Increasing representation of women defers structural change and abets the system
Griffin, 2015. (Penny, Senior Lecturer in International Relations at the University of New South Wales, Australia. “crisis, austerity and gendered governance: a feminist perspective,” in feminist review 109: 49-72, spp)
Essentialism has been no obstacle to the rapid uptake of the ‘rise of gender harmony’ in governance discourse on finance. Frequently described and represented as more responsible, nurturing, financially cautious and intrinsically less corrupt (see, for instance, Stern, 2001; World Bank, 2001), women have found themselves positioned in recent discussions of financial crisis as a solution to the excesses of male-dominated finance, in a show of essentialism that governance feminism has run with in its agenda for getting more women in boardrooms and on trading floors. Economic observers have frequently attributed the seeds of the global financial crisis ‘to a combination of reckless risk-taking and outright corruption’ and, just as ‘risk-taking has been laid at the door of masculinity, so too has corruption’ (Fogg, 2013). Accordingly, women ‘are simply more honest’, more trustworthy and public-spirited and less corrupt than men (ibid.). They are also ‘naturally’ more prone to long-term thinking or empathic and prosocial behaviour than men (ibid.). Policy-oriented studies have emerged to demonstrate ‘that including women is good for business’ and evidence has been marshalled to show that firms that promote women into management are more profitable, better organised, accountable, motivated and innovative (Prügl, 2012: 29). Making ‘women’s difference productive for the solution of the crisis’, such accounts have centralised women’s supposed patience, their consistence and their attention to detail (ibid.: 30). Importantly, however (and in case men begin to feel threatened by all this attention on women’s gifts), these accounts have redeemed men in finance by extolling women’s contributions to profit in conjunction with men’s tendency towards extremes, painting women as ‘competent associate[s] in a common endeavor’ (ibid.: 31). Iceland’s efforts to ‘signal a new culture within the banking system’ (Wall Street Journal, 2008), appointing female chief executives to the newly nationalised Icelandic banks, serves as a good example of the extent to which essentialist, and behavioural, explanations have monopolised contemporary accounts of financial crisis. According to Salam, the ‘macho men of the heavily male-dominated global finance sector’ created the conditions for global economic collapse’, assisted by ‘their mostly male counterparts in government’ (Salam, 2009: 68). Women, on the other hand, are less inclined to ‘risky’ behaviour on financial markets (except when menstruating; see Lite, 2008). As Elias (2013: 161) notes, women’s perceived carefulness as consumers (according to Global Gender Gap reporting) also makes them better placed as managers of household finances. According to the WEF, they are ‘driving the post-financial-crisis-economic-recovery’ not only though their ‘retail power’ but by ‘engaging in acts of consumption that enable them to break with traditional gender stereotypes in favor of an empowered gender identity as consumer’ (ibid.: 161–162). Governance feminism’s embrace of the neo-liberal market guarantees that it firmly avoids questions that might challenge the shape of the economic system that has led to crisis. Governance feminism, and governance feminism’s response to financial crisis, has been extensively silent on the gendered underpinnings of global governance, and global finance in particular, focusing instead on a particular (and perhaps unsurprising) support for institutional measures to enhance women’s participation. The increasing prevalence of descriptions of gender that directly correlate low gender gaps with high economic competitiveness is, as Elias (2013: 159) notes, a powerful instrument of governance, feeding into states’ obsessions with their national economic competitiveness and ‘thus legitimating neoliberal competitiveness enhancing policy agendas’. While it may be, then, ‘no bad thing that an organisation such as the WEF has placed gender prominently on its issue agenda’, since this can legitimate ‘a focus on gender issues within state and nonstate arenas and within international organisations’, the ‘inevitability about the way in which gender issues are instrumentalised in order to link women’s empowerment and gender equality straightforwardly to economic growth and competitiveness’ is, Elias notes, troubling. ‘By disappearing feminism in favour of technical measurement and celebrity humanitarianism’, governance feminism simply reiterates problematic visions of gender ‘whereby gender equality and women’s empowerment’ can be understood only in relation to their ‘ability to serve the market economy’ (ibid.: 166–167).