and devaluing the feminine is culturally and collectively internalized to such an extent that we are all variously complicit in its reproduction. And it is also implicitly and explicitly manipulated to reproduce inequalities as if this were natural and inevitable, thus making critique and resistance difficult. In short, devalorizing the feminine produces even as it obscures vast inequalities of power, authority, and resource distribution. Exposing how this power operates must be one objective of a critical political agenda. With these points in mind, I argue that the transformative potential of feminist critique lies in exposing and subverting all hierarchies that rely on denigration of "the feminine" to normalize and depoliticize subjection. I am not arguing that gender hierarchy is the "primary" oppression overshadowing race or class or sexuality. The point is rather that gender hierarchy and its elevation of "masculinity" is a historically contingent structural feature of social relations, that the subordination of women is not reducible to other structural oppressions (or vice versa), and that the dichotomy of gender underpins-as the denigration of the feminine naturalizes-hierarchies of gender, class, race, sexualities and geopolitical "difference." Because forms of subjection differ structurally, systematic and comparative analyses of RGCS require attention to "different histories, different mechanisms and sites of power, different discursive formations, different regulatory schemes" (Brown, 1997:86). In this essay, however, my focus is less on the production of subjection than exposing the political work that collective and internalized gender coding does across multiple forms of subjection. I am not presuming that sexist oppression is the most salient or powerful hierarchy in any particular context; I am arguing that investigating feminization as devalorization allows a broader understanding of how racial, sexual, class, and other oppressions are naturalized and provides us with greater analytical/political leverage. While this is only one among a number of critical insights to be expanded and applied,31 consider it a particularly productive vantage point, and especially in relation to militarization and war.INTERSECTIONALITY IN MILITARIZATION AND WARS In a recent volume, Hunt and Rygiel (2006:3) develop the concept of "(en)gendering" war to "disrupt and make visible the masculinized,militarized, racialized, sexualized, and classed dynamics through which war operates." They argue that official "war stories" do political work: they camouflage interests, agendas and politics that underpin war for the purpose of legitimating and gaining support for militarization. A crucial aspect of their effectiveness is the extent to which they depend on gendered ideologies (masculinization and feminization) that are naturalized and therefore go "unnoticed" (2006:5). By going unnoticed ideologies are depoliticized even as the identities and practices they mobilize profoundly affect politics. In the remainder of the paper I use triad analytics to explore how feminization accomplishes typically unnoticed political work in war stories. In other words, how does the valorization of masculinized identities, ideologies, and actions operate in contexts of militarism and war? The most familiar theme in war stories involves constructing the "enemy" as "other": to distinguish "us" from "them," render "others" in some sense inferior, and thereby justify war's violence against "them." The specifics of othering vary by history and context, but invariably involve some form of objectification so that "they" become objects to which norms of respect and non-violation need not be extended. Historical othering ranges from early Greeks characterizing Persians as effeminate, to Christians casting non-believers as immoral, to Europeans depicting "natives" as uncivilized. Thinking through how othering occurs in nationalist, colonial, and contemporary war stories reveals gendered identity investments and ideologies in operation. Critics of European imperialism have produced a wealth of research documenting the manipulation of ideologies to justify colonial wars and obscure their racist, economic, and heteronormative dynamics (Said, 1979; 1993; Spivak, 1987;Chatterjee, 1989; Stoler, 1991;McClintock, 1995). What surface repeatedly are characterizations of the colonized as feminine: weak, passive, irrational, disorderly, unpredictable, lacking self-control, economically and politically incompetent. European power-wielders (not only men or all men) could then justify military interventions by casting themselves in favorable masculinist terms: as uniquely rational, sexually and morally respectable, and more advanced economically and politically. In colonial wars and geopolitical maneuvering, "civilization" became a code word for European superiority, and the identity of "Europeans" was valorized. Through this lens, military interventions were perhaps a regrettable but nonetheless a necessary component of "enlightening" and "civilizing" primitive, unruly (feminized) "others." As Eisenstein (2004:75) observes, while they extolled the virtues of reason as a progressive force, Europeans positioned rationality "against savagery (natives), emotionality (women), and sexuality (racialized others)." At the same time-and complicating simplistic models of gender-the development of European nationalisms and normalization of bourgeois respectability produced an idealized model of femininity, pure, dutiful, maternal. This superficial valorization of femininity is contradicted by the practices it invoked. Women were expected to think and act in feminine ways, and to feel good about their