Solves deterrence better
Lété and Pernik 17. Bruno Lété is a senior fellow for Security and Defense Policy in the Brussels office of The German Marshall Fund of the United States. Piret Pernik is a research fellow at the International Centre for Defence and Security in Tallinn; “EU–NATO Cybersecurity and Defense Cooperation: From Common Threats to Common Solutions”; December 2017; GMF; https://www.gmfus.org/sites/default/files/EU-NATO%2520Cybersecurity%2520and%2520Defense%2520Cooperation%2520edit.pdf //BY
Study the Adequacy of Cybersecurity and Defense Concepts and Strategies EU or NATO planning is inwardly focused, revolving around member states’ existing capabilities and institutions, while their adversaries often plan their capabilities around the specific vulnerabilities of the actors they expect to confront. Russian “active measures” in Europe and North America, for example, are designed to exacerbate political tensions and vulnerabilities, such as ethnic relations, regional separatism, or socio-economic or cultural cleavages. In this manner, Russia views the development of cyber capabilities as supporting a broader set of conventional, hybrid, or nuclear capabilities. In this light, there is a real need for the EU and NATO — or an independent academic institution — to take a more outwardly focused approach to studying the cyber strategies and capabilities of NATO and the EU’s potential adversaries or competitors, such as Russia or China, and that puts in perspective the EU and NATO’s own state of play in cyberspace. Such an outward-looking approach toward cybersecurity and defense could serve as a source of inspiration on how to improve EU and NATO cyber strategy and capabilities. As a modern state-on-state conflict is increasingly likely to begin in cyberspace, the EU and NATO must think more actively which cyber capabilities they must develop to more effectively deter — or even retaliate against — their potential adversaries. Develop EU–NATO Triggers for a Joint Response to Cyber-Attacks Leaders in EU and NATO member states are getting more comfortable talking openly about active and reactive joint responses to adversaries in cyberspace. NATO has already recognized a serious cyber-attack as a potential Article 5 trigger, and at its November 2017 defense ministerial, the Alliance announced the creation of a Cyber Operations Center that will facilitate the integration of cyber capabilities with conventional military capabilities. But the current doctrine and crisis management conditions enshrined in NATO and EU cyber policies still puts the emphasis on a defensive posture only. A clearer definition is needed of the circumstances, degree, and manner in which active or counter-measures can or should be taken if EU–NATO member states perceive a cyber threat or suffer a cyber-attack. The authorization to use the EU civilian toolbox or NATO offensive capabilities may be clear if a member state faces a large-scale, devastating cyber crisis. The grey zones are a problem. The Kremlin for instance has clearly been focusing its efforts in the gray zone, and it has gained some sophistication in avoiding lines that would trigger a common response from EU or NATO member states. Russia is also not the only potential adversary capable of similar tactics.6 There is thus an acute need to define when and how the EU and NATO must respond against the day-to-day cyber intrusions that fall below the threshold of being perceived as a clear act of aggression. 6 For example, small to medium scale cyber-attacks on critical infrastructure, hacking of sensitive information, spreading of disinformation. The Kremlin has been focusing its efforts in the gray zone, and it has gained some sophistication in avoiding lines that would trigger a common response from EU or NATO member states.” “ G|M|F December 2017 7 Policy Brief The development of a set of EU–NATO basic principles that would trigger a joint response would be a good first step. The Tallinn Manual published by the NATO CCDCoE could offer inspiration on how the EU and NATO can define these principles while respecting the application of the international law.7 Currently the EU and NATO need to assess each individual cyber threat or cyber-attack on a case-by-case basis without the support of standard measurement tools and indicators that can help them formulate a swift and proportionate response. This considerably slows down the decision-making process. Having a set of pre-agreed basic principles would contribute significantly to efforts at improving reactiveness and resilience at the EU and NATO levels.