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Debating about policy is good, it’s the only way to reflect upon personal boundaries and engage with contingency – their model excludes that and causes dissatisfaction through thematizing politics

Turnbull 05 (Nick Turnbull PhD – Lecturer in Politics at the University of Manchester, “Policy in question: from problem solving to problematology”, University of New South Wales, February 2005, https://www.academia.edu/download/66798539/SOURCE02.pdf, MG)

The key to moving beyond both positivism and the deconstruction of meaning is the foundation of questioning and the concept of the problematological answer. Politics is surely the sphere of debate over the meaning of public problems and how to solve them. If we disagree on a question, we argue about it, add to it with other questions, weaken it, and debate the pro and con of the possible answers. A plurality of meanings means a plurality of answers, which indicates contingency, but it is not an aporia (an impassable obstruction to knowledge) (see Derrida 1993). It simply entails that meaning is in question.74 This establishes rhetoric as a legitimate dimension of discourse because problematological answers have an equal status, as answers, to apocritical answers. Some questions cannot be solved beyond dispute but they can be expressed and then debated. In fact, as I pointed out in Chapter Four, there is no argumentation in poststructuralism, because if signification were a free play of meaning it would be impossible to indicate one answer to a question over another (Meyer 1995: 238). Similarly, while Foucault depicts a figurative picture of discourse (see Foucault 1970) he has no argumentation, which perhaps accounts for the feeling that agency is absent in his work. But while we are ‘prisoners’ of language, defined by it in important ways, we can reflect upon our boundaries as well, through questioning, even if this is difficult. Knowledge has its own inertia because we operate on the basis of presumed answers and so reality appears continuous (Meyer 2000; see also Chapter Seven). Nonetheless, it is also open to question and therefore we are not always powerless. Even those working within an established discourse have to continually reinforce its legitimating power, and therefore can escape responsibility only by rhetorical means. Hence powerful elites have a strategic interest in arguing for particular ways of framing problems. Agency and structure are in reason, and we can understand both in terms of questioning. Rationality is still possible, so our task should be to reverse the fragmentary reductionism of science and the internal fragmentation of radical poststructuralism but without reimposing the problem solving model upon reality as the sole, unjustified criterion of resolution. By drawing on Meyer’s concept of problematological answers, we can establish what is rational and what is irrational about politics without judging it in scientific terms. This is essential if we are to understand policymaking, which is multidisciplinary.

In political theory, where poststructuralism is enjoying contemporary popularity, for example with Laclau and Mouffe (1985) and Zizek (1999), poststructuralists argue that politics emerges from the failure of ontology to establish the conceptual closure of reason. Laclau and Mouffe, for example, identify the breakdown of foundationalism with an appreciation of the contingency underlying social relations as the source of politics, in contrast to scientific utopianism which searches for an essence (1985: 142-3). However, if ontology is a failed approach to philosophy then why develop an alternative philosophy based on this failure? Meyer makes this criticism of Derrida by pointing out that the concept of ‘trace’ of the subject actually reinstates Cartesianism in a new guise, albeit one of radical negativity: ‘Is it not quite simply an insurmountable contradiction to want to declare the death of Cartesianism, while in the same breath overcoming that death by stating that the subject is a trace of itself?’ (1995: 136). He points out a similar contradiction in Lacan’s assertion that the ‘lack’ of reality is reality, asking if this does not, in fact, reveal a foundational problematicity that defines humanity (1995: 136-7). Robinson’s (2004) review of several works drawing on Lacanian theory, including books by Mouffe and Zizek, sums up the problems of this approach to politics very well. He points out that Lacanian theorists work from ontology rather than politics (2004: 261). Instead of articulating contingency, ‘lack’ is instead reified into an essence; a nihilistic, fundamental negativity (2004: 259). This actually tends to exclude politics from theory by essentialising negativity in exactly the same way as the totalising theories they reject (2004: 268).