feminine identity. But romanticizing the "maternal feminine" did less to empower women than render them perpetual dependents. Feminine virtue and morality were best assured by confining these qualities-and (bourgeois) women-to a private sphere of domesticity and assigning men the public sphere responsibility of defending and protecting feminized dependents. Rather than empowering European women, the idealization of bourgeois (heteronormative) femininity became a tool for disempowering non-European men. The patronizing and protectionist logic of bourgeois norms provided imperial governments a moral, as well as rational, justification for militarized colonization. In this war story, the barbarity of "other" men was proven by their (allegedly) oppressive treatment of women, and this demanded the rescue of victimized females by honorable, civilized men. In short, the protection of idealized femininity (to paraphrase Spivak's (1987) apt analysis) justified wars by white men to "save" brown women from brown men. The crusading rhetoric and protectionist logic obscured colonial government agendas, and it resurfaces with particular vengeance and new complexities in contemporary militarism and war.4 The US-led "war on terror" exemplifies how the triad of identity investments, ideological commitments, and militarized practices interact. Some argue that George W. Bush's "forceful" response to the 9/11 bombings involved not only his outrage and claim to military leadership, but also his desire to establish a hypermasculine image of himself and the United States. It is well-known that Bush had personal reasons for enhancing his militarist (manly) identity. He had avoided serving in Vietnam, was invested in the image of being a "guy's guy," and arguably hoped to redeem his father's failure to oust Saddam in the first Gulf War. For many Americans, the identity and power of the US had been feminized by its defeat in Vietnam, made more humiliating by losing to a people stereotyped as ethnically/racially inferior. Feminization anxiety was also fueled by the increasing visibility of women in politics and the workplace and the growing strength of LGBT political movements. A yearning to remasculinize the nation ( Jeffords 1989) was already present and readily tapped by Bush and his advisors as the nation responded to 9/11 and its spectacular demonstration of US vulnerability to "penetration" by foreign men. The war story the Bush administration immediately cultivated featured fanatical terrorists inexplicably committed to destroying freedom, democracy, and (implicitly Western) civilization by any means. Enemies this irrational and unpredictable could only be defeated by drawing an absolute line between "good" and "evil" and adopting the strongest possible measures to eliminate those deemed evil. Feminization operates here to construct enemies as so absolutely different from "us" that the only viable strategy is their annihilation. Those who were fearful, skeptical, or who actively opposed Bush's strategies were rendered unequivocally suspect-unpatriotic, anti-American, naively (irrationally) out-of-touch, or quite simply unmanly (lacking the guts to do what must be done). In this instance, feminization operates to deny absolutely the rationality of dissenters or any cogent reasons for critique. It also denied any positive identification with dissent or resistance. Dissenters are simply and irredeemably discredited: unwilling to stand up for their country, ungratefully abandoning the US and free-loading on its military power, and/or failing to grasp "real world politics." Those seeking debate and diplomacy were feminized-cast as behaving like cowardly women and undermining US interests by wimping out of military action. In effect, dissidents become a less stark but ultimately an equally threatening enemy: "If you're not with us you're against us." And as enemies, those who are against us lose any claim to inclusion, respect or (apparently) rights. There is yet another angle to 'notice.' Bush used the logic of crusading protectionism to justify his warring agenda and disable feminist critiques.5 Like earlier imperial powers, as it embarked on its post-9/11 military actions, the US claimed to be liberating women of Afghanistan and Iraq: rescuing "other" women from the "barbaric" conditions of their subjection to the Taliban and Islamic fundamentalists. Zine (2007:34) captures succinctly the political work of this war story: "the archetypal image of the deprived and debased Muslim woman was resurrected to perform her duty as a signifier of the abject difference of Muslims; the barbarity and anti-modernism of Islam and its essential repression of women; and most importantly as camouflage for US military interventions." These were not the only "official" stories told to justify the "war on terror." But the political -work that they did was crucial. They constructed an "enemy" who was unpredictable, religiously (irrationally) motivated, indiscriminately violent, and bent on destroying (Western) civilization. This foreclosed any "reasoned" engagement and legitimated a strategy of annihilation. In conjunction with other factors and forces, these stories worked to build a modicum of "consent" and a modest "coalition of the willing" that enabled the US to proceed with its war and claim it was not acting unilaterally. These stories rendered critique and opposition not just suspect but dangerously treasonous and capable of imperiling the project of saving civilization. Through variously feminizing diverse sets of actors, the Bush administration's war stories undercut dissent and legitimated extremes of surveillance and containment, quickly implemented against those the ruling