Conventional security assistance is key, not cyber
Karnitschnig 6-20 (Matthew Karnitschnig, Chief Correspondent at POLITICO Europe. BA in History @ Hampden Sydney College, MS in Journalism @ Columbia. “THE MOST DANGEROUS PLACE ON EARTH”, https://www.politico.eu/article/suwalki-gap-russia-war-nato-lithuania-poland-border/)LR
Despite the Baltics’ strategic concerns, what may be the most dangerous thing about the Suwałki Gap is its relative irrelevance. A move by Russia on Poland or Lithuania would clearly trigger NATO’s Article 5 mutual defense provision, immediately pulling in all the alliance’s members — from Turkey to Bulgaria to France and the United States. At least in theory. How eager would Washington and NATO be to risk Armageddon over a stretch of largely unpopulated farmland few of their citizens even know exists? It’s exactly the kind of edge case that Putin has proved eager to test. Until (and if) Finland joins, Lithuania’s 900-kilometer border with Russia and Belarus is the longest in the alliance. But with an army of just 20,000 and an air force with only five planes including transport aircraft and one single-engine Cessna, Lithuania, like its Baltic neighbors, is ill-equipped for a Russian assault — even with help from the German-led battle group currently stationed in the country. “The only answer to that challenge is an increased NATO presence here,” said Margiris Abukevičius, Lithuania’s vice minister of defense. “We know how Russia is obsessed with closing land corridors.” During a visit to Vilnius earlier this month, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz tried to reassure his hosts of Berlin’s commitment to Baltic security but ended up sowing confusion. Scholz told reporters that Berlin would move “in the direction” of stationing “a robust combat brigade” in Lithuania, implying several thousand troops would be deployed. His aides later walked back the comments, saying that Germany would only move the unit’s headquarters — around 50 personnel — there, while the majority of the troops would remain in Germany. While the U.S.-led alliance has yet to take a final decision, officials have signaled that NATO would significantly bolster forces in the Baltics and elsewhere along the EU’s eastern frontier, heralding a historic shift in NATO posture and shifting the pact’s center of gravity to the east. Though NATO has four 1,000-strong battle groups stationed across the region, Baltic political leaders and military planners argue that much more would be needed to deter Russian aggression. “You have a so-called trip-wire force, but you may as well call it a suicide mission,” said Ilves, who served as Estonian president from 2006 to 2016. The U.S. and Germany long cautioned against such a move, in part because of a 1997 accord, known as the NATO-Russia Founding Act, in which the alliance agreed with Moscow not to establish permanent bases in new member states in “the current and foreseeable security environment.” Russia’s attack on Ukraine, however, has convinced even longtime skeptics of what NATO calls “forward defense” in Eastern Europe that the time has come. “I’ve changed my mind,” said Ben Hodges, a retired American lieutenant general who commanded the U.S. Army in Europe from 2014 to 2017. “Our good faith efforts to engage with Russia have failed.” In Belarus, over which Putin has recently asserted more influence, the Russian military has recently used air bases and other military infrastructure to launch assaults on Ukraine. Hodges said he doubts whether Russia, which is struggling in Ukraine, could muster the capabilities it needs to attack the Baltics for now. But he said it was essential for NATO to use this opportunity to prepare for the worst, including by bolstering the Baltics’ air defenses and ensuring better integration between local forces and the rest of the alliance. He said he could envision a system with a “rotating permanent presence” of NATO forces in the region, similar to how the U.S. operates in South Korea. Another key factor in the region’s defense is Poland, which has the largest military in the region. Historic disputes between Poles and Lithuanians in the Suwałki corridor over language and minority rights on both sides of the border have led to speculation that Putin could use those tensions to his advantage, similarly to his tactic in Donbas, where he succeeded in harnessing pro-Russian sentiment to unleash a separatist movement. That has yet to happen. Cross-border cooperation between the Polish and Lithuanian militaries has never been closer, according to General Rajmund Andrzejczak, Poland’s top military commander. “We see what the Russians are doing in Ukraine, so we don’t trust them,” said the general, who once served in the Suwałki region, stressing that Poland was prepared to honor its alliance obligations towards Lithuania if Russia moves in. “We have to be very, very ready,” he said.