We will not be able to theorise ‘the political’ adequately without expressing the problematicity that defines it. Despite affirming contingency as essential to reason, poststructuralist theories have little to say about rhetoric. Instead, they speak of politics in terms of the impossibility of reason (Zizek 1999) or as defined by antagonism (Laclau and Mouffe 1985). Why should we speak of politics in such radical terms? When we are faced with contingency we resort to persuasion in order to reach a solution. However, poststructuralists barely speak ofrhetoric in its traditional sense as ‘persuasion’ because the theory derives from the idea that literal discourse is only possible by repressing other meanings. Yet we know that policy, for example, does effectively make pronouncements that function at a literal level, no matter what symbolic meaning might be attributed to it; a bus timetable, for example. Politics deals with contingency, yet it does reach answers despite this. Hence poststructuralism seems only to apply to cases of radical social disjuncture or, on the other hand, to define everything that makes sense as authoritarian. Apart from the fundamental dissatisfaction we feel about a theory that thematises politics in only a negative light, such a theory does not help us conclude anything about policy, which deals with answers as much as questions.

Problem solving is good, it’s the only way to express identity and establish a foundation for knowledge – their theory is reductionist, paradoxically replicates the shortcomings of ontology, and crowds out politics

Turnbull 05 (Nick Turnbull PhD – Lecturer in Politics at the University of Manchester, “Policy in question: from problem solving to problematology”, University of New South Wales, February 2005, https://www.academia.edu/download/66798539/SOURCE02.pdf, MG)

If poststructuralism has a critical value it is because it questions established theory and therefore has at least questioning as a fundamental property (even if it does not affirm this, because it affirms nothing), which indicates that it is possible to answer. Policymaking involves posing questions and settling upon answers. Hence, we cannot understand it without a philosophical framework that accounts for both questioning and answering. Dewey’s practical orientation is something to hold on to because policymaking does seek practical solutions. Political reasoning is not necessarily irrational, even if it can be when people employ irrational discourse to their own political advantage.

Radical postmodernism or poststructuralism is not sufficient for understanding policymaking not just because it is abstract, nonpractical philosophy, but because it actually rejects philosophy. In this sense, it has much in common with positivism even though they are quite different. This is Meyer’s view of these two streams of twentieth century thought, and in their rejection of questioning he identifies a common thread (1994: 44). Science restricts rationality by rejecting philosophy in favour of solving problems empirically; nihilism (poststructuralism) rejects philosophy by saying that we have only questions, while failing to thematise this as positive, therefore rejecting rationality along with it. At the same time, it paradoxically replicates the shortcomings of ontology in rejecting it. Problematology is opposed to both of these. Meyer thematises the nature of philosophy as questioning and therefore contemporary problematicity is the condition for the restoration of philosophy, not its renewed rejection.

I would point out that references to questioning are everywhere in discussions of postmodernity and postmodernism. For example, Smart describes postmodernity as the period in which the values of Western civilisation are ‘justifiably in question’, as that which ‘called into question or subjected to doubt’ modern ideas of progress (1993: 26, 28). He cites Giddens’ description of a generalised problematicity across society, and not just of philosophy, when he noted that ‘we increasingly find ourselves “left with questions where once there appeared to be answers”’ (1993: 35). It is in the very nature of modernity to generate the radically reflexive questioning that now encompasses modernity itself, says Zygmunt Bauman, who describes the postmodern social condition as ‘an incessant flow of reflexivity’ that produces ‘institutionalized pluralism, variety, contingency and ambivalence’ (1992: 149). Not dissimilarly, Lyotard stated that postmodernity is in fact a consequence of the modernist drive to question its own presuppositions (1984: 79). And Beck argues that the pervasive ‘doubt’ that has arisen around the project of modernity could provide the basis for a new ethics, modern identity and social contract (1997: 162). One could find many references to questioning elsewhere. So, although Western thought has always put things into question, what is new is the generalised reflexive questioning of postmodernity and the lack of new answers.