regime deemed suspect. In short, these official war stories worked powerfully to justify the "war on terror" and gain at least the appearance of consent. The US government and its coalition partners invaded Afghanistan and subsequently Iraq. Investments in gendered identities and commitments to masculinist ideologies mattered for initiating the "war on terror," and they also matter within processes of militarization. Militaries, of course, are quintessential sites of hypermasculinity. Success in war is presumed to demand a constellation of qualities long considered the exclusive province of men: superior physical strength, incomparable male bonding, heroic risk-taking, extremes of violence, and readiness to sacrifice one's life for the cause. Historically, military service afforded decisive proof of manhood and constituted a claim to citizenship. The valorized identities and ideals of military service continue to fuel recruitment and enlistment activities, with the increasingly crucial addition of economic incentives. Masculinist qualities remain key to military life but are complicated in today's services by a variety of differences among men (by ethnicity, race, religion, class, skills) as well as by the inclusion of women. Within militaries, multiple masculinities and their emotional investments are differently mobilized in pursuit of warring objectives.6 More physically powerful and hypermasculine men are valued but subordinated to orders from above; commanding officers, with their presumed leadership competence, enjoy higher prestige and less ambivalent valorization. Increasing reliance on advanced technologies prompts new masculinities. While desk jobs that distance soldiers from the battle front were previously feminized, computer specialists and high-tech operators today are increasingly valorized (Blanchard, 2003). If we consider the education and training required for these positions, classed and raced dimensions of masculinities come into view. Indeed, the techno-war paradigm of the US military presents a new version of western superiority: high tech sophistication, efficiency, and "awesome" power. Intersectional analysis is particularly complicated by the increasing numbers of women in military service, who face conflicting expectations and manipulations of their femininity, masculinity, and sexuality.7 The effects of women's inclusion are variously interpreted, with no easy conclusions. Some analysts argue that women's presence humanizes and democratizes militaries-perhaps even rendering them less masculinist. Others are less optimistic. Given traditional expectations of virile, aggressive hypermasculinity, militaries are treacherous places for anyone who is feminized. Women especially-but not exclusively-are at risk. Through a triadic lens, however much female soldiers struggle to "prove" and sustain their identification as sufficiently masculine, ideologies of male supremacy and practices of sexual violence undermine their efforts. Lack of structural equality (and respect) between men and women in everyday life, enduring stereotypes of female dependence and physical inferiority, the embodiment of sex difference (menstruation, pregnancy), and the objectification of women as sexual targets interact to pose multiple threats to military women.8 These are in addition to the dangers they face as soldiers in war zones. Whether or not the presence of women humanizes militaries, the presumed femininity of women soldiers (contradicting the masculinism demanded of them) is variously manipulated in support of military objectives. The US-led "Operation Iraqi Freedom" provides stunning examples of how the femininity, masculinity, and sexuality of female soldiers can be mobilized. The images from these war stories are familiar, but the gender, racial, and geopolitical politics underpinning them have largely gone unnoticed in public discourse. For instance, soon after the invasion of Iraq, the March 2003 capture of US Army Private Jessica Lynch and her subsequent rescue was a major media event. While initial reports praised her soldiering in the face of enemy fire, these were quickly overshadowed by feminizing her plight: a white woman subject to "rape by Arab men" had to be spectacularly rescued. The story worked to reproduce the virtue and vulnerability of (white) womanhood, the demonization of Iraqi men, and the heroic efforts of US Special Forces to "save" her from presumed abuse. Equally important, the story also served Bush's military agenda by diverting attention from the increasingly visible Iraqi resistance, the flaws in US policy and preparedness, and the larger questions these raised. When accounts of abuse, rape, and torture of prisoners in the Abu Ghraib prison surfaced in late 2003, European and American audiences especially were "shocked" by the photos that were broadcast worldwide. There was the shock of viewing graphic abuse and the shame of coalition ("civilized") soldiers as perpetrators. But most disturbing were photos of American women torturing Arab men. The official war story blamed "a few bad apples," thus avoiding more critical interrogation of behaviors cultivated by militarism, valorized masculinism, and deteriorating security conditions in Iraq. Blaming the few was apparently persuasive to many in the US, where identification as the "good guys" carries deep emotional investments and encourages collective amnesia about US racism and military atrocities. The initial outrage and political furor were quickly eclipsed by the (Western) media's focus not on the implications of torture and the reality of failing military policies, but on the sensational photos. These were both an easier story to "sell" and could serve