Would use the Estonia model
Zandee et al. 21. Dick Zandee is Senior Research Fellow and Head of the Security Unit of the Research department of the Clingendael Institute. Prior to his work at Clingendael, he was Head of the Planning & Policy Unit of the European Defence Agency; “Countering hybrid threats”; October 2021; Clingindael Institute; https://www.clingendael.org/pub/2021/countering-hybrid-threats/ //BY
Additionally, synchronisation between the EU and NATO response activities to cyber threats deserves more attention. The EU and NATO could discuss more concretely the delineation of responsibilities and especially of military tasks with regard to cyber threats: when and how should the EU and/or NATO respond to actual cyber threats? For example, a logical division of labour could be an EU focus on enhancing coordination and cooperation among its member states regarding the protection of critical civilian digital infrastructure, while NATO concentrates on enhancing coordination and cooperation among its member states concerning the protection of military digital infrastructure. The focus for both organisations in this regard should be both preventive (sharing threat analysis and protection advice) as well as responsive (in case of actual cyberattacks). The development of a set of EU-NATO basic principles or (non-binding) guidelines on what would trigger a joint response would be a useful step as well. The Tallinn Manual published by the NATO Cyber CoE could offer assistance on how to define these principles while respecting the application of international law. Some experts advocate a common EU-NATO cyber strategy to better align EU-NATO efforts in tackling cyber threats, but currently there seems to be little support for this idea among the member states.