In postmodernity, questioning is not just a social condition but even extends to questioning the foundations of thought itself. Despite the differences between theorists described as postmodernists, they share in common the view that metaphysics is at an end. Along with Lyotard, Baudrillard, Derrida, Foucault, Lacan, Fish, and Rorty have all attacked foundational philosophy. The general view is that the foundation of knowledge has been called into question and no new metaphysics will ever be constructed. One would think philosophers had given up. In the postmodern critique we see the fragmentation of thought from within, of logical difference itself, which becomes marked by a ‘trace’ or a ‘lack’. This confusion is reflected in the uncertainty about the nature of postmodernism itself, which Smart says seems to bemore a series of questions than a definitive concept (1993: 12). Thus Lyotard’s ‘answer’ to the question of the postmodern is ‘that which, in the modern, puts forward the unpresentable in presentation itself’ (1984: 81). Postmodernism, then, is the non-closure of reason, the irrational without which the rational could not exist.

How might we understand postmodernity in a more rational way? If the postmodern condition is a situation of generalised questioning, shouldn’t this draw our attention to questioning itself? Indeed, what is Lyotard’s ‘incredulity toward metanarratives’ (1984: xxiv) if not an affirmation of questioning as a primary stance? Despite this, postmodern thinkers have not considered questioning for itself. In fact, questioning has received very little attention at all in philosophy, which has always questioned in practice even though it has never been its central theme (Meyer 1995: 6). Philosophers in the twentieth century did pay more attention to questioning, for example, to understand meaning (Collingwood 1939, 1962; Gadamer 1979), logic (Hintikka 1999) and politics (Castoriadis 1991). But while these thinkers valued questioning, they did so in only a limited way. This is because philosophy focused on answering, via ontology, and displaced questioning to a cognitive, rhetorical role.

Despite the title of Lyotard’s paper, ‘Answering the question: what is the postmodern?’, he could not answer satisfactorily because he did not recognise the value of questioning in his own critique. Because he could not adequately thematise questioning or answering, postmodern theory became that which paradoxically expresses progress as the impossibility and undesirability of progress. Postmodernity is different from modernity, but it also cannot be different, because difference itself has fragmented. Postmodernism neither is nor isn’t because identity is non-identical with itself; knowledge fragments from within and the cohesion of reason collapses. Under these terms conceptual confusion and a lack of meaning indicate success. But why should we accept this contradiction and mirror the fragmentation of thought (Meyer 1995: 3), now conceived of as positive, all the while denying its positivity because such an affirmation is impossible? Meyer makes the contradiction clear; ‘…how can we put as our guiding principle the negation of all guiding principles?’ (Meyer 1995: 3)

Is problematicity really unpresentable? The confusion over the nature of postmodernity is a natural result of the failure to thematise questioning as constitutive of reason. If we consider postmodernity in terms of questioning, postmodernity is the generalised questioning of modernity and problematology is the only sufficient response to historical problematisation. Postmodernity emerges from modernity as a problematological response to modernity’s questioning of itself, modifying the past without completely dissolving it in the answer.

With a rational account of postmodernity as questioning, poststructuralism and postmodernism are firmly behind us, this time philosophically so, a stop on the path to questioning that has been superseded by it (Meyer 2001a). Problematology explicates questioning and establishes a foundation for knowledge that also permits us to describe contemporary problematicity. Problematology is a new metaphysics to replace ontology. Meyer has created a new logic and terminology that expresses the problematicity of postmodernity, a necessary quality for a successful systematic study of contemporary society (see Bauman 1992: 161). If identity has fragmented, then it has become a question that cannot be conclusively resolved because it expresses several alternative possible answers at the same time, hence it is rhetorical. The decentering of the subject makes of us ‘an irreducible problem, one for which the only answer, far from suppressing the question, reproduces it endlessly’ (Meyer 1995: 303; see also Castoriadis on identity as a ‘puzzle’ 1991: 170-1). In postmodernity, our answer to the question of identity is always problematological, and therefore always in question as much as it provides an answer. With increased questioning comes politics and so political processes operate from, and contribute to, the production of individual and collective identities. Policymaking is also a part of this questioning and produces social identity and difference as much as solving practical problems.

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