multiple purposes. Several points warrant our notice. Fascination with the photos derived from many sources and tapped feelings of both repulsion and attraction. The pictures recalled images of Nazi concentration camps for some, and white voyeurism at racial lynchings for others. Even as they depicted abuse, the sexualized poses also eroticized domination. Goldstein (in Brittain, 2006) observes that viewing a pyramid of exposed buttocks invited homoerotic arousal, while the presence of a grinning woman allayed any homosexual anxiety about that arousal. As critiques of US policies and calls for secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld's resignation intensified, the media focus shifted. At least 1600 photos were made available for Congressional screening. Presumably there were more numerous images of men abusing men, yet these were displaced by a few photos featuring Lynndie England-a (white) woman-sexually humiliating (brown) men. England quickly became the focal point of condemnation. Details of England's personal life (early divorce, out-of-wedlock pregnancy, romance with an accused wife-beater) effectively constructed her as a very "improper" woman who appeared to revel in doing "improper" things (Brittain, 2006:88). For critics of the US, the Abu Ghraib photos, and especially those of England, confirmed the moral hypocrisy of American righteousness. The US-not alone but most blatantly-was prosecuting a deadly war in the absence of (rational?) foresight and planning, and on the basis of "faulty intelligence" that was increasingly exposed as willful misrepresentations. It was snubbing its nose at (civilized?) international law and human rights conventions, while claiming moral superiority and a crusading protectionist commitment to freedom and democracy. And the arrogance displayed in the photos was demoralizing to all who identified with the Islamic faith and/or sympathized with embattled Iraqis. The damage to US credibility and national interests-including the security of its soldiers and the safety of its homeland-was inestimable. Some feared, others hoped, that the scandal of Abu Ghraib would bring down the Bush administration and prompt a reassessment of the war in Iraq. Instead, Bush staunchly defended Rumsfeld, the war raged on, and the President was re-elected in November. Without denying the enormous complexity of how this transpired, I want to insist that we "notice" the media's complicity and what the official war stories obscured. The most telling point is the timing of these stories and hence their political effects. The shift to sensationalist Abu Ghraib abuse photos and their feminized depravity diverted attention from the implications of the US government's expanding detention activities, engaging in torture, and disregarding international conventions. Pornographic images of a "bad girl" did the political work of side-lining the issue of rights and suppressing debate about the war's objectives and operational practices. A second point is how the gendered and racialized messages in the images camouflaged neo-imperialist interests. Casting England as the ultimate "bad apple" positioned her as the problem, rather than the predominately male power wielders and the policies of the US government. England and a very few others paid with demotions and prison sentences while Bush and his regime escaped blame and accountability. Spoiled femininity took the rap for imperial masculinity. We might also notice how casting England as the depraved figure of femininity avoided all interrogation of privileged (white)masculinity and its arguably "depraved" history of violence. The most obvious examples include racial lynchings, torture and death of detainees, rape as a weapon of war, fire bombings, nuclear weapons, environmental warfare, use of land mines, and the indiscriminate maiming and killing of civilians. In addition, the England story completely diverted attention from the violence cultivated within militaries by hypermasculinist norms-violence which is practiced not only against external enemies but against all who are feminized, including service women themselves. Major media rarely turn their notice to the repetitive incidents of sexual harassment, rape and other forms of violence against women (and gays) in US military organizations. These incidents are now extensively documented, though the accused are rarely prosecuted and-like detention and torture practices-even more rarely punished. Finally, and in spite of the incalculable damage done to individual lives and American reputation by the abuses at Abu Ghraib, the official war stories focused attention in ways that still managed to serve an imperialist agenda: "The images of Arab men being broken, subdued, shamed, and disciplined by a white woman allow for the realization of the 'American dream' of the total demasculinization and humiliation of Arab men" (Brittain, 2006:89), assuring the American public that "they are still on 'top' in terms of their ability to inflict sexual humiliation and violence on the Iraqi enemy" (Brittain, 2006:91). INTERSECTIONALITIES OF MASCULINISM, MILITARISM, AND IMPERIALISM I introduced triad analytics as a tool for improving our analyses of social relations, arguing that emotional investments and cultural productions are inextricable from material practices. I used this framing to explore RGC and S in contexts of militarism and war, and to demonstrate how feminization devalorizes. To conclude, I review how gendered identities, ideologies, and activities are mutually constituted and operate to normalize domination and violence. No one escapes gender socialization and its historically sedimented norms of heterosexism. We cannot help but be invested in identities that our culture deems appropriate, "necessary," and worthy of esteem. While we are not locked into unchanging or monological scripts, following paths of least resistance is easier than not conforming-much less actively criticizing "the way things are." Because the naturalized "given" of binary sex difference is coded into gender identities and ideologies, it gives the status quo inordinate power to obstruct critique and transformation. Females are typically cast as, and socialized into, subjectivities and roles that feature dependence, accommodation, lack of personal autonomy and power, and "consent" to male domination. The effects of conformity "invite" ideologies of protection, if not contempt. Women who defy the stereotypes are deemed suspect, social problems and "unnatural" (African American "matriarchs," "antifamily" career women, "man-hating" feminists, "depraved" torturers). Males are no less-and in important respects, more abusively-socialized into subjectivities and roles that feature aggression, being "in control" (emotionally, physically, politically, economically), and denying anxiety, ambivalence, and vulnerability. Conforming to gender expectations costs men-and women and societies-dearly. As "compensation," men are accorded a sense of entitlement: to autonomy, power, and sexual access. Objectified and subordinate "others" may require protection but are also "at the disposal" of their superiors. This is the central dilemma constituted by gendering: the specific qualities of (weak, agentless) femininity "demand" a corollary exercise of (powerful, entitled) masculinity (see Stiehm, 1982; Brown, 1992; and Young, 2003). Not surprisingly, most men attempt to comply, often at high personal cost. Because the edifice of masculinity is a mythic construction, the pressure to "prove" one's manhood is relentless. However much individual males struggle to sustain their identification as sufficiently masculine, it is perpetually subject to challenge. One can be "unmanned" (feminized) by any evidence, or worse yet, simply the accusation of "gayness," weakness, or lack of control. Potential failure, and the despised vulnerability it invokes, is ever present. This is true for all masculinities, no matter race or class. This relentless pressure is particularly acute on the stage of political and military power. The stakes are high, especially in the context of impending or ongoing war. Leaders and soldiers respond accordingly-with displays of hypermasculinism: President Bush "must" prove himself and US invincibility, civilized nations "must" assert cultural superiority, soldiers "must" torture to secure intelligence, suspect others "must" be detained, civilians "must" be patriotic, critics "must" be silenced, deeper questions "must" be postponed. Official war stories not only camouflage the agenda of power-wielders during war; they also obscure the reproduction of hierarchies in everyday life. Their tacit (and sometimes explicit) manipulation of gender coding does the political work of normalizing, hence, depoliticizing how gender operates to perpetuate inequalities and the violence that attends them. The core dilemma of gender plays throughout: constructing women and feminized others in ways that demand masculinized identities and action. This is so taken for granted that alternative-to say nothing of structurally "equal"-arrangements are rendered unthinkable. In the "war on terror," gender coding reproduces feminized others who must be protected, controlled, detained, or eliminated by masculinized agents of ruling states. Like advocates of neoliberal capitalism are forever telling us: "there is no alternative." The systemic effects constitute a triadic tragedy of global proportions: hypermasculinized identity investments, arrogant ideological claims, and excessive-arguably depraved-military practices. Critics of imperialism have exposed how the idealization of (Western) femininity has been manipulated to justify western wars to "save" "other" women. Understanding feminization as devalorization affords an additional insight: that marginalized men more generally are subject to this crusading and protectionist "logic"-in colonial wars to "modernize" gender relations, nationalist wars to promote idealized families, invasions to "liberate" oppressed groups, wars on terror to eliminate the "irrational religious," wars on poverty that demoralize the (racialized) underclass, and battles against HIV/AIDs that demonize gay men. In sum, official war stories not only camouflage political agendas but also suppress critical thinking about institutionalized racism, sexism, classism, and homophobia. By obscuring the reciprocal constitution of valorized masculinity and vilified femininity these stories avoid critique of gender itself, with the effect of reproducing multiple forms of subjection and violence. My "thinking through" intersectionality tells a different story. It too is limited by its perspective, commitments, erasures, and generalizations. Framed by triad analytics, my story casts emotional commitments, cultural productions, and material practices as mutually constitutive. It foregrounds investments in gendered identities and gender ideologies not to privilege them but to explore how militarism and war-making depend on them. I do not claim that mine is the "superior" story though I believe it is an urgent one. I do claim that gender matters, and especially for "thinking through" militarism and war. More pointedly, I am arguing that we can neither adequately analyze violence, nor effectively advance intersectional analyses, if we ignore how feminization devalorizes.

Sign in to recut, update, or save this card.